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ABSTRACT  
This thesis contributes to the field of sustainable development by investigating complementary 
approaches to measuring the wealth of nations. The research adopts the ‘capitals theory’ of 
sustainability, which defines sustainability in terms of non-declining living standards and provides a 
clear wealth management rule: endowing future generations with the potential to be ‘at least as well 
off as the present’ requires that comprehensive wealth is non-declining over time.  
Focusing on the natural capital component of comprehensive wealth, the thesis explores how 
individual countries might account for resource depletion against the backdrop of rising international 
trade, the presence of transborder externalities, and the development of international environmental 
policies. Recalling of Boulding’s notion of ‘Spaceship Earth’ the thesis investigates the implications of 
accounting for natural capital depletion within national borders (the production-based perspective) 
versus adopting a more global consumption-based perspective that attributes wealth depletions along 
a supply chain to the country of final consumption.  
A 57-sector, 140-region multi-regional input-output model measures natural capital depletions from 
both the production and consumption perspectives, covering oil, coal, natural gas, minerals, ocean 
(fisheries), and forest (timber) natural capital depletions. The next paper expands the analysis to 
produce a new accounting perspective that incorporates carbon emissions as wealth depletions 
according to the damages they cause rather than the location of emissions. The discussion notes that 
each perspective entails policy ‘blind spots’ but that together they provide new insight into the 
measurement of national and global sustainability. The final paper links the thesis directly to global 
sustainability policy by investigating the extent to which measured progress towards the Sustainable 
Development Goals represents a genuinely new direction for the international development 
community.  
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“We have to remember that what we observe is not nature itself,  
but nature exposed to our method of questioning”  
 
Werner Heisenberg 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
21st century progress cannot be measured with 20th century statistics.  We need a fundamental ‘step-
change’ in accounting strategies. This simple observation has sparked global efforts to adjust, 
redefine, augment, complement, and even replace leading macro-economic statistics. A capacity for 
innovation and adaptation in national statistics is necessary. As economies evolve, so too must our 
tools of measurement. But there is now widespread recognition that established systems of national 
accounting and their associated macroeconomic statistics provide only a partial – and potentially 
misleading – view of modern economies (Wealth Economy 2019). Crucial omissions include issues of 
sustainability, human wellbeing, and inequality. In increasingly globalized, service-based economies, 
and against the backdrop of climate change, these blind spots could reduce the efficacy and relevance 
of official statistics. Put simply, the gap between national accounts and the world they seek to 
describe, is growing.  
In Physics and Philosophy, Nobel prize winning physicist Werner Heisenberg notes that there is a 
“subjective element in the description of atomic events, since our measuring device has been 
constructed by the observer” (Heisenberg 1958). This thesis is motivated by a belief that the same is 
true of the description of economic events, because our measuring device – economic accounts – have 
been constructed by the observer. Accounting systems are tools for collecting, organizing, and 
reporting information that is useful for measuring trends and making decisions (Agarwala and Allan 
2014; Coyle 2015; Obst et al. 2016; Agarwala and Brock 2018). The word ‘useful’ is key. Historically, 
the choice over what to include or exclude from the national accounts has been driven by political 
expedience rather than economic theory. Nor are national accounts necessary for economic growth 
(the UK’s industrial revolution pre-dates the System of National Accounts by about half a century). 
Accounts are human constructs, strategically designed to help us measure trends and inform stories 
about the economy. 
For much of the 20th century economic accounts were designed to tell stories of output, employment, 
and comparisons of growth in living standards over time and between countries. As these trends were 
measured, policies were designed specifically to boost the statistics. The growth imperative ushered 
in unprecedented improvements in the human condition (Rosling et al. 2018). But alongside these 
gains came over 1.5 trillion tonnes of CO2 emissions, a global loss of biodiversity, and worldwide strain 
on ecosystems (Rockstrom et al. 2009; Steffen et al. 2015).  
In threatening many of the welfare gains achieved over the past century, mounting environmental 
pressures provide a clear motivation for changing the economic story, moving beyond GDP, and 
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placing sustainability at the centre of the economic model. The development of new economic 
statistics and systems of accounts is an important element of this transition and is the focus of this 
thesis. The unifying question I investigate is ‘how can economic statistics help measure sustainability?’ 
Inspired by Mead (1955), Boulding (1966), Asheim (1986), and Proops et al (1999), I pursue a 
‘cosmopolitan’ view, devoting attention to questions of national versus global sustainability.  
Amid many competing definitions of sustainability, I adopt what may be called the wealth theory of 
sustainability. The theory emerges from the notion that future consumption depends on future 
productive capacity, which in turn depends on current net investment in capital (Hartwick 1977; 
Dasgupta and Heal 1979; Solow 1986; Asheim 2000; Dasgupta 2001). Defining comprehensive, or 
inclusive wealth as the sum of all forms of capital (e.g. human, man-made, and natural) that comprise 
an economy’s productive base, the theory provides a clear wealth management rule: endowing future 
generations with the potential to be ‘at least as well off as the present’ requires that comprehensive 
wealth is non-declining over time. Following initial empirical contributions by Pearce and Atkinson 
(1993a), wealth accounting research seeks to measure the extent to which individual countries adhere 
to the sustainable capital management rule (Pearce and Atkinson 1993a; World Bank 2006, 2011; 
UNU-IHDP and UNEP 2012, 2014; Atkinson et al. 2014; Hamilton and Hepburn 2017; Fenichel et al. 
2018; Lange et al. 2018; Managi and Kumar 2018). 
I investigate accounting methods for the natural capital component of comprehensive wealth. The 
term ‘natural capital’ provides both a powerful metaphor and an organizing intellectual framework 
for viewing nature through the economists’ lens. To some, it is a contemptible premise. Nature is not 
for commoditization. For others, ‘nature as capital’ opens opportunities to bring the tools of 
economics to the challenge of conservation. The chief motivation for thinking in terms of natural 
capital rather than ‘the environment’ is to apply our understanding of capital theory, capital valuation, 
management of net investments, and the utilization of capital services to generate human wellbeing 
(Binner et al. 2017). For this reason, natural capital refers to stocks of environmental assets that 
benefit people by generating flows of welfare-enhancing environmental goods and services. Stocks 
include fish in oceans and rivers, standing timber, mineral and fossil fuel deposits, and a stable climate. 
Some applications take a portfolio approach, noting that ecosystems are natural capital assets that 
contain and combine multiple individual forms of capital (water, standing timber, biodiversity).  
An important debate within the wealth theory of sustainability examines the extent to which the 
various capitals may be substitutable for one another. Early theoretical contributions (Solow 1974a, 
b; Hartwick 1977, 1978) emphasised the importance of the overall value of the comprehensive capital 
stock, but remained agnostic about its specific composition. Loosely, the theory permitted the 
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existence of sustainable development paths along which natural capital was continually depleted 
(including the point of exhaustion), so long as sufficient investments were made in alternative forms 
of capital. This substitution variant of the wealth theory became known as ‘Weak Sustainability’ 
(Neumayer 2014). In contrast, an opposing paradigm argues that natural capital deserves special 
treatment within the wealth theory on the grounds that it provides critical life support functions and 
is therefore limited in its substitutability with other forms of capital. This ‘Strong Sustainability’ 
paradigm itself has two variants, one calling for the overall value of natural capital to be maintained 
(but permitting substitution between types of natural capital), and another which identifies critical 
thresholds of specific natural capital stocks which must be maintained to preserve functioning global 
life support systems.  
Which paradigm best describes reality is a question that (i) may be unanswerable because neither 
paradigm is falsifiable (Neumayer 2014) and (ii) I choose to remain agnostic about. Early contributions 
to the wealth theory largely focussed on non-renewable natural capital, where the flow from the 
depleting stock was an input into production. The sustainability question is therefore only relevant if 
sufficient substitutability is assumed. The important subsequent question is whether such 
substitutability applied to all elements of natural capital. This question remains unresolved. However, 
one simple observation will be made: reconciling weak and strong sustainability will require both 
theoretical and empirical contributions. In focusing on the design of natural capital accounts, this 
thesis may ultimately contribute to the latter.  Moreover, whichever paradigm one adopts, natural 
capital accounts will be necessary to measure net investment for each asset class. The decision to 
focus on natural capital is motivated by its role in the global economy, its current treatment in 
economic statistics, and multiple unique characteristics which combine to make it an interesting topic 
for economic research. Natural capital provides the raw materials of which physical capital is 
comprised, the life support systems which enable humans to deploy all other capitals in the generation 
of welfare, and the operating space in which to do it. That is, natural capital underpins all wealth and 
welfare in the economy. Despite this, it has been poorly reflected in mainstream macroeconomic 
statistics.  
Continuous natural capital depletion is behind myriad looming environmental challenges, from 
climate change and species loss to air pollution, ocean acidification, and desertification. These 
mounting environmental pressures threaten to undermine economic welfare. The need for deliberate 
natural capital management has prompted new interest in natural capital accounting measures from 
the World Bank, United Nations, and by individual national statistical offices. That these standards are 
still in development is a key reason for the present focus on natural capital. Further motivation comes 
from a series of landmark global studies which, using different methods and approaches, converge 
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towards the same conclusion: natural capital is the only component of wealth that is facing sustained, 
global decline (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005; Lange et al. 2018; Managi and Kumar 2018).  
Finally, natural capital exhibits unique and challenging characteristics that make it an exciting area for 
economic research. It exists and is managed under all permutations of property rights regimes, 
variously exhibiting characteristics of pure- and quasi- public and private goods. Crucially for the 
research set out in chapters 2 and 3, it transcends political and economic boundaries, both in terms 
of managing transboundary stocks and addressing externalities. The combination of complex property 
rights and transboundary impacts and dependencies forces economists to incorporate lessons from 
natural science and political economy, and provides an opportunity to re-imagine economic statistics 
for a globalised world. The prevalence of tipping points, non-linearities, and irreversibilities in stock 
dynamics further differentiate natural from other types of capital. Whereas physical infrastructure can 
be destroyed and rebuilt, the extinction of species cannot be undone. An important and poorly 
understood feature of natural capital is its substitutability with other elements of wealth. This too, 
suggests natural capital deserves special attention.  
Focusing on natural capital within the wealth theory enables me to explore conceptual nuances in the 
way we might construct accounts. A core theme of the first two papers explores how arbitrary 
decisions around accounting boundaries, domestic versus global natural capital management, and the 
treatment of international trade might shape the kind of information that accounts can convey.  
Most natural capital and comprehensive wealth accounting initiatives employ a territorial, or 
production-based accounting perspective. That is, they include natural capital stocks that lie within a 
country’s borders and exclude foreign natural capital. This is a choice rather than a scientific or 
economic necessity. In his seminal treatise on trade and welfare, James Meade (1955) noted that “in 
applying the criteria of economic welfare to the problems of international economic policy, it is 
possible to take either a national or a cosmopolitan view” (Meade 1955, p9), where the cosmopolitan 
view referred to the global economy. A chief contribution of this thesis is to consider how natural 
capital accounts might differ if the territorial boundaries were relaxed.  
The need to incorporate international trade arises from two simple observations. First, fossil fuel 
markets are highly globalized: nearly 40% (5,181.03 Mtoe) of the total primary energy supply in 2012 
(13,371 Mtoe) was traded across national borders (International Energy Agengy 2014). Second, the 
shares of both carbon and natural resources embodied within internationally traded goods and 
services are substantial and growing (Davis et al. 2011; Peters et al. 2011; Sato 2013). It is therefore 
increasingly clear that no policy or accounting system is complete without considering the 
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international dimension. Accounting systems that clearly reflect the trade dimension of sustainability 
can enrich policy development and evaluation. 
The focus on natural capital component and the wealth theory of sustainability in no way undermines 
the importance of high quality accounting for social, physical, institutional, and human capitals, which 
are integral to the theory. Nor does this choice negate, refute, or belittle the important contributions 
from competing and complementary theories of sustainability from disciplines such as anthropology, 
sociology, political science, and ecology. Rather, the intention is to demonstrate that economic 
measurements informed by economic theory can usefully add to the stock of knowledge on 
sustainable development. The knowledge gaps I address entail three crucial omissions from 
mainstream economic statistics: the loss of natural capital, the transboundary nature of 
environmental impacts and dependencies, and extent to which global sustainability policy (namely 
the Sustainable Development Goals) represent a genuine departure from business as usual. My chief 
contributions are of an empirical and policy-oriented nature. I propose a natural capital dashboard 
comprised of a suite of accounts, each deliberately designed to elucidate a specific relationship 
between national economies and global environmental-economic impacts. It would include natural 
capital accounts constructed from the production and consumption perspectives, in totals and on a 
per capita basis, as well as the country’s exposure to climate risk. In combination, the dashboard would 
provide a more complete accounting for natural capital impacts and dependencies, and facilitate 
greater scrutiny over the real-world efficacy of sustainability policies.  
Inspired by the wealth theory of sustainability, the accounting perspectives developed in Chapters 2 
and 3 provide new ways of looking at the world, its depletions of natural capital, and the role of 
individual countries in environmental change. Chapters 2 and 3 respond to a knowledge gap 
highlighted by the Sarkozy Commission which noted that a measurement approach “centred on 
national sustainabilities may be relevant for some dimensions of sustainability, but not for others” 
(Stiglitz et al. 2009b, p77). Chapter 2 extends a debate over production versus consumption based 
accounting beyond greenhouse gas emissions to incorporate six additional components of natural 
capital: oil, coal, gas, minerals and rare earth metals, timber, and fishery resources. Chapter 3 places 
greenhouse gas accounting on a stronger footing within the wealth theory of sustainability by 
attributing emissions (that is, wealth depletions) to the countries according to the welfare losses they 
might incur, rather than their domestic emissions. 
My results demonstrate that arbitrary accounting assumptions have substantial implications for the 
types of information that accounts might convey. Focussing on domestic natural capital depletions 
ignores global footprints, resource dependencies, and transboundary externalities. In such accounts, 
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improved domestic natural capital management may mask greater environmental pressures 
elsewhere: an offshoring or leakage effect. Consumption-based accounts can help to highlight these 
international dimensions of natural capital management. The different accounting perspectives 
developed in Chapters 2 and 3 provide completely different maps of the world. Relying on any one of 
these perspectives to the exclusion of others imposes evidence and policy blind spots. The resulting 
suite of accounts enables us to analyse natural capital depletions from multiple angles, leading to a 
more comprehensive understanding of sustainability in an increasingly globalised world. 
The final paper steps outside the wealth theory of sustainability. In doing so it represents a substantial 
conceptual departure from the rest of the thesis. But in terms of its focus and contribution, it is entirely 
in keeping with my overarching question of what economic statistics can tell us about sustainability. 
The wealth theory that informs Chapters 2 and 3 is just one of many potential frameworks in which to 
investigate sustainability. Those chapters explore what new types of accounts might be useful. 
Chapter 4 adopts a different framework for defining and measuring sustainability, and addresses a 
different set of challenges therein. The framework is provided by the 17 Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) adopted by the United Nations in 2015. In combination, they effectively ‘reveal’ the 
global community’s view of what sustainability entails. However, a common critique of sustainability 
metrics and indeed all ‘alternatives to GDP’ is that they either (i) correlate so closely with per capita 
GDP that they add very little new information, or (ii) correlate so poorly with per capita GDP that they 
ignore very important information. A parallel question posed by Thomas Schelling (1992) concerns 
whether poor countries should sacrifice growth to reduce climate change, or whether they should 
develop at all costs and face the environmental consequences later, as richer economies. Chapter 4 
examines data on SDG performance in an attempt to shed light on both of these questions: does SDG 
performance genuinely go ‘beyond GDP’ and, if SDG performance is the globally agreed definition of 
sustainable development, should countries attempt to achieve it by a narrow focus on per capita GDP 
growth or should they pursue broader environmental and social objectives as well? 
The first two papers of this thesis address the domestic and global nature of the natural capital impacts 
of nations. Incorporating international trade in natural resource explicitly, the first paper constructs 
and contrasts natural capital accounts from the production and consumption perspectives. The 
second paper focuses on the treatment of greenhouse gas emissions within wealth accounts, and asks 
where along the global supply chain might we attribute the natural capital depletions generated by 
emissions. Finally, the third paper returns to the broader question of economic measurement for a 
sustainable 21st century. Here, I examine the extent to which the 17 Sustainable Development Goals 
represent a genuine departure from ‘development as normal’. In combination, the research offers 
insights into the difference between national and global sustainability, and how we might measure 
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the sustainability of development. Each paper includes its own introduction and conclusion, and 
comments on the policy relevance of the work. The final section of the thesis reflects on lessons 
learned and potential next steps. 
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2. PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION ACCOUNTS FOR NATURAL CAPITAL 
DEPLETIONS  
 
In the post-war era globalisation has opened markets, facilitated the spread of people, ideas and 
culture, and lifted millions out of poverty. But it has also ushered in an era of unprecedented natural 
resource depletion and environmental change. Many of the development challenges we currently face 
deal with the intersection of these two trends: the benefits of economic activity and the costs of 
environmental degradation. International trade plays an important role in both (Dupuy 2011; Dupuy 
and Agarwala 2014). It separates the location of production from that of consumption and drives a 
wedge between those who demand natural resources, the countries that govern them, and those who 
experience the associated social, economic, and environmental consequences. Measurement systems 
that fail to account for this offshoring effect may provide a distorted picture of national and global 
sustainability.  
The ‘wealth theory’ of sustainability emerges from the notion that future consumption depends on 
future productive capacity, which in turn depends on current net investment in capital (Weitzman 
1976; Dasgupta and Heal 1979; Dasgupta 2001; Arrow et al. 2012). Defining comprehensive, or 
inclusive wealth as the sum of all forms of capital (e.g. human, man-made, and natural) that comprise 
an economy’s productive base, the theory provides a clear wealth management rule: endowing future 
generations with the potential to be ‘at least as well off as the present’ requires that comprehensive 
wealth is non-declining over time. Following initial empirical contributions by Pearce and Atkinson 
(1993a), wealth accounting research seeks to measure the extent to which individual countries adhere 
to the sustainable capital management rule (Atkinson et al. 2014; Hamilton and Hepburn 2017). 
Most wealth accounting efforts employ territorial accounts that describe trends in natural capital 
stocks within a country’s national borders and are therefore relevant for calculating domestic per 
capita natural capital depletions. Trade enters solely through the effect of net exports on national 
savings. We argue that because international trade is a large and growing share of the global economy, 
rising from just 24% of gross world product in 1961 to 64% in 2011 (World Bank 2018), there is 
justification for re-examining the extent to which territorial natural capital accounts are fit for purpose 
when measuring national and global sustainability in an increasingly globalised world. Indeed, the 
influential Sarkozy Commission noted that a measurement approach “centred on national 
sustainabilities may be relevant for some dimensions of sustainability, but not for others” (Stiglitz et 
al. 2009b, p77).  
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Entering into force in 2016, the Sustainable Development Goals address multiple development 
challenges, ranging from ending poverty and hunger to addressing climate change and developing 
institutions and partnerships. A key strength is that they explicitly recognise the role that globalisation 
plays in driving and addressing social, economic, and environmental challenges of sustainable 
development. Several of the goals and indicators deal directly with natural resource flows and material 
footprints. This paper focuses on developing the evidence base for measuring progress towards SDG 
12, to “ensure sustainable production and consumption patterns” (Sachs et al. 2019). The goal rightly 
recognises the diverging natural capital footprints of resources used in production versus consumption 
activities, and marks the need for accounting mechanisms that can measure not just the domestic, but 
also the global nature of sustainability.  
We propose the development of two simultaneous and complementary natural capital accounts, one 
from the traditional production, or territorial based perspective, and another from the consumption-
based perspective. Production-based accounts record resource depletions that take place within a 
country’s borders over the course of a year, regardless of where those resources are ultimately 
consumed. Consumption based accounts record resource depletions embodied within a country’s 
final demand, regardless of where in the world those depletions actually took place. Examining both 
sets of accounts simultaneously provides a more complete understanding of an economy’s 
contributions towards both national and global sustainability, provide insight into dependencies on 
domestic versus global resource stocks, are crucial to understanding resource security concerns, and 
may identify opportunities for joined-up bilateral and international resource policy. To show that both 
accounts convey different information about the natural capital depletion of nations, we develop a 
57-sector, 140-region multi-regional input-output model and examine natural capital depletions 
covering six natural resources: oil, coal, natural gas, minerals, fisheries, and timber.  
The chief contribution of this chapter is to extend the discussion of production and consumption 
accounting that exists around greenhouse gases (Davis et al. 2011; Steininger et al. 2016; Afionis et al. 
2017) to incorporate other elements of natural capital. This provides countries with a more complete 
understanding of their natural capital impacts and dependencies, and helps reduce ‘policy blind spots’. 
By measuring both domestic and international trends in emissions, countries can assess leakage 
effects and potentially identify opportunities to improve natural capital management via treaties, 
trade deals, and technology transfers with key trade partners. The breadth of resources considered 
here is an important extension: oil, coal, gas, minerals, fisheries, and timber have all been the focus of 
resource security concerns in rich and developing countries. 
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2.1. The wealth theory of sustainability  
 
In an early effort to embed sustainability within official statistics, Nordhaus and Tobin (1972) made 
three core adjustments to gross national product. They distinguished between intermediate and final 
output, shifted the focus from production to consumption, and developed a preliminary measure of 
‘net investment’. The focus on consumption rather than output was thought to place greater emphasis 
on welfare – indeed the authors claim that “the goal of economic activity, after all, is consumption” 
(1972, p4). Perhaps the more important contribution was the idea that measures of sustainable 
economic welfare must make adjustments for the depletion of capital (net investment). That nature 
provides a suite of capital assets that are necessary for economic production has a long history in 
economics. Indeed Irving Fisher included mining land, fisheries, timber land, and mineral materials as 
components of wealth as early as 1906 (Fisher 1906). What Nordhaus and Tobin (1972) argued was 
that any measure of sustainability would need to directly account for changes in capital.  
The establishment of the Sustainable Development Goals is a clear acknowledgement that economic 
progress is not adequately measured by standard official statistics such as gross domestic product 
(GDP). Leading economists have supported calls to move ‘beyond GDP’ for at least half a century 
(Coyle 2015). Arguments for doing so can largely be grouped into three broad categories. First, 
established macroeconomic statistics fail to adequately reflect changes in human wellbeing and in the 
worst instances can lead decision-makers to pursue welfare reducing policies (see the various works 
of Amartya Sen, capably reviewed in Hamilton (2019), but also Easterlin (1974; 2010) and Layard 
(2011). Second, by focusing on income flows rather than capital stocks, official statistics such as GDP 
omit considerations of sustainability, providing a potentially misleading view of the long-run viability 
of an economy. Third, although the standards and guidelines governing the calculation of official 
statistics are constantly under review, they have failed to keep pace with the changing nature and 
structure of economic activity. There is growing concern that international trade and transboundary 
externalities are (i) increasingly important factors in the global economy and (ii) poorly reflected in 
official statistics. This paper focuses on the intersection of the latter two issues: sustainability and 
international trade.  
Amid multiple competing definitions and interpretations of what ‘sustainability’ may mean, the 
Brundtland Commission’s view that development is sustainable if it “meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generation to meet their own needs” (Brundtland et al. 
1987, p41) stands out. It can be adopted and adapted by countries in all stages of development, is 
applicable across multiple academic disciplines, and can be linked to clear policy objectives. Solow 
(1994) simplifies the definition, noting that “a sustainable path for the national economy is one that 
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allows every future generation the option of being as well off as its predecessors” (emphasis added, 
Solow (1994, p25). This interpretation links the spirit of Brundtland to the theory of economics and 
the practice of sustainability measurement. An established theoretical result in resource economics is 
that because future welfare depends on future productive capacity, sustainability requires that an 
economy’s broadly defined productive capacity is non-declining over time (Dasgupta 2001; Atkinson 
et al. 2014). Here, productive capacity includes all forms of capital – produced, human, natural, social, 
and intangible – that can be used to generate human welfare. Let us call this inclusive wealth.  
Solow (1974a) showed that if the elasticity of substitution between exhaustible natural resources and 
alternative forms of capital was greater than unity, constant consumption could be maintained even 
if production entailed the use of finite non-renewables. Hartwick (1977) showed that this implies a 
strict savings rule: the competitive rents from non-renewable resources must be reinvested in 
alternative forms of capital. Several extensions quickly followed. Hartwick (1978) extended the 
analysis to include both renewable and non-renewable resources, Dixit et al (1980) generalize the 
result, and Dasgupta and Heal (1979) and show that the Hartwick Rule requires an elasticity of 
substitution between natural and man-made capital of at least 1. Solow (1986) offers a Hartwick-
inspired ‘rule of thumb’, namely that the sustainable consumption level would be just equal to the 
annual interest generated by an economy’s inclusive wealth. 
Combined, these contributions form the basis of the wealth theory of sustainability. Its principle 
tenets are (i) that multiple forms of capital make up the productive base, or inclusive wealth of an 
economy and (ii) sustainability requires that the value of this broadly defined inclusive wealth is non-
declining over time. Given (iii) that substitution is possible between types of capital, the use of non-
renewable natural capital is still possible along a sustainable development path, so long as (iv) a 
Hartwick Rule is followed. Noting that (v) it is the net change in wealth over time rather than its level 
that determines whether a path is sustainable, Pearce and Atkinson (1993a) developed a simple 
savings rule to assess the extent to which national economies were maintaining inclusive wealth, and 
were the first to present empirical estimates for a range of countries. Hamilton and Clemens (1999) 
formalised the savings rule for an optimal economy, Dasgupta and Maler (2000) extended to the non-
optimal economy, and the World Bank developed wealth accounts and calculated Genuine Savings 
dating back to 1970 (Lange et al. 2018).  
2.2. The wealth theory of sustainability and international trade 
 
The development of wealth accounts and the genuine savings measure as an indicator of weak 
sustainability represents a significant advancement in the economics of sustainability. However, in 
20 
 
focusing on illustrating the links between natural resources, wealth, savings and depletions, the 
various contributions outlined above made a series of theoretical simplifications: closed economies, 
constant population, and stationary technology. The closed economy assumption is increasingly 
irksome given the growth of international trade in natural resources (Dupuy and Agarwala 2014). 
Trade drives a wedge between domestic and international resource depletions, and the presence of 
transboundary externalities (and therefore imperfect markets for natural capital resources) means 
that merely relying on import prices in adjusted savings metrics would systematically bias any 
individual country’s measured progress towards national versus global sustainability (Oleson 2011; 
Atkinson et al. 2012; Wiedmann et al. 2015; Steininger et al. 2016). Of course, if natural capital 
resources embodied in international trade were priced at their theoretical shadow price, this would 
not be an issue because genuine savings measures account for net exports. But when natural capital 
is traded below its shadow price, this adjustment fails. If natural resources are exchanged on 
international markets at prices that deviate from their optimum shadow price, then international 
trade implicitly entails transfers of ‘virtual sustainability’ between resource exporters and importers. 
The more natural capital is traded internationally, the more important this distortion becomes. UNEP 
(2015) show that in physical terms, resource extraction increased by a factor of 1.8 from 1980 to 2011, 
but that resource trade increased by a factor of 2.5, meaning the divergence between domestic and 
global resource use is accelerating. 
In his seminal treatise on trade and welfare, James Meade (1955) noted that “in applying the criteria 
of economic welfare to the problems of international economic policy, it is possible to take either a 
national or a cosmopolitan view” (1955, p9), where the cosmopolitan view referred to the global 
economy. The intuition behind this dichotomy was applied more directly to environmental issues in 
Boulding’s (1966) essay, “The economics of the coming spaceship Earth”. Boulding caricatured two 
economies. The ‘cowboy economy’ was open, “symbolic of the illimitable plains and also associated 
with reckless, exploitative, romantic and violent behaviour, which is characteristic of open societies,” 
whereas the ‘spaceman economy’ imagines Earth as “a single spaceship, without unlimited reservoirs 
of anything, either for extraction or for pollution, and in which, therefore, man must find his place in 
a cyclical ecological system…” (Boulding 1966, p4). One interpretation of Boulding’s message is that in 
a world of abundance, individual economies can behave like cowboys. But as population and affluence 
grows, that illimitable and relatively open system will approach planetary boundaries and Earth must 
instead adopt the spaceman economy. It is important that in Boulding’s spaceman economy the 
primary measure of success is the extent, quality, and maintenance of the capital stock.  
Boulding’s intuition that the capital stock (ie inclusive wealth) is the object of interest was clearly 
supported by the earliest papers on wealth theory of sustainability. But the question of international 
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trade, open and closed economies, and cowboys and spacemen took longer. It wasn’t until 20 years 
after Boulding’s essay, and nearly 10 years after the first appearance of the Hartwick Rule, that the 
savings rule was extended to the open economy setting. A crucial result was that the strict Hartwick 
Rule described in the previous section need not hold in the open economy setting. Asheim (1986) 
showed that in a general equilibrium setting an open economy could violate the Hartwick Rule if (i) it 
is a net exporter and (ii) the resource rent is rising over time in line with the Hotelling Rule (Asheim 
1986). He notes that “in a world economy adhering to a maximin criterion, it is the resource-
consuming economies’ – not the resource-producing economies’ – responsibility to transform a 
declining resource base into reproducible capital” (Asheim 1986, p400). Asheim stops short of saying 
exporters could be cowboys while importers must be spacemen, but the importance of international 
trade for the wealth theory of sustainability had been demonstrated. More recently Arrow et al (2012) 
show that in the presence of transboundary negative externalities such as climate change, the 
appropriate reduction in genuine savings includes the domestic damages generated by global 
emissions rather than the emissions generated domestically. 
These are not merely theoretical nuance. They have direct implications for sustainability 
measurement in an increasingly globalised world and concerns over global (rather than national) 
natural capital depletions feature prominently in policy debates. The need to incorporate international 
trade arises from two simple observations. First, fossil fuel markets are highly globalized: nearly 40% 
(5,181.03 Mtoe) of the total primary energy supply in 2012 (13,371 Mtoe) was traded across national 
borders (International Energy Agengy 2014). Second, the shares of both carbon and natural resources 
embodied within internationally traded goods and services are substantial and growing (WTO 2010; 
Fischer 2011; Peters et al. 2011; Sato 2013; Wiedmann and Lenzen 2018). It is therefore increasingly 
clear that no policy or accounting system is complete without considering the international dimension. 
Accounting systems that clearly reflect the trade dimension of sustainability can enrich policy 
development and evaluation. For instance, Atkinson et al (Atkinson et al. 2011) explore how border 
taxes might be designed to ‘level the playing field’ in the face of unequal emissions caps. Peters et al 
(2008; 2011) showed that from 1990-2008, increased virtual carbon imports by developed countries 
exceeded their combined emissions reductions under the Kyoto Protocol (carbon leakage).  
2.3. Production and consumption accounting 
 
We develop a 57 sector, 129 region input output (IO) model to explore how two distinct accounting 
perspectives – production (aka territorial) and consumption – might inform climate and resource 
policy discussions within the context of international trade (Leontief 1936; Miller and Blair 2009). The 
notions of production and consumption accounting may be familiar from a rapidly growing literature 
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on carbon accounting (Atkinson et al. 2011; Peters et al. 2011, 2012; Sato 2013; Raupach et al. 2014; 
Afionis et al. 2017; Lenzen et al. 2018). We contribute to this literature by expanding the analysis to 
incorporate additional elements of natural capital depletion. By including a broader set of natural 
capital assets (fossil fuels, fisheries, forestry and mineral extraction) our analysis permits a broader 
understanding of ‘sustainability accounting’. 
The MRIO enables us to construct natural capital accounts from both the production and 
consumption-based perspectives. This is a useful exercise for several reasons. First, mainstream 
economic statistics conceptualise economies as isolated national entities connected to the ‘rest of the 
world’ only through net exports. But this simplistic view of the role of international trade in modern 
economies conceals important relationships and trends in resource dependence and environmental 
impacts. This is important for policy because countries may be able to exert influence on resource 
management beyond their borders through trade relationships, treaties, and international policies 
such as the Paris Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals. Second, the wealth theory of 
sustainability demonstrates that non-declining wealth over time is a prerequisite for sustainability. 
But international trade in natural resources drives a wedge between resource production and 
consumption. Does trade offer countries the opportunity to ‘import (virtual) sustainability’? This is 
directly related to a third motivation, namely that the combination of production and consumption 
accounts provides a more detailed evidence base for informing the political economy of international 
resource dependence. Combined, these accounts might shed light on new opportunities to develop 
international resource policy.  
An increasingly influential carbon accounting literature stresses the importance of developing both 
production and consumption based accounts for greenhouse gas emissions (Steininger et al. 2016; 
Afionis et al. 2017). An important debate within this literature compares the ethical, policy and 
economic implications of accounting for the emissions generated within a country’s borders (the 
territorial, or production perspective), versus adopting a consumption perspective that considers the 
(virtual carbon) emissions implicitly embodied within a country’s final demand (Peters and Hertwich 
2008). 
Atkinson et al. (2012) extend the analysis beyond GHGs alone to consider a broader set of 
environmental resources, thus linking the production versus consumption debate to comprehensive 
wealth accounting. Examining a suite of natural capital assets embodied in international trade reveals 
important insights for understanding broader trends in resource use. In particular, Atkinson et al. 
(2012) show that for many countries there is a substantial difference between the value of natural 
capital depletions used to produce total output (the territorial perspective) and that necessary to 
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satisfy its final demand (the consumption perspective). They find that for low and middle income 
countries, territorial natural resource depletions exceed consumption based depletions, but that for 
high income countries the relationship is reversed: the value of consumption based depletions 
exceeds that of territorial depletions by approximately double.  
Building on Atkinson et al (2012) we place the production and consumption accounting debate within 
the context of SDG 12. Results indicate that adopting the territorial versus consumption-based 
perspective leads to statistically significant impacts on carbon, natural capital and comprehensive 
wealth accounts. The accounts we develop enable an applied and empirical discussion of wealth 
accounting in a globalised world, and are necessary for measuring progress towards SDG 12. 
An important caveat is that, consumption accounting, either of carbon or more broadly defined 
natural capital, introduces its own set of challenges and shortcomings. Data for generating territorial 
inventories require inputs from fewer statistical organizations, fewer manipulations and less 
aggregation than for consumption-based inventories (which require MRIO analyses) (Peters and 
Hertwich 2008). Furthermore, whereas territorial accounts represent one extreme in which 
consumers hold no responsibility for emissions and natural capital depletions, consumption accounts 
represent another extreme in which producers hold no responsibility. It is not clear that one is better 
than the other: producers and consumers both share the gains from trade. Thus, a reasonable 
compromise might be to develop a method of sharing responsibility for emissions and depletions 
between producers and consumers (Lenzen et al. 2007; Raupach et al. 2014; Afionis et al. 2017). This 
warrants further study, as the shared responsibility mechanisms developed for carbon emissions focus 
on combining trends in historical emissions with equity goals for per capita emissions (Raupach et al. 
2014) and may not be readily applicable to other elements of natural capital. For sustainability 
accountants, the interest in broader natural capital might suggest that responsibility for emissions and 
depletions could be allocated in proportion to value added, as in Lenzen et al. (2007). 
Further challenges and caveats relate to issues of national sovereignty and the responsibility for 
foreign natural resource management. Why should importers concern themselves with the internal 
affairs of exporters? One argument for focusing on domestic production accounts is that this is the 
only area over which governments have the legitimacy to govern: countries should not infringe upon 
the sovereignty of others by attempting to exert influence beyond their borders. Whilst it is certainly 
true that the international political economy of resource use can be contentious, a narrow inward-
looking evidence base predicated on territorial accounts limits the information available to policy 
makers. Moroever, the scale of diplomatic representations around the world – the Global Diplomacy 
Index covers just 61 countries with a combined 7,320 international diplomatic posts – suggests that 
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countries do exert influence beyond their borders (Lowy Institute 2019). However, even if we ignored 
this and pretended countries were only concerned with domestic governance, it would still be of 
interest to understand issues of leakage and resource security. More importantly, in the presence of 
transboundary externalities, national sovereignty is already violated. This is particularly important in 
the management of natural resources, for instance international fisheries, transboundary rivers, air 
pollution, and climate change. An important literature in economics explores how agents might 
collaborate and coordinate to govern the global commons. The accounts developed here help to 
ensure that these processes can incorporate the most comprehensive evidence base possible. Finally, 
there is some precedent for considering negative externalities of imports on moral grounds. The 
avoidance of child, sweatshop, and slave labour; prohibitions on blood diamonds; and certifications 
of fair trade products all demonstrate a desire understand the provenance of internationally traded 
goods and services. 
A more problematic challenge is that the data described below does not adjust for sustainably versus 
unsustainably managed resources. Harvesting timber from a sustainably managed plantation is clearly 
different from illegal logging of irreplaceable primary rainforest. Similarly, virtual carbon imported 
from industries regulated by the EU ETS do not represent increased emissions in the same way that 
unregulated virtual emissions would. Ideally, a distinction would be made between sustainably 
managed resource consumption and unsustainable natural capital depletion. With sufficient data, 
future IO models could incorporate a ‘sustainability matrix’ to adjust for resource management 
practices. That the data do not allow this distinction to be made is an important caveat, but it is hoped 
that the results may still be useful in providing a broad overview of the resource depletions of nations. 
However, in aggregate the renewable resources considered here (fisheries and forestry) are in global 
decline. 
The argument here is not that one perspective should be used in lieu of the other, but rather that each 
offers useful insight into how progress towards sustainability might be measured and should be 
considered when developing, implementing and evaluating policy. At a fundamental level, accounts 
are simply tools for measuring change over time. The story they tell depends on how they are 
designed. 
2.4. Data and Methods 
 
Data for this analysis come from the Global Trade Analysis Project’s (GTAP) version 9 database, which 
covers 57 sectors across 140 countries and regions  for the year 2011 (Narayanan et al. 2015). Although 
it was developed to support computable general equilibrium modelling, GTAP’s global IO database 
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has been used in numerous carbon accounting studies (Proops et al. 1999; Davis and Caldeira 2010; 
Davis et al. 2011; Atkinson et al. 2011, 2012). Two chief advantages of GTAP are that it is already 
balanced (for analysis at different scales of analysis) and that sectoral disaggregation is harmonized 
across regions. Data on natural capital depletion values (resource rents) for oil, gas, coal, fisheries, 
forestry, and mining for 2011 are from GTAPv9. GTAPv9 provides data on energy volumes and GHG 
emissions by sector and region. This includes the volume of firm and household energy purchases, as 
well as the bilateral trade in energy products. Emissions data contained within GTAPv9 covers 28,818 
million tonnes of CO2e emissions from fuel combustion and major non-CO2 GHGs (CH4, N20, CF4, HFCs 
and SF6) for the year 2011. Due to the data and labour intensity of updating non-CO2 GHGs, these data 
in GTAPv9 are based on detailed raw input data for 2001 (Rose et al. 2010) to which an emissions 
growth function is applied as in Ahmed et al. (2014). The MRIO model is described in Appendix 1. 
The decision to include non-fossil fuel GHGs imposes a trade-off: accounts that incorporate a wider 
range of emissions provide a more complete picture of national and global sustainability, but results 
will not be comparable to EB accounts constructed elsewhere (Davis et al. 2011; Steininger et al. 2016), 
as those studies only consider fossil fuel GHGs. 
The carbon price used in sustainability accounting should reflect the full social cost of carbon, defined 
as the discounted value of all future (net) damages arising from emitting a unit carbon today. However, 
despite considerable debate of what the SCC might be (Stern et al. 2006; Tol 2008; van den Bergh and 
Botzen 2014; Nordhaus 2017; Ricke et al. 2018) a globally agreed value for carbon emissions remains 
elusive. Nordhaus (2017) uses DICE to calculated a SCC of $31/tCO2. Averaging results from multiple 
IAMs, the US Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases produced SCC values 
ranging from $11/tCO2 to $105/tCO2, with variation due to different discount rates and treatment of 
low-probability, high-impact events (IAWG 2016). A survey of expert economists and climate scientists 
resulted in mean estimates between $150-$200/tCO2 (Pindyck 2016), and a recent study of SCC 
estimates based on BHM records a global median SCC of $417/tCO2 (Ricke et al. 2018). 
The variation in SCC estimates is especially problematic for sustainability measurement as accounts 
could easily be dominated by carbon, thereby giving less weight to other elements of natural capital 
(Agarwala et al. 2014a). Our primary interest is in the attribution of emissions and the distribution of 
their damages. As such, we present results as country-level attribution coefficients for PB, CB, and DB 
accounting perspectives, interpreted as the share of global emissions attributed to each country under 
each accounting perspective. Country-level attributions in monetary terms for each accounting 
perspective may be calculated as follows. Multiply the quantity of global emissions by a chosen carbon 
price to obtain the global monetary carbon liability. Multiply this global liability by the country 
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attribution coefficient corresponding to the desired accounting perspective. In addition to country-
level attribution coefficients, we report monetary values calculated in this manner, using SCC 
estimates of $31/tCO2, $150/tCO2, and $417/tCO2 for comparability. 
Two important caveats deserve consideration before the results are discussed in detail. First, the data 
considered here does not adjust for the re-growth of renewable resources, so they are implicitly 
treated as non-renewables in their interpretation. Strict adherence to the wealth theory would require 
that analysis takes place in ‘net’ terms, which would incorporate new discoveries of non-renewables 
and the natural (net) regeneration of fish and forest stocks. The inability to make these adjustments 
here is an important caveat. However, widespread overfishing could turn previously renewable stocks 
into non-renewables if fisheries are unable to recover. There is some evidence for this. The World 
Bank’s authoritative report on the state of the world’s fisheries found that “the proportion of fisheries 
that are fully fished, overfished, depleted, or recovering from overfishing increase from just over 60 
percent in the mid-1970s to about 75 percent in 2005 and to almost 90 percent in 2013” (World Bank 
2017, p. 1).   
The more important caveat is that the wealth theory requires changes in net wealth to be valued at 
the appropriate shadow price, which would fully reflect the marginal contribution to intertemporal 
welfare created by a change in the quantity of the stock. In practice, these theoretical shadow prices 
are impossible to observe and the standard approach in the literature is to compute resource rents as 
a crude approximation. This is a fundamental and as yet unresolved challenge in the wealth accounting 
literature and the results discussed below are open to criticism on this front.  
Natural capital resource depletions contained in the GTAPv9 database for the year 2011 summed to 
just over one trillion US dollars, excluding greenhouse gas emissions. Of this, fossil fuels (USD 837.3 
billion) comprised the largest share, with $639 billion from oil and with coal and gas relatively equal 
at $99.2 billion and $98.9 billion, respectively. Mining and mineral rents totalled $68.9 billion. 
Renewable natural capital in our analysis consists of fisheries rents ($74.2 billion) and forestry 
production ($19.8 billion).  
Table 1 summarizes descriptive statistics of resource depletions calculated from both the production 
and consumption perspectives for oil, coal, gas, mineral, forestry and fishery resources. Rows 1-2 
describe national level data valued in millions of 2011 USD. Rows 3-4 describe per capita production 
and consumption based resource depletions. Per capita production based resource depletions 
(ranging from $1.81 in Nepal to $9,383.78 in Qatar) exhibit greater variation than their consumption 
based counterparts (ranging from $6.76 in Malawi to $1,187 in Luxembourg). This is due to the 
distribution of natural resources: a small number of countries have disproportionate natural capital 
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endowments (e.g. major oil producing countries). Per capita differences (production minus 
consumption) depletions are described in the final row, ranging from -$1,151.87 in Luxembourg to 
$8,851.29 in Qatar. If production minus consumption depletions are greater (less) than 0, then the 
country is a net exporter (importer). 
Table 1 Summary of Resource Depletions (total and per capita) 
    Mean  St.Dev  min  max  skewness 
Production* 
  
7284.80 18143.57 2.24 112455.84 4.10 
Consumption* 
  
7230.72 20947.78 19.56 163429.73 6.08 
Production** 
(per capita) 
 
436.90 1382.53 1.81 9383.78 4.80 
Consumption** 
(per capita) 
 
229.97 247.95 6.76 1187.57 1.50 
Prod – Cons** 
(per capita) 
206.93 1281.88 -1151.97 8851.29 4.85 
* values in millions of 2011 USD 
** values in 2011 USD 
Sample is 138 countries and regions. Taiwan and ‘Rest of the world’ (Antarctica, Bouvet Island, British Indian 
Ocean Territory, and French Southern Territories) are omitted due to lack of data. 
 
Figure 1a-c depicts the combined value of per capita depletions across all oil, coal, gas, mineral, 
forestry and fishery resources. Figure 1a-b depict per capita production and consumption based 
depletions. Fig 1c illustrates the difference between per capita production and consumption 
depletions (specifically, production minus consumption)1. There are several striking features of these 
maps. First, Fig 1a-b convey different stories about the impact of national economies on global natural 
capital. The highest per capita production based depleting countries consist mainly of major oil 
producing nations such as Qatar ($9,384), Kuwait ($8,676), Brunei Darussalam ($6,405) and Norway 
($5,866). Australia ($1,222), Canada ($938) and Russia ($707) also fall in the top 20. Countries with 
the highest consumption-based depletions per capita include Luxembourg (£1,188), Iceland ($1068), 
and Kuwait ($889). The difference map (Fig 1c) can be interpreted as the magnitude of ‘policy blind 
spot’ (Steininger et al. 2016) that would arise if policies were informed by only one of the production 
or consumption accounts. Negative (positive) values indicate per capita resource importers 
(exporters).  
 
 
 
1  All values are in 2011 US dollars. Chloropleth class breaks (colour categories) correspond to a boxplot 
distribution The values for the six colour classifications are defined as follows (min, p25 – 1.5* iqr), (p25 - 1.5*iqr, 
p25], (p25, p50], (p50, p75], (p75, p75 + 1.5*iqr] and (p75 + 1.5*iqr, max], where iqr = interquartile range. 
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Figure 1 Production and Consumption Accounts for Natural Resource Depletions 
 
 
 
Figure 1a-b show per capita production and consumption based resource depletions. Fig 1c shows the difference 
(production minus consumption) in per capita resource depletions. Resources include forestry, fisheries, coal, 
oil, natural gas, and other mining (metal ores, uranium, gems). Values in 2011 USD. Greenhouse gas emissions 
are not included. 
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Examining national aggregates rather than per capita values, Figure 2 lists the 20 economies with the 
greatest divergence between the value of production and consumption based natural resource 
depletions. As in Fig 1, negative (positive) values represent net importers (exporters) of natural capital. 
It is noteworthy that both developed and developing countries appear as top resource importers and 
exporters. This suggests that the production versus consumption accounting gap for natural resources 
is important for countries at all stages of development. Unsurprisingly, major oil producing countries 
dominate the list of net exporters.  
Figure 2 Natural resource depletions: the production versus consumption ‘accounting gap’ 
 
Figure 2 shows the 20 economies with the greatest difference between production- versus consumption-based 
resource depletions. Negative values indicate that consumption based depletions are greater than production 
based depletions. Resources include forestry, fisheries, coal, oil, natural gas, and other mining (metal ores, 
uranium, gems). Values in billions of 2011 USD. Rest of North Africa includes Algeria, Libya, and Western Sahara. 
Rest of Western Asia includes Iraq, Lebanon, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, and Yemen. 
Table 2 details national and per capita resource depletions for the 20 largest economies in 2011. 
Columns 3 and 5 show the value of resource rents calculated from the production and consumption 
perspectives, respectively. Showing these as a percentage of GDP, Columns 4 and 6 can be interpreted 
as the resource intensity of GDP. Column 7 shows the ratio of production to consumption depletions. 
Depletion ratios greater (less) than one indicate net resource exporters (importers). Columns 8 – 11 
describe per capita resource depletion. Columns 8 and 10 reflect per capita depletions from the 
production and consumption perspectives, while columns 9 and 11 compare these to the average 
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Production minus consumption based resource depletions, billions of 2011 USD. 
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global citizen. Values greater than one indicate that per capita depletions are greater than the global 
average, while values less than one indicate the reverse. 
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Table 2. Production and consumption accounting for natural resource depletions 
 
GDP 
Resource Depletions (millions of USD) Per capita depletions & comparison 
to global average (GA) 
Production  Consumption Ratio  Production Consumption 
Value % GDP Value % GDP PBP/CBP Per capita P/GA Per capita C/GA 
United States 15,517,926 80,863 0.52 163,430 1.05 0.49 259.46 1.80 524.38 3.64 
China 7,572,554 112,456 1.49 159,277 2.10 0.71 83.66 0.58 118.50 0.82 
Japan 6,157,460 5,091 0.08 61,921 1.01 0.08 39.83 0.28 484.39 3.36 
Germany 3,757,698 6,656 0.18 35,908 0.96 0.19 82.92 0.57 447.31 3.10 
France 2,862,680 2,846 0.10 25,446 0.89 0.11 43.55 0.30 389.42 2.70 
United Kingdom 2,619,700 13,364 0.51 26,279 1.00 0.51 211.26 1.46 415.42 2.88 
Brazil 2,616,202 19,250 0.74 21,847 0.84 0.88 96.89 0.67 109.96 0.76 
Italy 2,276,292 2,899 0.13 22,368 0.98 0.13 48.83 0.34 376.69 2.61 
Russian Federation 2,051,662 101,086 4.93 39,746 1.94 2.54 707.09 4.90 278.02 1.93 
India 1,823,050 16,742 0.92 50,037 2.74 0.33 13.42 0.09 40.12 0.28 
Canada 1,788,648 32,228 1.80 18,706 1.05 1.72 938.42 6.51 544.69 3.78 
Spain 1,488,067 2,002 0.13 16,702 1.12 0.12 42.83 0.30 357.33 2.48 
Australia 1,390,557 27,292 1.96 15,088 1.09 1.81 1,221.69 8.47 675.39 4.68 
Korea, Republic Of 1,202,464 1,662 0.14 22,171 1.84 0.07 33.29 0.23 443.99 3.08 
Mexico 1,171,188 8,441 0.72 12,707 1.08 0.66 70.88 0.49 106.70 0.74 
Netherlands 893,757 3,991 0.45 6,234 0.70 0.64 239.07 1.66 373.44 2.59 
Indonesia 892,969 29,584 3.31 21,790 2.44 1.36 120.40 0.83 88.68 0.61 
Turkey 832,546 2,525 0.30 13,084 1.57 0.19 34.40 0.24 178.23 1.24 
Switzerland 699,580 330 0.05 4,128 0.59 0.08 41.69 0.29 521.72 3.62 
Saudi Arabia 671,239 101,097 15.06 16,139 2.40 6.26 3,580.16 24.83 571.55 3.96 
World 72,642,218 1,006,192 1.37 1,006,192 1.37 1.00 144.67 1.00 144.67 1.00 
Table 2 shows total and per capita resource depletions calculated via production and consumption approaches. 20 countries with the highest 2011 GDP are shown, alongside 
the whole world. Per capita depletion values are in 2011 US$, total depletion values are in millions of 2011 US$. Natural resources covered include forestry, fisheries, coal, 
oil, natural gas, and other mining (metal ores, uranium, gems, etc). 
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Gross world product in 2011 was $72.6 trillion USD, with a resource intensity of 1.37%. Dividing the 
value of resource depletions by global population gives per capita resource depletions for the global 
average citizen of $144.67 USD. The global per capita mean is equal for both production and 
consumption-based depletions, but the distribution around the mean is not. Per capita production 
based depletions have a standard deviation 1382.53, compared to 247.95 from the consumption 
perspective. This is largely driven by the unequal distribution of fossil fuel resources relative to the 
global population. The ratio of per capita production based depletions to the global average is highest 
in oil rich nations such as Qatar and Kuwait (65 and 60 times the global average) and lowest in Nepal 
(0.01 times the global average).  
There are 39 countries for whom per capita consumption based depletions are more than twice the 
global average. The ratio is highest for Luxembourg and Kuwait (8.23 and 6.16 times the global 
average, respectively). It is possible that population statistics obscure these results. Both Luxembourg 
and Kuwait have small official domestic populations as commuters and migrant workers are not 
included in population data. For instance, while Luxembourg’s consumption-based depletions per 
capita are 8.23 times the global average, the consumption based resource intensity of GDP is 1.03% 
(ranked 122nd of 140). Similarly, Kuwait’s consumption-based depletions are 1.84% of GDP, similar to 
that of South Korea. 
The G7 countries had a combined GDP of $40.8 trillion with production (consumption) based resource 
intensity of 0.54% (1.21%). Their combined per capita production based depletions were 76% of the 
global average while from the consumption based perspective they are 273% of the global average. 
The full table of results is available in Appendix 4. 
Figure 3 provides a breakdown of per capita production and consumption-based depletions for each 
element of natural capital. Correlations between production and consumption depletions are 
strongest for fisheries (ρ = 0.912) and forestry (ρ =  0.838). Correlations for coal (ρ =  0.409), oil (ρ =  
0.429), and natural gas (ρ =  0.499) are comparatively lower. The log scale suggests that variation 
across countries is substantial for non-renewables, but much less so for renewable natural capital such 
as fisheries and forestry. The line of equality (dashed grey line) indicates per capita production and 
consumption depletions are equal. Deviations from this line suggest that the two accounting 
perspectives provide different information about an economy’s relationship to natural capital. 
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Figure 3 Per capita production and consumption depletions of natural capital resources 
 
Figure 3 compares per capita PB versus CB depletions for a suite of natural capital resources. All values are in 
2011 USD. Countries with per capita production based depletions less than $1.00 are omitted.  
Table 3 details national and per capita greenhouse gas emissions for the 20 largest economies on 
2011. Columns 3 and 5 show the value of GHG emissions calculated from the production and 
consumption perspectives, respectively. Columns 4 and 6 display these as a share of GDP and can be 
interpreted as the carbon intensity of GDP. Column 7 shows the ratio of production to consumption 
based emissions. Ratios greater (less) than one indicate net exporters (importers) of virtual carbon. 
Columns 8 and 10 reflect per capita emissions from the production and consumption perspectives, 
while columns 9 and 11 compare these to the global average citizen. Values greater (less) than one 
indicate that per capita emissions are greater (less) than the global average citizen’s. 
Using a mid-range carbon price of $150/tCO2, global emissions (28,818 million tons) totalled $4.3 
trillion, or 5.95% of gross world product, with global average per capita emissions of 4.13 tons or 
$619.56. 38 countries have CB per capita emissions greater than twice the global average and 50 
countries for which it is less than half the global average. The G7’s production ($2,293,801) and 
consumption ($2,284,398) emissions are similar, representing  5.63% and 5.60% of GDP, respectively.  
The notable outlier in terms of emissions intensity of GDP is China (14.34% and 11.88% from the 
production and consumption perspectives). The next highest is the US, at 4.94% of GDP (production) 
and 5.36% (consumption). Finally, G7 per capita production emissions are approximately double the 
global average with per capita consumption emissions 2.35 times the global average.
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Table 3 Production and consumption accounting for greenhouse gas emissions 
 
Production and Consumption Greenhouse Gas Emissions  
GDP 
GHG emissions (millions of 2011 USD) GHGs per capita & comparison to global average 
Production Consumption Ratio  Production Consumption 
Value % GDP Value % GDP PBP/CBP Per Capita P/GA Per Capita C/GA 
United States 15,517,926 766,199 4.94 832,509 5.36 0.92 2,458.42 3.97 2,671.18 4.31 
China 7,572,554 1,086,166 14.34 899,264 11.88 1.21 808.08 1.30 669.03 1.08 
Japan 6,157,460 154,512 2.51 183,623 2.98 0.84 1,208.70 1.95 1,436.43 2.32 
Germany 3,757,698 104,199 2.77 126,065 3.35 0.83 1,298.02 2.10 1,570.41 2.53 
France 2,862,680 53,681 1.88 73,923 2.58 0.73 821.54 1.33 1,131.31 1.83 
United Kingdom 2,619,700 70,612 2.70 93,869 3.58 0.75 1,116.24 1.80 1,483.89 2.40 
Brazil 2,616,202 55,799 2.13 68,656 2.62 0.81 280.84 0.45 345.55 0.56 
Italy 2,276,292 58,432 2.57 75,145 3.30 0.78 984.05 1.59 1,265.51 2.04 
Russian Federation 2,051,662 225,524 10.99 200,729 9.78 1.12 1,577.53 2.55 1,404.08 2.27 
India 1,823,050 265,697 14.57 251,665 13.80 1.06 213.03 0.34 201.78 0.33 
Canada 1,788,648 78,467 4.39 76,750 4.29 1.02 2,284.81 3.69 2,234.83 3.61 
Spain 1,488,067 42,201 2.84 47,658 3.20 0.89 902.84 1.46 1,019.58 1.65 
Australia 1,390,557 56,951 4.10 59,534 4.28 0.96 2,549.28 4.11 2,664.90 4.30 
Korea, Republic Of 1,202,464 75,285 6.26 69,827 5.81 1.08 1,507.60 2.43 1,398.32 2.26 
Mexico 1,171,188 63,615 5.43 66,656 5.69 0.95 534.17 0.86 559.71 0.90 
Netherlands 893,757 25,539 2.86 24,935 2.79 1.02 1,529.89 2.47 1,493.71 2.41 
Indonesia 892,969 58,064 6.50 63,876 7.15 0.91 236.31 0.38 259.97 0.42 
Turkey 832,546 42,853 5.15 50,192 6.03 0.85 583.75 0.94 683.72 1.10 
Switzerland 699,580 6,227 0.89 14,023 2.00 0.44 787.02 1.27 1,772.26 2.86 
Saudi Arabia 671,239 54,766 8.16 57,669 8.59 0.95 1,939.44 3.13 2,042.26 3.30 
World 72,642,218 4,322,741 5.95 4,322,741 5.95 1.00 619.56 1.00 619.56 1.00 
Table 3 shows total and per capita GHG emissions calculated via production and consumption approaches. 20 countries with the highest 2011 GDP are shown, alongside the 
whole world. GHG emissions are valued at $150/tCO2. GDP, PB and CB emissions (columns 2, 3, and 5) are in millions of 2011 USD. Per capita emissions are in 2011 USD.  
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2.5. Discussion 
 
The 17 sustainable development goals represent the growth and development objectives agreed by 
the global community (Griggs et al. 2014; Sachs et al. 2019). They are not explicitly framed within the 
wealth theory of sustainability, but there are considerable opportunities for overlap and mutual 
reinforcement. Goals 3, 4, and 5 on health and wellbeing, education, and gender equality clearly relate 
to elements of human capital. Goals 1, 2, and 10 on ending poverty, hunger and reducing inequalities 
entail obvious links to social and institutional capital, as do goals 16 (peace, justice and strong 
institutions) and 17 (partnerships for the goals). Goals 7, 9 and 11 on clean energy, industry and 
infrastructure, and sustainable cities and communities require investments in physical and human 
capital, and so on. The relationship between various forms of capital and achieving the SDGs is even 
more important when we consider interactions between SDGs and components of wealth. Strong 
institutions help deliver decent work and economic growth, which in turn contributes to affordable 
and clean energy systems, thus enabling progress on climate action (SDG 13). 
Given the importance of broadly defined wealth to delivering the SDGs there is an opportunity for 
wealth accounts to directly inform progress towards achieving the SDGs. One obvious link relates to 
SDG 12, to “Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns”. SDG 12.2 aims to “achieve the 
sustainable management and efficient use of natural resources” and entails two associated indicators 
(UN 2017): 
SDG 12.2.1: Material footprint, material footprint per capita, and material footprint per GDP. 
SDG 12.2.2: Domestic material consumption, domestic material consumption per capita, and 
domestic material consumption per GDP. 
The primary difference between the two indicators is how they deal with international supply chains. 
Material footprints (SDG 12.2.1) are a consumption-based measure that reflects the amount of 
material required along the supply chain to satisfy final demand, regardless of where those materials 
are sourced. In contrast, domestic material consumption (SDG 12.2.2) is (confusingly) a territorial or 
production-based measure calculated as domestic extraction plus imports minus exports. Both are 
typically measured in thousands of tonnes per year and for SDG reporting are aggregated to four 
categories: biomass, fossil fuels, metal ores, and non-metalic minerals (United Nations Statistics 
Division 2018). 
There are good reasons for developing indicators in biophysical rather than monetary terms (Victor 
2019). Biophysical accounts are a necessary first step to developing monetary accounts and are 
therefore unavoidable. Second, biophysical accounting units may be more directly applicable in a 
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range of policy contexts (e.g. limiting fossil fuel extraction or setting fishing quotas). One of the chief 
motivations, however, is that the challenge of valuing natural capital rents is avoided entirely, and 
secular price fluctuations (arising for instance due to geopolitical events) do not lead to wild changes 
in the accounts.  
However, the wealth theory of sustainability and subsequent wealth management rules require 
wealth depletions valued at the appropriate shadow prices rather than measured in physical flows. 
We provide a complementary accounting approach that links the conceptual background 
underpinning SDG 12 to the formal wealth theory of sustainability. Our production-based accounts 
align most closely with domestic material consumption, whilst our consumption-based accounts align 
with material footprints. By using resource rents rather than biophysical flows, our results are also 
relevant to those wishing to measure sustainability within the wealth framework. 
Our results show that constructing accounts from both perspectives reveals different, yet equally 
important trends in natural capital depletions. Focusing exclusively on production accounts opens the 
potential for ‘leakage’ and ignores opportunities to influence resource management along the supply 
chain. Moreover, the suite of accounts developed here enables us to provide greater insight into the 
global nature of sustainability.  
We argue that production and consumption accounts are useful and complementary tools for 
understanding the natural capital impacts and dependencies of nations. But their usefulness is not 
limited to sustainability and environmental policy. In fact, it may be the case that natural capital and 
wealth accounts more broadly are even more useful for assessing and guiding macroeconomic 
policies. Governments are beginning to develop extended public sector balance sheet accounts in 
order to better understand fiscal risks and add information to economic and fiscal outlooks. Public 
sector net debt and public sector net financial liabilities are familiar measures to macroeconomic 
policy makers, but some governments (e.g. UK and New Zealand) are beginning to explore more 
comprehensive measures.  
Natural capital accounts are also important elements of the public sector balance sheet (PSBS), which 
if constructed well can greatly improve fiscal outlook and policy (IMF 2018). Complete PSBS can enrich 
fiscal policy by providing a more complete measure of public assets and liabilities (revealing 
opportunities for improved management). This improves the identification of risks (including tail-, 
transition-, and exchange-risks), and can improve fiscal policy making by enabling a systematic and 
more comprehensive evaluation of the impact of potential policies on public sector assets and 
liabilities (IMF 2018). Using the SEEA natural capital accounts in combination with a PSBS leverages 
the power of both. Sound balance sheet management facilitates increased revenues, reduced risks, 
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and improved fiscal policy making. The IMF (2018, viii) argues that financial markets are increasingly 
paying attention to the entire government balance sheet and … strong balance sheets enhance 
economic resilience.”  
Natural capital accounts can improve balance sheet analysis in several ways: 
• A better understanding of liabilities. Respiratory illness due to poor air quality can place a 
burden on the public finances either by reducing labour supply, reducing labour productivity, 
increasing burdens on publicly funded health systems, or some combination of the three. The 
risk is particularly acute in aging societies (Harris et al. 2019). The SEEA air emissions account 
records particulate emissions by resident economic units and type of substance, which can be 
used to assess the overall public liability arising from air pollution. See SEEA-CF 3.6.3 (UNSD 
2017). Similarly, the SEEA Environmental Activity Account organises information on 
environmental protection expenditure and can improve estimates of how these liabilities 
might be affected by climate change.  
• A more accurate reflection of future revenue. The SEEA Environmental Activity Account 
organises data on public sector revenues from environmental taxation. These accounts can 
shed light on the reliability of current revenues, the potential for future revenues, and the 
fiscal effect of asset stranding and other transition related risks. 
• A more accurate reflection of public sector net worth. In most instances, government receipts 
from natural resources are treated as revenue, even when those funds come from the 
depletion of non-renewable natural capital. This overstates government revenues and inflates 
the net operating balance relative to the more accurate view that such depletions mimic the 
sale of nonfinancial assets. The SEEA accounts would record these depletions as reductions in 
wealth. Including natural capital stocks in the PSBS would help finance ministries and central 
banks ‘stress test’ environmental and technology scenarios around climate change and 
decarbonisation. 
• The indirect impact of public policy in generating public goods, which build broad assets such 
as natural, social and other forms of intangible capital in addition to physical infrastructure, 
yield indirect returns in the form of higher future personal and corporate tax revenues 
generated through higher productivity.  
 
The IMF’s 2018 Fiscal Monitor focused on managing public wealth and notes that (i) public sector 
balance sheets have enabled economies to manage economic shocks, but that (ii) the treatment of 
natural resources within public sector balance sheets could be improved as they currently record 
natural resource depletions only as revenues rather than capital depletions. As more countries begin 
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to produce public sector accounts, the treatment of natural capital within them will become 
increasingly important. This coincides with the revision and implementation of the UN System of 
Environmental Economic Accounts (SEEA), and in particular the Experimental Ecosystem Account 
(SEEA-EEA). Developing SEEA accounts alongside public sector balance sheets can greatly improve the 
measurement of public sector net worth. Any attempt to do so should also address the international 
trade dimension. For instance, international payments for ecosystem service schemes could provide 
revenue and affect the value of domestic natural capital assets. Alternatively, border taxes on virtual 
carbon could affect the value of fossil fuel resources. These public sector accounts are also useful for 
conducting intertemporal balance sheet analyses, which include the possibility of future taxation as a 
source of government revenue. This is a potential area where natural capital accounts could be 
particularly important, as environmental taxes may become more politically acceptable. 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
 
The wealth theory of sustainability suggests that maintaining living standards requires non-declining 
per capita wealth over time. Natural capital depletions represent a reduction in wealth. But in a 
globalised economy with long international supply chains, a question arises about where to attribute 
wealth depletions. Most wealth accounts adopt a territorial or production-based perspective. These 
describe trends in natural capital stocks within a country’s national borders and are therefore relevant 
for calculating domestic per capita natural capital depletions. This paper investigates whether 
territorial natural capital accounts are fit for purpose when measuring national and global 
sustainability in an increasingly globalised world.  
The discussion is centred around SDG 12 – sustainable consumption and production – and adds and 
responds to calls for more complete official statistics on the national and global dimensions of natural 
capital depletion. In the technical report on the SDG Index, Lafortune et al (2018,  p15) note that 
measurement of SDG 12 relies on non-official data, which are needed “to gauge environmental spill 
over effects embodied into trade via input-output estimations”.  
We respond by developing a 140-region 57-sector Multi-Regional Input-Output model to describe 
natural capital flows embodied within international trade. The analysis enables us to measure the 
extent to which countries may be ‘importing virtual sustainability’ by depleting foreign rather than 
domestic natural capital. In so doing, we provide evidence to support the Sarkozy Commission’s 
conjecture that a measurement approach “centred on national sustainabilities may be relevant for 
some dimensions of sustainability, but not for others” (Stiglitz et al. 2009a, p77).  
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The results confirmed that this is indeed the case. Our suite of accounts makes it possible to calculate 
the magnitude of the policy blind spot imposed by relying on just one accounting perspective. Globally, 
natural capital depletions of coal, oil, gas, minerals, timber, and fisheries totalled $1 trillion in 2011. 
The G7 countries had a combined GDP of $40.8 trillion with production (consumption) based resource 
intensity of 0.54% (1.21%). Their combined per capita production based depletions were 76% of the 
global average while from the consumption based perspective they are 273% of the global average.  
The future of wealth accounting must make a stronger effort to reflect the role of globalisation – of 
goods, externalities, and policy responses – within official statistics. The regular construction of 
production and consumption based accounts for natural capital will be made much easier as countries 
start developing official statistics in-line with the UN System of Environmental Economic Accounts. 
Macroeconomic policy makers may be among the greatest beneficiaries of such information, as it 
would enable a more genuine assessment of the public sector balance sheet. The overarching 
conclusion is that perspective matters in developing accounts. Afterall, what we observe is not the 
economy itself, but the economy exposed to our method of accounting.  
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3. CARBON ACCOUNTS FOR MEASURING SUSTAINABILITY UNDER 
GLOBALIZATION 
 
3.1. Abstract: 
 
The explosive growth of international trade – from 24-61% of gross world product in the last half 
century – means that traded goods and services now account for 20-33% of global greenhouse gas 
emissions. There are severe implications for the development, measurement, and enforcement of 
global carbon and sustainability policy. Who is responsible for emissions released along the global 
supply chain? Is it producing and exporting countries like India and China? Or are rich countries 
ultimately liable for the carbon footprint of high-consumption lifestyles? We expose multiple 
shortcomings of the current approach to carbon accounting. First, by confusing the location of 
emissions with the location of climate damages, it overlooks fundamental tenets of climate science. 
Second, by failing to address globalization, it distorts not only the ethical and legal underpinnings, but 
also the real-world efficacy of international climate policy. And finally, it has so far failed to reach its 
potential to inform sustainability theory, accounting, policy, and science. We develop a 57-sector 140-
region Multi-Regional Input-Output (MRIO) model to address these shortcomings. We trace virtual 
carbon flows along each step of the global supply chain, and construct GHG accounts according to 
multiple attribution rules. In combination, this suite of accounts provides a more nuanced and holistic 
understanding of the carbon footprint of nations. We introduce a novel procedure for linking 
emissions to the location of climate losses, and provide a global CO2e account that is fully consistent 
with sustainability theory and science. Results are reported in terms of contributions to national- vs 
global-level sustainability, and progress towards multiple Sustainable Development Goals.  
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3.2. Introduction 
 
Sustainability science for the 21st century must account for globalization across three domains: 
economies, environmental challenges, and policy needs. In the half century from 1961-2011, 
international trade grew from 24% to 61% of gross world product (World Bank 2018), and goods 
traded internationally now drive 20-25% of global CO2 emissions (Afionis et al. 2017). Because 
production processes cross multiple borders along global supply chain, where we account for the 
associated embodied, or ‘virtual’ carbon flows becomes a key policy issue (Davis et al. 2011). But in 
failing to adequately address globalization, the carbon accounting literature is failing to reach its 
potential to inform sustainability theory, accounting, and policy. We place carbon accounts within a 
formal theory of sustainability, construct global greenhouse gas (GHGs) emissions accounts that are 
more consistent with economics and climate science, interrogate the resulting distributional effects, 
and consider policy implications.  
The ‘wealth theory’ of sustainability emerges from the notion that future consumption depends on 
future productive capacity, which in turn depends on current net investment in capital (Weitzman 
1976; Hartwick 1977; Dasgupta and Heal 1979; Solow 1986; Dasgupta 2001; Hamilton and Hepburn 
2017). Defining comprehensive, or inclusive wealth as the sum of all forms of capital (e.g. human, 
man-made, and natural) that comprise an economy’s productive base, the theory provides a clear 
wealth management rule: endowing future generations with the potential to be ‘at least as well off as 
the present’ requires that comprehensive wealth is non-declining over time. Following initial empirical 
contributions by Pearce and Atkinson (1993b), wealth accounting research seeks to measure the 
extent to which individual countries adhere to the capital management rule (Pearce and Atkinson 
1993b; Hamilton and Hepburn 2017; Fenichel et al. 2018; Lange et al. 2018).  
The biosphere’s capacity to regulate climate is a component of natural capital. GHG emissions degrade 
this capital and are reflected in sustainability accounts as wealth depletions: the marginal ton of CO2 
equivalent reduces future productive capacity by the value of the social cost of carbon (SCC). But while 
sustainability accounts are typically compiled at the national level, the integrated assessment models 
(IAMs) used to calculate the SCC and tend to be global in scope, or contain a small number of regions 
(e.g. RICE2010 contains 12 regions (Nordhaus 2017). An attribution rule for distributing global wealth 
depletions across countries is needed to measure the sustainability of individual nations, and their 
contributions to global (un)sustainability. This paper investigates potential attribution rules 
(henceforth, accounting perspectives).  
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A rich literature explores the motivations and implications of attributing emissions to countries at 
different points along the global supply chain. Four main perspectives have been proposed. Extraction 
based (EB) accounts attribute emissions to the country in which fossil fuels were extracted, regardless 
of where they are combusted or the resulting goods are consumed. Production based (PB) accounts 
attribute emissions to the country in which emissions in the production of goods and services, 
regardless of where the source fuels originated or resulting goods are ultimately consumed. 
Consumption based (CB) attribute emissions to the country in which goods and services are consumed, 
regardless of where they entered the supply chain or were released into the atmosphere. Sharing 
based (SB) perspectives attribute emissions according to some form of shared responsibility, such as 
historical emissions or value-added (ie relative gains from trade) (Kartha et al. 2009; Marques et al. 
2012; Raupach et al. 2014; Steininger et al. 2014).   
Each perspective tells us something different about an individual country’s relationship to global GHG 
flows. More importantly, relying on any single accounting perspective creates and reinforces ‘policy 
blindspots’ (Steininger et al. 2016).  For instance, a PB account can identify whether domestic 
emissions fall following implementation of a new climate policy, but would not identify whether the 
decrease in domestic emissions is offset by rising imports of carbon-intensive goods (ie carbon 
leakage), or whether a relatively low-carbon economy could reduce global emissions at lower cost by 
means of technology diffusion to countries from which it imports. EB accounts also have blind spots, 
most notably in that they omit all non-fossil fuel GHGs. And CB accounts attribute notional liabilities 
for foreign production processes to domestic countries, potentially raising questions of national 
sovereignty. Finally, the EB, PB, and CB perspectives focus on the location of emissions, regardless of 
the location of damages (and therefore the wealth depletions).  
We contribute to sustainability accounting by examining three potential attribution rules, constructing 
a global account for each, and calling for a ‘dashboard approach’ to emissions accounting for 
sustainability measurement. Shifting the focus from the location of emissions to the location of 
damages, we use a 140 region 57-sector multi-regional input-output model (MRIO) to introduce a new 
carbon accounting perspective that is fully consistent with: (i) sustainability theory, (ii) climate 
economics, and (iii) sustainability accounting for a world in which countries are not compensated for 
climate damages. The distribution of damages is determined by historical relationships between GDP 
growth and temperature change (Burke et al. 2015) and, for comparison, a regional integrated 
assessment model with global coverage (Nordhaus and Boyer 2000). Our approach extends the supply 
chain of virtual carbon flows beyond extraction, production, and consumption to incorporate the 
distribution of the global climate externality. Results show that observed progress towards national 
and global sustainability is sensitive to the accounting perspective used, suggesting that sustainability 
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accounting requires a ‘dashboard’ approach combining multiple carbon accounts. Policy implications 
relate to the design of international climate agreements, the potential for climate compensation, and 
multiple Sustainable Development Goals 8.4 (Economic Growth), 10.b (Reduced Inequality), 12 
(Responsible Production and Consumption), 13 (Climate Action), 17.11 (Trade), and 17.19 (Monitoring 
and Accountability). 
3.3. Carbon accounting within a sustainability framework 
 
Accounts are tools for telling stories over time (Coyle 2015). Ideally, the information contained in these 
stories is driven by the specific goals and interests of decision-making end users. Formal accounting 
procedures are then developed to identify, collect, and report information material to those decisions. 
Buried within these accounting procedures are a combination of assumptions (e.g. regarding 
institutional, spatial, conceptual, and temporal boundaries, and notional liabilities) and compromises 
(often pragmatic) that shape the way accounts can be used and the stories they can tell. Once 
established, accounts may be used for purposes beyond their original intent: modern national 
accounts were developed to assess whether the US economy could sustain a war effort, but are now 
(mis)used in myriad applications. A chief motivation for this paper is to examine whether carbon 
accounts designed to inform climate policy can tell the story of national and global sustainability.  
Modern economies enable fossil fuels extracted in one country to be combusted in another to produce 
goods that are consumed in yet another, thus creating a global supply chain for CO2 emissions (Fig 4) 
(Davis et al. 2011).  A rich literature explores the motivations and implications of attributing emissions 
to different points along the global supply chain. The various perspectives tell different stories about 
national contributions to global emissions, and have important implications for assessing the efficacy 
and efficiency of global climate policies. In general, the literature shows that: PB accounts tend to 
attribute fewer emissions to wealthy industrialized nations (e.g. Western Europe) and more to 
developing countries with carbon-intensive exports (e.g. China); that CB accounts do the opposite; 
that emissions reductions in wealthy nations (measured in PB accounts) are often offset by increased 
imports of virtual carbon (leakage effects, identifiable in CB accounts) from developing nations (Peters 
et al. 2009, 2011; Davis and Caldeira 2010); that EB accounts only cover fossil fuel emissions; that PB 
accounts omit transport emissions; and that CB accounts have more complete coverage, but also more 
error due to aggregation and data issues in trade models.  
Despite these differences, the accounting perspectives share several common features. First, selection 
between them is arbitrary: nothing in climate science or economics compels us to adopt a given 
perspective, or to attribute emissions to any specific point along the global supply chain. Although PB 
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accounts dominate global climate policy (IPCC 2006), this is more an accident of international legal 
norms, notions of sovereignty, and a convenient level of analysis than a scientific necessity. Indeed, it 
ignores a fundamental feature of climate science and key challenge for international negotiations, 
namely that the location of climate damages is independent of the location of GHG emissions. Second, 
the blind spots exhibited by each account suggest that sustainability is too complex to be fully 
measured from a single perspective. The multidimensional nature of national and global sustainability 
suggests a ‘dashboard’ approach might be necessary. Third, EB, PB, and CB accounts were deliberately 
designed to inform and evaluate carbon policy, rather than sustainability science (Fig 4). While 
sustainability accounts must incorporate emissions, they need not be restricted by the existence of 
accounts designed for other purposes.  
Figure 4 extends the global supply chain from extraction, production, and consumption (blue) to 
include the location of damages (green), thus making the sustainability account more consistent with 
theory (Arrow et al. 2012) and science (Ricke et al. 2018). It depicts the global supply chain of GHG 
emissions from extraction to production to consumption, as characterized by the carbon accounting 
literature (blue) and our extension to sustainability accounting (green). The existing carbon accounting 
literature focuses on completeness (ie full or partial emissions coverage), carbon leakage, notions of 
climate justice (e.g. producer vs. consumer liabilities), shared responsibility (based on income, 
historical emissions, inequality, or value-added), optimal instrument (tax) design, and monitoring and 
transaction costs of carbon polices. The vast majority of this literature focuses on PB vs CB accounting. 
But for sustainability accounts, the supply chain must reflect the actual incidence of the carbon 
externality, as this is what determines changes in wealth. Here we ‘extend the virtual supply chain’ to 
incorporate the location of the carbon externality (damage), making the sustainability account more 
consistent with climate science and sustainability theory. Damages refer to the welfare losses that 
each country will suffer as a result of global carbon emissions. This is empirically and conceptually 
different from the amount that each country contributes to global damages (ie national emissions). 
As Arrow et al. (Arrow et al. 2012, p. 328) demonstrate, the appropriate adjustment to wealth is not 
a nation’s emissions, but rather “the damages caused to a country by anthropogenic climate change”. 
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Figure 4 Emissions accounting along global supply chains 
 
 
3.4. From carbon accounting to sustainability accounting 
 
Most wealth accounts incorporate emissions according to the PB approach (World Bank 2006, 2011; 
Lange et al. 2018). PB adjustments to inclusive wealth accounts would be appropriate if (i) the 
damages from climate change only accrued to the country that created the emissions, or (ii) a global 
compensation mechanism ensured that each fully compensated countries for the damages they 
suffer. Even the compensation mechanism would require that the correct social cost of carbon be 
charged in the polluting country and distributed to the country facing the damages. Identifying the 
latter still requires a damage-based account. Given that neither (i) or (ii) hold in the real world, there 
is no scientific or economic justification for linking the location of emissions to reductions in 
comprehensive wealth (though doing so may be relevant for policy design under the polluter pays 
principle). Whereas the former is driven by global political and economic factors, the latter is driven 
by biospheric processes. There are three notable exceptions to PB wealth accounting (there are many 
exceptions when considering only carbon accounting). Arrow et al (2012) show formally that domestic 
wealth may be reduced (increased) by trans-boundary negative (positive) externalities, such as the 
domestic consequences of foreign emissions. The Inclusive Wealth Reports (henceforth, IWRs) (UNU-
IHDP and UNEP 2012, 2014; Managi and Kumar 2018) incorporate the potential for transboundary 
externalities arising from GHG emissions. Finally, Atkinson et al (2012)  develop a wealth account using 
CB principles for emissions and other elements of natural capital.  
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The distinction between PB and CB accounting is important for several reasons. First, IPCC and UNFCCC 
carbon accounting guidance dictates that “national inventories include greenhouse gas emissions and 
removals taking place within national territory and offshore areas over which the country has 
jurisdiction” (IPCC 2006). However, this territorial boundary condition excludes the 2.6 per cent of 
global emissions generated by international shipping and aviation (Smith et al. 2015), which is an 
important part of forward looking, 21st century sustainability accounts given the growth rate of 
emissions in this sector (80% from 1990-2010, compared with 40% for the rest of GWP) (Bows-Larkin 
2015) . Moreover, the territorial focus does not coincide with national statistics such as GDP (Pedersen 
and de Haan 2006; SNA 2009). However, perhaps the most important reason to consider consumption 
accounts is the prospect of carbon leakage when climate policies have relatively low participation. 
Leakage occurs when climate regulations apply unequally (e.g. more strict on developed than 
developing countries), thus generating an incentive for more strictly regulated economies to offshore 
carbon intensive activities and import carbon intensive products. Because most (60-70%) of carbon 
embodied in international trade is imported by wealthy countries (Peters and Hertwich 2008), 
consumption based accounts would attribute a greater share of emissions liabilities to these countries.  
Shifting the focus from carbon policy to sustainability measurement, we propose an accounting 
perspective that adjusts wealth according to country-level damages induced by global GHG emissions. 
Whereas EB, PB, and CB accounts focus on the location of emissions to inform carbon policy, the 
damage-based (DB) perspective focuses on the location of climate impacts, as this is what ultimately 
drives future productive capacity, and therefore comprehensive wealth. Such accounts could be used 
to inform sustainability measurement, motivate adaptation strategies, assess changes in country-level 
comprehensive wealth, and provide insight into which countries might be compensated for climate 
damages.  
3.4.1. Calculating country-level damages  
 
Empirical applications of Arrow et al’s (2012) theoretical contribution require a method for calculating 
country level damages. The existing literature provides two such methods: disaggregating global or 
regional IAM results down to the country level, or using econometric models of country-level long-run 
(50yr) relationships between weather and GDP growth to estimate the impacts of future warming.  
The Inclusive Wealth Reports (IWRs) adopt the first approach. We construct and report both. 
The IWRs use the RICE99 IAM described in Nordhaus & Boyer (2000) to calculate country-level damage 
coefficients averaged over the period 1990-2010. Nordhaus & Boyer (2000) report regional damages 
as a percentage of GDP lost due to climate change in 13 regions under a 2.5C warming scenario. 
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Multiplying each country’s GDP by its corresponding regional damage coefficient, and dividing by the 
sum of damages across all regions, the IWRs calculate country-level damage coefficients. The IWRs 
interpret these as the percentage of global damages suffered by each country. Country-level 
coefficients are multiplied by the total value of carbon emissions (calculated as the product of the 
quantity of global emissions and the SCC) to yield country-level damages in monetary terms.  
This procedure has the advantage of breaking the implicit link between the location of emissions and 
the location of damages. But several shortcomings remain. The first stems from its reliance on RICE-
99 as a model not only of climate, but also economic change over 100 years. IAMs compound scientific 
unknowns surrounding climate sensitivity with economic unknowns such as the correct discount rate 
and the evolution of technical progress to yield results that are “close to useless for policy analysis” 
(Pindyck 2013). Published SCC estimates generated on the basis of IAMs vary from $-6.6/tC to 
$2,400/tC (Tol 2008). Moreover, IAM results are notoriously sensitive to arbitrary parameters (Pindyck 
2013), which can be ‘adjusted’ to ensure model results are ‘consistent’ with what we thought we knew 
before using the model (Pezzey et al. 2017). Finally, even as climate science progresses and provides 
better projections of future climate conditions, economists are left with the task of calculating the 
effect of these changes on economies 100 years in the future. In an important thought experiment, 
Schelling (1992) noted that economists in 1900 trying to do the same would have had to foresee the 
dominance of private cars on paved roads, widespread use of vaccines and antibiotics, internet 
communications, industrially produced fertilizers, and mechanized agriculture.  
A second limitation of the IWR approach arises when extending regional results to the country level. 
RICE99 divides the world into 13 sub-regions, which for modelling purposes are aggregated to 8 
regions “on the basis of either economic or political similarity” (Nordhaus and Boyer 2000, p27). Each 
region is described by a single social welfare function. Sectoral damage functions are common across 
all countries in the region. The USA and China each constitute one region, leaving six regional social 
welfare functions to describe the rest of the globe. The ‘other high income’ group lumps together 
Japan, Aruba, Canada, Israel, Australia, and Hong Kong. ‘OECD Europe’ forces Greece and Portugal into 
the same climate change region as Finland and Iceland. And the ‘Middle income’ group places South 
Korea, Brazil, and Barbados together in the same region. The RICE99 regions include countries that 
are characterized by substantial heterogeneity in terms of size, latitude, elevation, coastal extent, 
ecosystems, GDP, and economic structures. In using RICE-99 to break the implicit link between the 
location of emissions and damages, the IWR approach may have adopted a new problem in treating 
such diverse countries as part of the same regions.  
48 
 
A final and particularly important impediment to using RICE in the current analysis is that the model 
assumes relative autarky: there “is no international trade in goods or capital except in exchange for 
carbon emissions permits” (Nordhaus and Boyer 2000, p11). Our task is to investigate how attributing 
emissions to different points along global supply chains informs our understanding of national versus 
global sustainability. It is difficult to justify an autarkic model as the basis for an accounting system to 
describe international trade.  
3.4.2. The new climate economy approach to assessing emissions 
 
Noting the challenges and uncertainties in IAMs, an emerging literature identifies country-level 
economic impacts of climate change uses econometric models to estimate the effect of variation in 
temperature and precipitation on economic output (Dell et al. 2014). In an early contribution, Dell et 
al (2012) constructed a 53 year, 125 country panel of weather and macroeconomic data to show that 
warming significantly reduces growth in poor countries (by 1.3 percentage points for every 1C 
temperature rise), but that in rich countries the effect is not robust.   
Using data from 1960-2010 for 166 countries, Burke et al (2015) (henceforth BHM) build an 
econometric model to estimate the impact of changing temperature and precipitation on economic 
performance. Combining their model with a range of standardized future warming scenarios 
(Representative Concentration Pathways, RCPs (Moss et al. 2008)) and common assumptions 
governing the evolution of future economic and population trends (Shared Socioeconomic Pathways, 
SSPs (O’Neill et al. 2014))  they estimate the country-specific economic impact of future climate 
change. Using SSP5 and RCP 8.5 to compare a world with and without warming, BHM show a 
significant 22.6% shortfall in gross world product due to climate change by 2099. Globally, their results 
indicate much greater losses due to climate change than are predicted by leading IAMs, but at the 
country level, they show that currently cold countries could experience significant benefits from a 
warmer climate. Such results must be interpreted with caution. Numerous factors including global 
geopolitical responses and socio-economic tipping points could be imagined in a doomsday scenario 
of runaway climate change, but are not presently fit for inclusion in econometric models. 
There are several advantages to using new climate-economy results in assigning carbon damages to 
individual countries. By focusing on macro relationships, econometric models of this sort can side-step 
the challenge faced by IAMs of modelling: (i) every direct mechanism whereby climate change affects 
economic output and (ii) the myriad indirect feedback loops between them. The availability of data at 
the national level avoids the complications of extrapolating from regional results, and long panels 
mean this approach may be better at ‘capturing’ country-level adaptation and changing trade 
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relationship that may mediate climate impacts. Finally, our objective is to incorporate carbon damages 
arising along global supply chains within a sustainability accounting framework. Noting that accounts 
are only as reliable as the data on which they are built, it is helpful to use climate-economy 
relationships based on half a century of observed data. 
3.5. Data and Methods 
Multi-regional input output (MRIOs) models are well suited to tracing emissions along global supply 
chains. We use the Global Trade Analysis Project’s version 9 database (GTAP9) to construct a 57-
sector, 140-country MRIO for the year 20112. Two chief advantages of GTAP are that it is balanced for 
use at different scales of analysis and that sectoral disaggregation is harmonised across regions. As a 
result, GTAP databases have become a mainstay in the carbon accounting literature. 
GTAPv9 provides data on energy volumes and GHG emissions by sector and region. This includes the 
volume of firm and household energy purchases, as well as bilateral trade in energy products. 
Emissions data contained within GTAPv9 covers 28,818 million tonnes of CO2e emissions in 2011. This 
includes CO2 emissions from fuel combustion and major non-CO2 greenhouse gasses (CH4, N20, CF4, 
HFCs and SF6) for the year 2011. Due to the data and labour intensity of updating non-CO2 GHGs, these 
data in GTAPv9 are based on detailed raw input data for 2001 to which an emissions growth function 
is applied as in Ahmed et al. (2014). The MRIO model is described in Appendix 1. 
The decision to include non-fossil fuel GHGs imposes a trade-off: accounts that incorporate a wider 
range of emissions provide a more complete picture of national and global sustainability, but results 
will not be comparable to EB accounts constructed elsewhere (Davis et al. 2011; Steininger et al. 2016), 
as those studies only consider fossil fuel GHGs. 
3.5.1. Carbon prices 
 
The carbon price used in sustainability accounting should reflect the full social cost of carbon, defined 
as the discounted value of all future (net) damages arising from emitting a unit carbon today. However, 
despite considerable debate of what the SCC might be (Stern et al. 2006; Tol 2008; van den Bergh and 
Botzen 2014; Heal and Millner 2014; Nordhaus 2017; Ricke et al. 2018) a globally agreed value for 
carbon emissions remains elusive. Nordhaus (2017) uses DICE to calculated a SCC of $31/tCO2. 
Averaging results from multiple IAMs, the US Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of 
Greenhouse Gases produced SCC values ranging from $11/tCO2 to $105/tCO2, with variation due to 
different discount rates and treatment of low-probability, high-impact events (IAWG 2016). A survey 
 
2 This is the same input-output model as described in Section 2.4. 
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of expert economists and climate scientists resulted in mean estimates between $150-$200/tCO2 
(Pindyck 2016), and a recent study of SCC estimates based on BHM records a global median SCC of 
$417/tCO2 (Ricke et al. 2018). 
The variation in SCC estimates is especially problematic for sustainability measurement as accounts 
could easily be dominated by carbon, thereby giving less weight to other elements of natural capital 
(Agarwala et al. 2014a). Our primary interest is in the attribution of emissions and the distribution of 
their damages. As such, we present results as country-level attribution coefficients for PB, CB, and DB 
accounting perspectives, interpreted as the share of global emissions attributed to each country under 
each accounting perspective. Country-level attributions in monetary terms for each accounting 
perspective may be calculated as follows. Multiply the quantity of global emissions by a chosen carbon 
price to obtain the global monetary carbon liability. Multiply this global liability by the country 
attribution coefficient corresponding to the desired accounting perspective. In addition to country-
level attribution coefficients, we report monetary values calculated in this manner, using SCC 
estimates of $31/tCO2, $150/tCO2, and $417/tCO2 for comparability.  
3.5.2. Assigning damages to countries 
 
We use two approaches to assign climate damages to individual countries. First, we extrapolate from 
the RICE99 IAM down to the GTAPv9 regional level as in the IWRs, for comparability. For example, 
RICE99 results indicate that OECD Europe loses 2.83% of GDP under a 2.5C warming scenario. Second, 
we use BHM’s central estimates of country level climate impacts under SSP5 and RCP8.5. The 
difference between GWP in a warming world relative to the baseline is the BHM global climate liability 
for a given year. Country-level damage coefficients are defined as the ratio of any individual country’s 
shortfall to the global total and indicate the proportion of global damages suffered by individual 
countries. Country-level damage coefficients averaged over 25 and 50-year slices of BHM results are 
also constructed. Finally, these are aggregated to match the 140 GTAPv9 regions. Negative damage 
coefficients represent country-level net benefits from climate change 
3.6. Results 
 
An important question is whether the various accounting perspectives described above provide differ 
meaningfully. If each perspective told a similar story then using PB accounts that are already compiled 
for carbon policy may be sufficient. If, however, the various perspectives illuminate different features 
of the carbon wealth of nations, then reliance on any single perspective would leave policy makers 
systematically under informed. 
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Table 4 shows summary statistics of country-level GHG attribution coefficients calculated under PB, 
CB, and four variants of DB accounting procedures, using an integrated assessment model (DB-IAM), 
and Burke et al (2015) country-level climate impact estimates for 2011, and averaged over 25 and 50 
year horizons (BHM2011, BHM25yr, and BHM50yr, respectively) to calculate country-level coefficients. 
Country-level coefficients for the RICE model are calculated following the method set out in the 
Inclusive Wealth Reports (UNU-IHDP and UNEP 2014). RICE aggregates to 8 global regions and country-
level impacts are calculated as the proportion of each country’s GDP in the regional GDP total. PB and 
CB coefficients exhibit a zero lower bound and are right-skewed (PB 7.44, CB 6.95): no country in the 
sample produces or consumes negative emissions.  PB (CB) coefficients have standard deviation of 
2.68 (2.48) and maximum value of 25.13 (20.80), in both cases, for China.  
Each variant of DB accounting reflects some negative damages (gains) from warming. The IAM based 
results have the lowest standard deviation (1.93) and range (-0.74 to 12.65). The lower variance may 
be due to structural factors of the RICE99 IAM, rather than the result of climate science or economic 
effects. Aggregation to just 8 modelling regions means that heterogeneous biomes and economies are 
modelled to experience homogeneous climate impacts. DB coefficients calculated according to BHM 
results for 2011 and the 25 and 50 year horizons exhibit the highest standard deviation (9.47, 6.35, 
and 4.60, respectively), and greatest range (BHM2011: -42.38 to 34.78; BHM25yr: -25.23 to 27.75; 
BHM50yr -16.53 to 25.04). Skewness also rises from -0.61 (2011) to 1.05 (50yr) as the time horizon is 
extended, reflecting greater losses from extreme warming. 
Table 4 Summary of attribution coefficients (% of global damages) 
    N  Mean  St. Dev  Variance  Min  Max  Skewness 
Production Based 140 0.71 2.68 7.16 0.00 25.13 7.44 
Consumption Based 140 0.71 2.48 6.16 0.00 20.80 6.95 
Damage Based (IAM) 138 0.70 1.93 3.72 -0.74 12.65 4.03 
Damage Based (BHM 2011) 134 0.75 9.47 89.67 -42.38 34.78 -0.61 
Damage Based (BHM 25 yr) 134 0.75 6.35 40.33 -25.23 27.75 0.17 
Damage Based (BHM 50 yr) 134 0.75 4.60 21.12 -16.53 25.04 1.05 
 
Table 4. Summary statistics of country-level attribution coefficients under each perspective. PB and CB 
coefficients have similar variance, range, and skew, and a 0-lower bound. Four variants of damage based 
coefficients are calculated using the RICE99 integrated assessment model (DB-IAM), and results from Burke et 
al (2015) for the year 2011, and averaged over 25- and 50-year horizons. DB-IAM coefficients exhibit smallest 
variation and range, DB-BHM coefficients, the largest (but falling as time horizon is extended). 
 
Table 5 highlights (dis)agreement – the extent to which accounts convey the same or different 
information – between accounting perspectives. This is a proxy indicator for the extent to which each 
accounting perspective tells us something different about the world. If all perspectives were very 
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highly correlated, an argument could be made that they do not convey enough unique information to 
justify the additional effort to compile them. That this is not the case (ie low correlation, or high 
‘disagreement’) suggests that the perspectives do convey unique insights. Pearson correlation 
coefficients shows strong and statistically significant correlation 𝑟 = .99 between PB & CB, and 25 year 
slices of the BHM variants (BHM2011 & BHM25yr and BHM25yr & BHM50yr). Correlation between BHM 
coefficients over 50 years (BHM2011  and BHM50yr) are also significant and strong 𝑟 = .97. Interestingly, 
correlations between DB-IAM and the suite of DB-BHM coefficients are the smallest, 𝑟 = -0.09, -0.04, 
and 0.04 (for BHM2011 , BHM25yr, BHM50yr, respectively), though none of these is statistically significant. 
DB-IAM is weakly (though significantly) correlated with both the PB and CB approaches 𝑟 = 0.32 and 
0.39, respectively. Finally, the BHM correlation coefficients with both PB and CB are positive, 
significant (except for PB and BHM2011,) and strengthen as the time horizon rises. 
 
Table 5 Correlations between emissions accounting approaches 
  
  
Damage   
 
Production 
Based 
Consumption 
Based 
 
IAM 
Burke et al (2015) 
BHM 
(2011) 
BHM   
(25 yr) 
BHM   
(50 yr) 
Production 
Based 
1 
Consumption 
Based 
0.99* 1 
Damage Based 
(IWR) 
0.32* 0.39* 1 
Damage BHM 
(2011) 
0.21 0.23* -0.09 1 
Damage BHM 
 (25 yr) 
0.26* 0.29* -0.03 0.99* 1 
Damage BHM  
(50 yr) 
0.31* 0.34* 0.04 0.97* 0.99* 1 
Table 5. Correlations between emissions accounting approaches. Reports pairwise Pearson correlation 
coefficients of country-level attributions under PB, CB, and four DB accounting perspectives: following the IWR 
approach (for comparability), and using Burke et al (Burke et al. 2015) results for 2011 and 25 and 50 year 
averages, respectively. * indicates significance at the 0.01 level. 
 
Figure 5 illustrates these relationships graphically, plotting country-level attribution coefficients for 
each possible pair-wise comparison of accounting perspectives. In the bottom right, BHM variants are 
highly correlated. In the top left, PB and CB tell a similar story. No discernable relationship may be 
identified between DB-IAM and DB-BHM. Importantly, the PB and DB perspectives do not appear to 
‘agree’ with any of the DB variants, leading us to conclude that DB accounts may illuminate elements 
of the carbon wealth of nations that are not readily apparent in standard accounts. 
 
53 
 
Figure 5. Comparison of country-level attribution coefficients across all accounting perspectives. Displays 
correlation between the various accounting mechanisms, using the full sample. DB-IAM: Damage Based – 
Integrated Assessment Model, using RICE99 results reported in Nordhaus & Boyer (2000), aggregated to GTAPv9 
regions as in IWR (2014). DB-BHM*: Damage Based using Burke et al (2015) country-level climate impacts for 
the year 2011, and averaged over 25 and 50 year slices of BHM modelling.  
 
Figure 6 indicates where (dis)agreement between perspectives arises. Splitting the sample 
geographically shows that there is generally agreement in most regions, with the strong exception of 
Europe and Central Asia.  Disagreement between DB accounting mechanisms is largely driven by how 
they treat Europe, where strong negative correlations exist between DB-IAM and DB-BHM2011 (Fig 6, 
Europe & Central Asia). This is largely because Burke et al. (2015) find potential output gains due to 
warming in currently cold countries. There is more agreement between the DB-IAM and DB-BHM 
approaches in Latin America & Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia. Disagreement over Europe 
& Central Asia is because BHM results indicate substantial benefits to mild warming across northern 
Europe, whereas RICE results suggest these countries will be made unambiguously poorer. 
Figure 5 Comparison of country-level attribution coefficients 
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Figure 6 Attribution coefficients by region 
 
Figure 6. Comparisons of country-level attribution coefficients across different accounting perspectives. PB: Production 
Based accounts. IAM: damage based accounts, using the RICE99 integrated assessment model to identify country-level 
impacts as in IWR (2014). BHM: damage based accounts, using Burke et al (2015) results to identify country level impacts for 
the year 2011. For simplicity, CB and the 25- and 50-year slices of the BHM coefficients are omitted. Fig 5 shows that 
correlations between CB & PB, and between BHM2011 , BHM25yr, and BHM50yr, are so strong that no information is lost in this 
simplification. North American region is omitted (n=2). Outliers removed (China, USA, Russia, Japan, and India). 
 
3.6.1. Cross-country Comparisons 
 
Table 6 compares country level attribution coefficients constructed according to each accounting 
perspective for the 20 largest economies in 2011 (column 2: GDP in millions of 2011 USD). PB and CB 
accounts (columns 3 and 4, respectively) have been converted into coefficients describing each 
country’s share of the total global burden, for comparison. Columns 5-8 show country-level damage 
coefficients under four variants of the DB accounting perspective: the IAM approach (as in the IWRs), 
and the BHM-based approach for the year 2011, and averaged over 25 and 50-year time scales, 
respectively. PB and CB accounts can be thought of as damages caused, whereas the DB accounts refer 
to damages incurred3. 
 
 
3 I am grateful to Ben Groom for providing this succinct interpretation. 
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Table 6 Attribution coefficients for selected countries under different accounting perspectives 
  
PERCENTAGE OF GLOBAL EMISSIONS ATTRIBUTED TO 
EACH COUNTRY 
 
GDP* Production 
 Based 
Consumption  
Based 
Damage Based 
IAM  BHM 
2011 
BHM 
25yr  
BHM 
50yr 
UNITED STATES 15517.93 17.72 19.26 8.10 32.81 24.35 18.69 
CHINA 7572.55 25.13 20.80 0.59 7.50 7.14 6.79 
JAPAN 6157.46 3.57 4.25 3.64 16.31 10.26 6.73 
GERMANY 3757.70 2.41 2.92 12.65 -42.38 -24.34 -14.18 
FRANCE 2862.68 1.24 1.71 9.26 -14.58 -8.26 -4.85 
UNITED KINGDOM 2619.70 1.63 2.17 9.29 -22.71 -13.70 -8.52 
BRAZIL 2616.20 1.29 1.59 3.23 31.10 20.72 14.34 
ITALY 2276.29 1.35 1.74 7.97 0.74 0.81 0.81 
RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION 
2051.66 5.22 4.64 -0.74 -33.91 -22.71 -16.23 
INDIA 1823.05 6.15 5.82 5.31 34.78 27.75 25.04 
CANADA 1788.65 1.82 1.78 -0.64 -41.03 -25.23 -16.53 
SPAIN 1488.07 0.98 1.10 4.55 7.59 4.65 2.99 
AUSTRALIA 1390.56 1.32 1.38 -0.42 8.31 5.58 3.90 
KOREA, REP. 1202.46 1.74 1.62 2.72 -3.83 -2.38 -1.39 
MEXICO 1171.19 1.47 1.54 2.24 20.52 13.40 9.22 
NETHERLANDS 893.76 0.59 0.58 2.72 -6.16 -3.55 -2.09 
INDONESIA 892.97 1.34 1.48 1.09 10.05 8.04 7.33 
TURKEY 832.55 0.99 1.16 1.19 -1.34 -0.77 -0.38 
SWITZERLAND 699.58 0.14 0.32 1.68 -9.47 -5.67 -3.52 
SAUDI ARABIA 671.24 1.27 1.33 0.89 26.23 18.36 13.00 
* billions of 2011 USD. IAM refers to the RICE99 integrated assessment model. Country level GHG attribution coefficients for 
the 20 largest economies in 2011. GDP reported in billions of 2011 USD. Coefficients are percentages of the global GHG 
liability attributed to each country under each accounting perspective. Columns 3-4 report PB and CB coefficients, 
respectively. Columns 5-8 report DB coefficients based on IWR (using RICE99 and averaged over 1990-2010 for comparison 
with IWRs) and BHM results for 2011, and averaged over 25 and 50-year time horizons, respectively. Negative values indicate 
net benefits from climate change. Coefficients can be multiplied by total emissions (28,818 million tons in GTAPv9 for the 
year 2011), or by total emissions and SCC for comparison with other research. 
 
Consistent with previous research, our results show that the US and China are dominant outliers under 
both the PB and CB accounting perspectives, representing a cumulative 42.85% and 40.06% of global 
emissions, respectively. DB accounts tell a different story. IAM-DB (column 5) are mostly positive 
(except for Russian Federation, Canada, and Australia), and with absolute value ≤ 12.65. In contrast, 
BHM-DB coefficients are negative for 9 of 20 of the world’s biggest economies in 2011 and the 
56 
 
maximum absolute value is more than three times larger, at 42.38. BHM coefficients become less 
extreme as the time horizon is extended, reflecting that gains from moderate warming are eventually 
outweighed by damages at more extreme temperatures.  
3.6.2. Production versus Consumption Based Accounts 
Figure 4 showed that the carbon accounting debate largely focuses on the distinction between PB and 
CB approaches (Afionis et al. 2017). Table 5 and Figure 5 suggest a degree of agreement between PB 
and CB accounts. But Figure 7 shows the 20 economies with the greatest difference between PB and 
CB accounts, in millions of tons of CO2. Positive values indicate that PB emissions are greater than CB 
emissions, and the region is a net exporter of virtual carbon. Negative values indicate that CB 
emissions are greater than PB emissions, and the region is a net importer of virtual carbon.  
Figure 7 The accounting gap: Production minus Consumption Based Emissions 
 
Figure 7. The 20 countries with the greatest absolute value difference between PB and CB emissions. Values in millions of 
tons of CO2 for 2011. Rest of Western Asia includes Iraq, Lebanon, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, and Yemen. Positive 
(negative) values indicate the country is a net exporter (importer) of virtual carbon. Can be converted to monetary accounts 
using an appropriate SCC estimate. 
Our results confirm that when considering the contributions of individual countries to global 
(un)sustainability, the distinction between PB and CB accounts is minor. For the median country, the 
absolute value of the difference between (PB – CB) emissions is 5.8 million tons of CO2, which is 
approximately 0.02% of global emissions, or roughly equivalent to the PB emissions of Senegal. But 
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when considering country-level accounting, the distinction is important: for the median country, the 
absolute value of PB minus CB emissions represents 23% of PB emissions. Moreover, the countries in 
Fig. 7 represent approximately 3.3 billion people, (48% of global population), and 78% (3.36 Gt) of the 
world’s total GHG emissions embodied in international trade (virtual carbon). Thus, for measuring 
global sustainability, the PB versus CB distinction is of minor consequence. Indeed, they cover 
approximately the same quantity of emissions (with the caveat that PB accounts omit international 
shipping and aviation emissions). But for accounting at the country level, and for understanding the 
nature of national contributions to global emissions, the distinction can be meaningful. 
Figures 8 and 9 map PB and CB coefficients for the full sample, using the same scale (note that intervals 
are the same for panels a and b, but that within panels the intervals are of unequal range). In both 
perspectives, China, the USA, India, Russia, Japan, and Canada are dominant. Europe’s share of global 
emissions appears lower in PB accounts relative to CB accounts, confirming that Europe is a net 
importer of virtual carbon.  
Figure 8 Country-specific shares of global emissions under production-based accounting 
 
Figure 9 Country-specific shares of global emissions under consumption based accounting 
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Figures 8-9. Country-level attribution coefficients under PB (a) and CB (b) accounting perspectives. Both 
perspectives exhibit 0-lower bound. Both versions are dominated by a small number of outliers. Full sample, n 
= 140 regions (as in GTAPv9). Country-level coefficients represent the share of global emissions attributable to 
each country under each accounting perspective. Intervals are the same for panels a and b, but within panels 
the intervals are of unequal range. 
3.6.3. Damage based accounts 
Figure 10 maps country level damage coefficients calculated according to Burke et al (2015) for the 
year 2011. These coefficients incorporate the country-level loss of production capacity and are 
subsequently theoretically most consistent with the capitals theory of sustainability. Under the BHM 
model, currently cold northern countries experience negative damages (benefits) to mild warming. 
The range [-42.0 to + 35.0] is much greater than for PB and CB emissions, indicating the extreme 
heterogeneity of climate impacts and subsequent sustainability (wealth) effects across countries.  
The countries with the greatest magnitude difference between DB-BHM2011 and PB emissions 
include Germany, Canada, and the Russian Federation, whose economies are expected to benefit from 
mild warming, and Brazil, India, and the United Arab Emirates, who are expected to suffer damages 
disproportionate to their PB emissions. For instance, at 372 million tons of CO2, Brazil’s PB emissions 
represent just 1.3% of the global total, but the DB account reveals that it suffers 31.1% of the global 
loss of wealth due worldwide emissions from 2011. Similarly, India contributes 6.15% of global 
emissions (1,771.3 million tons of CO2) under the PB account, and suffers 34.78% of the value of global 
damages. 
Figure 10 Country-specific shares of global emissions under damage based perspective (BHM 2011) 
 
Figure 10 shows country-level GHG attribution coefficients calculated according to the BHM2011 variant of 
damage based accounts. Negative damages (blue) are modelled benefits from mild warming. Impacts are 
aggregated to match the 140 regions contained in GTAPv9 for comparison with other results. 
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At the global scale, some of these extreme damages are balanced by modelled gains. For instance, the 
long-run, observed, functional relationship between temperature and GDP growth derived in BHM 
indicates that Germany and Canada are expected to experience benefits equivalent to 42.4% and 
41.0% of the global GHG liability from 2011, respectively.  
3.6.4. Distributional Implications 
One of the most important implications of constructing GHG accounts from multiple perspectives is 
the ability to understand the distributional impacts of emissions from multiple angles. Figure 11 
illustrates the unequal distribution of ‘notional liabilities’ for GHG emissions across the global 
population by constructing population-weighted Lorenz Curves for PB, CB, and DB-IAM accounts. 
Lorenz curves plot the cumulative attribution of global emissions (vertical axis) against the cumulative 
share of the global population (horizontal axis). The black line (y=1) denotes the line of perfect 
equality. At any point along this line, the global share of GHG attributions is equal to the global share 
of population. Deviations to the lower right of the line of equality demonstrate increasing inequality. 
For instance, at the midpoint of the line of equality, 50% of the world’s population would be 
‘responsible for’ 50% of the world’s GHG emissions. However, the various accounting perspectives 
attribute only about 5-7% of global emissions to 50% of the global population.  
Lorenz curves for the PB and CB perspectives describe the inequality in the global distribution of 
production versus consumption-based emissions. The Lorenz curve for the DB-IAM reflects the 
inequality in the distribution of damages (wealth losses) due to global emissions, regardless of where 
they were released or where the resulting goods were consumed. Tightly nested Lorenz curves across 
PB, CB, and DB-IAM perspectives in Figure 11 indicate highly and similarly unequal global distribution 
of GHG attributions.  
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Figure 11 Inequality in emissions attributions: PB, CB, and DB-IAM accounting perspectives. 
Figure 11. Population-weighted Lorenz Curves for PB, CB, and DB-IAM accounting perspectives suggest that each 
accounting perspective describes similar inequality in the distribution of GHG allocations. The black line indicates 
the line of perfect equality. Deviations to the lower right indicate rising inequality in the distribution. Attributions 
are highly and similarly unequal across each PB, CB, and DB-IAM perspectives: approximately half the world’s 
population is accountable for just 5-7% of emissions attributions. 
Comparing the full suite of accounting perspectives, Figure 12 shows that the DB-BHM perspectives 
yield the most unequal distribution of wealth depletion due to climate change. It is possible for Lorenz 
curves to drop below the horizontal axis. Here, negatively sloped Lorenz curves demonstrate shares 
of the global population that are expected to experience benefits from warming (as determined by 
each accounting perspective).  
Within the three variants of the DB-BHM accounts, inequality decreases as the time horizon increases. 
This is because the initial marginal benefit of warming (negative damages) in currently cold countries 
are exhausted early-on. As climate changes, the negative consequences of additional warming 
moderate the distribution. However, Figure 12 clearly demonstrates that the DB-BHM perspectives 
indicate substantially more inequality arising due to GHG emissions than could be anticipated under 
PB, CB, or DB-IAM accounts. This is especially problematic because in the absence of international 
compensation for the wealth losses due to global emissions, this is the most reflective of the real 
world. 
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Figure 12 Inequality in emissions attributions: all perspectives  
Figure 12. Lorenz curves illustrate inequality in emissions attributions across all accounting perspectives. DB-
BHM_2011, DB-BHM_25yr, and DB-BHM_50yr refer to damage based coefficients calculated according to the 
2011, 25-year, and 50-year slices of country-level climate impacts from Burke et al (2015), respectively.  The 
black line indicates the line of perfect equality. Deviations to the lower right indicate rising inequality in the 
distribution.  
 
3.7. Discussion and Policy Implications  
 
GHG emissions represent a market failure that requires policy intervention. But in an increasingly 
globalized world, with goals in multiple domains of sustainable development, interventions must 
consider various interdependencies, vicious and virtuous feed-back loops, and complex trade-offs. 
Doing so requires a robust and reliable evidence base. Global climate change and the suite of 
Sustainable Development Goals represent multidimensional challenges. They are ill-served by 
unidimensional metrics. The argument here is not that one perspective should be adopted in lieu of 
the others, but that each offers useful insight into how progress towards sustainability might be 
measured. Sustainability science should provide the appropriate evidence bases to address 
multidimensional challenges from multiple angles.  
GHG accounts are a useful starting point. Noting that countries can impact emissions at multiple points 
along the GHG supply chain (Davis et al. 2011; Steininger et al. 2016) an important literature has 
emerged exploring the implications of developing carbon accounts from various perspectives. But 
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these have typically emphasized the location of emissions, and ignored the distribution of resulting 
damages.  If the sustainability of nations is the goal, then wealth accounts reflecting the damages of 
climate change are the appropriate metric. Thus far, the carbon component of wealth accounts has 
typically relied on PB accounts. Not only is this the wrong evidence base for sustainability 
measurement, reliance on PB accounts systematically ignores the potential for countries to promote 
upstream and downstream decarbonization. Perhaps most importantly, failing to account for carbon 
damages overlooks what may be the greatest source of inequality within the SDG remit: the 
distribution of wealth depletions due to climate change. Our results have shown that for some 
countries, the difference can be substantial. 
Consistent with the wealth theory, the damages calculated here represent a loss of wealth, or 
productive capacity. An interesting question for further work would be to clarify which component of 
wealth these losses should be attributed to. A strong case could be made that because emissions 
represent a depletion of climate capital, that they would fall under the natural capital umbrella. 
However, the social cost of carbon theoretically incorporates the full set of impacts arising from a unit 
of carbon. If climate change impacts human capital (eg. through reduced cognitive capacity and 
therefore lower labour productivity), physical capital (e.g. via property damages due to flood and fire), 
or social capital (e.g. via the impact of mass migration), then attributing the loss exclusively to natural 
capital would be misleading. In aggregate terms, this may not be an issue if the weak sustainability 
approach of perfect substitutability is assumed. However, to the extent that the capitals interact and 
may face limited substitutability, this has the potential to become a serious concern. 
The various complementary accounts presented here could be used to build a dashboard of GHG 
accounts for guiding and evaluating climate policy. The more complete information they convey may 
help to reduce policy blind spots, motivate more aggressive climate action, and identify opportunities 
for coordination and collaboration in climate policy. Coordination failures are widely recognized as 
obstacles to adopting stringent emissions policies. For instance, a PB account shows that at 400Mt 
CO2e, Australia emits just 1.3% of global emissions – a fact that is often cited in to suggest that 
unilateral climate policy in Australia would hurt the economy without having much impact on climate 
change overall. But in per capita terms, Australians emit 3.37 time more CO2 and 4.15 more GHGs than 
the global average citizen. Moreover, Australia’s fossil fuel exports (largely of coal and liquid natural 
gas) introduce a further 565.72 Mt CO2e into the global supply chain. Finally, the DB account shows 
that Australia is expected to incur between 4% and 8% of all climate damages. With just one-third of 
one percent of the global population, this means that Australia’s per capital loss of wealth due to 
climate change may be 12 to 24 times greater than that of the average global citizen. Focusing 
exclusively on the PB account would ignore the incentive Australians have to lobby for global action, 
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given their disproportionate exposure to climate damages. Moreover, Australia could also have an 
impact through its exports. With a comparative advantage in research and engineering, it could take 
a leadership role in developing and diffusing green technology throughout South East Asia (Agarwala 
2020). Thus, countries that may appear ‘too small to make a difference’ from one accounting 
perspective, could be significant players in different areas of the dashboard.  
Beyond the dashboard, the suite of accounts is relevant to measuring progress across multiple SDGs. 
In particular, progress towards SDG 12 on responsible production and consumption will require at 
least PB and CB accounts to be constructed and monitored. These should reflect impacts along global 
supply chains, and incorporate additional elements of natural capital beyond carbon emissions. 
Similarly, SDG 8.4 aims to promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth by improving 
resource efficiency in production and consumption, decoupling growth from environmental 
degradation, and developing 10-year framework programs on sustainable production and 
consumption. To be meaningful, these framework programs should include PB and CB GHG accounts, 
and attempts to decouple growth and environmental impact need to account for upstream and 
downstream effects along global supply chains.  
Our results also indicate that climate change could undermine progress towards reduced inequality 
(SDG 10) by more than was previously thought. The DB-BHM2011 perspective uncovers the potential 
for much greater inequality in wealth depletions than is found in either PB or CB accounts. This is 
clearly evident in the variation in country-level damage coefficients illustrated in Fig 10, and the 
resulting Lorenz curves in Fig 12. That the SDG devoted to reducing inequality, and its suite of 
indicators, fails to mention inclusive wealth suggests that these inequalities could easily be 
overlooked. 
Perhaps the most relevant SDG for this research is SDG 13: taking urgent action to combat climate 
change and its impacts. These goals provide the strongest justification for the development of damage 
based accounts. The impacts of climate change are not captured in PB or CB accounts. Only the DB 
perspective (whether using an IAM or country-level macroeconometric results as in BHM) actually 
complete the supply chain of GHG emissions by incorporating the incidence of the externality within 
an accounting framework. Moreover, the sustainability accounting story – linking the value of 
emissions to the wealth of nations according to their share of climate damages – also relates to 
ongoing policy discussions, particularly around how to disperse funds under the Green Climate Fund 
(SDG 13.a). One appropriate method could be to link the distribution of funds to shares of climate 
damages. This could identify those countries that should be ‘first in line’ for climate finance, and the 
actual release of funds could be tied to the merits of each individual project. That is, the Green Climate 
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Fund could support a reverse auction in which funds available to any given country could be weighted 
by their share of climate-induced wealth depletions.  
Finally, this research directly contributes to SDG 17.19: building on existing initiative to develop 
measurements of progress on sustainable development. Sustainability accounts constructed on the 
basis of any single accounting perspective will systematically ignore important lessons from climate 
science and undermine our understanding of the carbon wealth of nations. Climate change and the 
sustainability policies are too important to be exposed to the systematic blind-spots of any individual 
accounting perspective. A suite of accounts emphasizing different components of the carbon wealth 
of nations is necessary. The resulting evidence will be relevant to the design and evaluation of both 
climate and sustainability policies, and more importantly, to making them compatible with one 
another.  
3.8. Conclusions 
 
The carbon accounting literature compares the ethical, policy and economic implications of 
accounting for the emissions generated within a country’s borders (the territorial, or production 
perspective), versus adopting a consumption perspective that considers emissions implicitly 
embodied within a country’s final demand. We place this debate within the broader context of 
sustainability accounting and develop extended accounts to reflect the wealth impacts of carbon 
externalities. Different accounting perspectives yield substantively different understandings of 
country-level emissions and the contributions of individual nations to global (un)sustainability.   
Carbon accounting has failed to reach its full potential in guiding sustainability science for several 
reasons. They have not connected with the increasingly influential ‘capitals theory’ of sustainability, 
and its associated wealth accounting literature. This is because PB and CB accounts focus on the 
location of emissions, ignoring the location of wealth depletions. The failure to address globalization 
and growth in international trade has undermined the potential impact of carbon accounts and 
national policies by failing to highlight opportunities for de-carbonization along global supply chains.   
To address this we have developed multiple carbon accounts, made them theoretically consistent with 
the capitals approach to sustainability (by extending accounting procedures to include the incidence 
of climate damages, ie wealth depletions), and examined the distributional effects highlighted by each 
accounting perspective. Damage based accounts are constructed according to two scientific evidence 
bases, the RICE99 IAM (Nordhaus and Boyer 2000) and Burke et al (2015). Results are linked to 
multiple SDGs, and a dashboard approach comprising multiple accounting perspectives is advocated 
to help identify and overcome blind spots, and identify new areas to target effort and influence.  
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4. MEASURING SUSTAINABILITY WITH THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
GOALS: PRINCIPLE, PRINCIPAL, AND PRACTICE 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
This paper examines whether the sustainable development goals in practice deliver the paradigm shift 
they represent in principle. The sustainable development goals (SDGs) provide the overarching 
framework of the 2030 international development agenda. Combined, the 17 SDGs, 169 targets, and 
232 unique indicators provide the benchmark against which national and global sustainability will be 
measured. They are the North Star of the international community (Wackernagel et al. 2017). But to 
what extent do the SDGs truly re-orient and provide a new direction for the global political economy? 
This paper examines the extent to which measured progress towards achieving the SDGs represents 
a departure from ‘development as usual’.  
Amidst many competing and complementary definitions (Böhringer and Jochem 2007; Atkinson et al. 
2014), the SDGs and associated indicators effectively ‘reveal’ the global community’s adopted 
definition of sustainable development. The goals are intended to represent a new direction, a re-
orientation of the global political economy towards a system that delivers for people, planet, and 
prosperity (Griggs et al. 2013). Inherent within them is an acknowledgement that development is a 
multidimensional challenge requiring integrated progress across multiple objectives for all countries 
(Obersteiner et al. 2016; Stafford-Smith et al. 2017; Breuer et al. 2019).  
The goals move beyond the North-South development dichotomy which styles development as 
something to which poor countries aspire and wealthy countries ante up (Caballero 2019). Some of 
the world’s wealthiest countries still face “major challenges” across goals on reduced inequalities and 
sustainable consumption and production (Sachs et al. 2019). A related and central feature of the SDGs 
is that they integrate concern for the environment across the full suite of goals, rather than separating 
‘environmental’ and ‘economic’ objectives (Elder and Olsen 2019). Breaking down the barrier between 
the environment and development communities in this way is a substantial structural achievement 
for the 2030 Agenda (Caballero 2019).  
But for all their strengths, the SDGs also face serious challenges. A perennial objection, common to all 
alternatives and complements to GDP, is essentially an argument for business as usual. Its logic is 
succinct. If the new measure is well correlated with GDP, it offers little new information. If it is not, 
then it ignores too much relevant information. Either way, per capita GDP is still the best measure 
around. In their simplest form, objections on these grounds are both defeatist and useless in the 
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pursuit of sustainability (however defined), and robust rebuttals have been provided by leading 
economists  (Nordhaus and Tobin 1972; Weitzman 1976; Sen 1983; Stiglitz et al. 2009a; Coyle 2015). 
Whilst it would be problematic if the SDGs could be compressed to a single indicator such as per capita 
GDP, the research set out here joins a global evidence base confirming this is not the case. A parallel 
question posed by Thomas Schelling (1992) concerns whether poor countries should sacrifice growth 
to reduce e.g. climate change, or whether they should develop at all costs and face the environmental 
consequences later, as richer economies. The analysis attempts to shed light on both of these 
questions: does SDG performance genuinely go ‘beyond GDP’ and, if SDG performance is the globally 
agreed definition of sustainable development, should countries attempt to achieve it by a narrow 
focus on per capita GDP growth or should they pursue broader environmental and social objectives as 
well? 
Reducing poverty and raising material living standards for the world’s poorest are development 
necessities, but will likely add to environmental pressures for at least the short- to medium-run. Trade-
offs between biodiversity conservation and human wellbeing are a constant challenge to meeting 
ecological targets (McShane et al. 2011; Agarwala et al. 2014b; Milner-Gulland et al. 2014). Strategies 
for ending hunger (SDG 2) and ensuring affordable food can conflict with policies to conserve 
terrestrial ecosystems (SDG 15). Indeed many other trade-offs can be identified – between access to 
energy and greenhouse gas emissions (Fuso Nerini et al. 2018), between development aid and the 
development of democracy (Deaton 2013), and between enhancing domestic versus global 
sustainability (Atkinson et al. 2012; Dupuy and Agarwala 2014). Overall, the goal most frequently 
associated with trade-offs is SDG 12, on sustainable consumption and production (Pradhan et al. 
2017). A chief contribution of this paper is to formally identify trade-offs and synergies between the 
goals using established statistical methods. A key concern is whether the SDGs can reconcile the need 
for large improvements in material living standards with the need for large reductions in 
environmental impacts. 
I start from the position that sustainability is a latent concept. It has no obvious unit of measure, no 
universally accepted definition, and the breadth of topics it encompasses inevitably leads to a range 
of synergies and trade-offs. Sustainability cannot be observed. But we can observe many of its 
components and by analysing them, contribute to the knowledge base. In short, sustainability is a 
multidimensional challenge and to understand it requires multidimensional statistics. This paper 
employs established latent variable techniques for reducing the dimensionality of complex data into 
a manageable set of variables. Principal components analysis (PCA) is a useful tool for reducing the 
dimensionality of large dataset whilst retaining maximum information (Bartholomew et al. 2008; 
Jollife and Cadima 2016; Lever et al. 2017). It has applications across myriad disciplines, and has been 
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used in contexts ranging from measuring and defining social capital and environmental performance 
(Morse 2018; Wealth Economy 2019) to identifying and classifying the earliest mammalian species 
(Gill et al. 2014). 
I conduct PCA on data provided by the SDG Index (Sachs et al. 2019). Developed by Bertelsmann 
Stiftung and the Sustainable Development Solutions Network, the SDG Index measures country-level 
performance on each of the 17 SDGs.  It is not an official UN Standard, but is audited by the European 
Commission Joint Research Centre (Papadimitriou et al. 2019). The 2019 Index covers 162 countries 
and includes a total 114 indicators (Lafortune et al. 2018; Sachs et al. 2019). There are at least four 
potential results: 
1. Mission failed: PCA reveals a single component explaining the vast majority of total variation 
across the SDG scores, and which clearly distinguishes countries by per capita GDP. The 
remaining components describe very little variation so differences in SDG performance can 
be explained by differences in per capita GDP. The distance between SDG ambition and 
reality is high, and the best single measure of development is still per capita GDP. 
2. Mission impossible: PCA reveals a dominant single component that contrasts ‘economic’ 
performance against environmental damage. At one end are wealthy but environmentally 
damaging economies, and at the other countries are too poor to make a footprint. In this 
outcome, the SDGs perfectly describe an environment versus development dichotomy, and 
the social and governance elements of the SDG agenda have little role. This would be 
damning result for the SDGs, which depend on the possibility of decoupling economic 
growth from environmental destruction, and would lend credence to the ‘de-growth’ 
argument. 
3. Mission irrelevant or ‘development by silos’: There are 17 principal components, each 
describing 1/17th of the total original variance. The goals are completely independent and 
progress towards any one of them tells us nothing about progress towards the others. Each 
goal may be pursued independently and there is no scope for synergy or risk of trade-off4. 
4. Mission accomplished: The SDGs are multidimensional in practice, as well as in principle. 
Several components are required to explain the variation across SDG scores and they have 
credible interpretations. Per capita GDP alone is an insufficient proxy for SDG performance 
and environmental, social, and economic objectives are clearly evident in the components. If 
a small number of components describes most of the variation, then there is a degree of 
 
4 An interesting alternative interpretation of this outcome is that the method has simply failed, on the grounds 
that we know there are important synergies between some of the goals which should be picked up in the 
analysis. 
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synergy and complementarity among goals and SDG performance entails success in multiple 
domains. Trade-offs between goals may also be evident and the analysis provides insight 
into what these may be. 
This paper’s chief contribution is to examine the extent to which the SDGs and associated indicators 
represent a truly new direction for the international development community, and if so, to offer an 
empirically defensible overview of what that new direction entails. Numerous reviews have found 
trade-offs and synergies among the goals. Some of these entail detailed models, others merely analyse 
the textual descriptions of the goals and indicators themselves. The approach taken here uses 
principal components analysis to elucidate and describe statistical relationships between the goals. 
Data comes from the SDG Index, which is the leading, global benchmark for measuring SDG 
performance. The inductive approach taken here is made possible by recent data that was unavailable 
to previous studies. Longer time series would permit more detailed statistical analysis, but sufficient 
data now exists to conduct early analysis into core themes across SDG measurement. However, results 
should be interpreted with caution. PCA interpretation entails a subjective element: relationships can 
be informative, but can also be spurious. Finally, it is likely that some discrepancy exists between what 
an SDG attempts to measure in principle, and what the available data actually measures in practice. 
Because this is a data-driven exercise, my findings are subject to all the caveats and contingencies that 
apply where measurements are imperfect proxies for the variable of interest. 
The research is timely in that it coincides with ongoing discussions within the Inter-Agency Expert 
Group on the SDGs, with the UN Statistics Division, and between National Statistical Offices, think 
tanks, businesses, non-governmental organisations, and academics. Many of the official indicators 
listed in the SDGs still lack official statistical definitions and as such are under continuous review. The 
UN Statistical Commission will conduct is comprehensive review of the official SDG indicators at its 
51st session in 2020 (and again in 2025). By examining principal components derived from the current 
stock of indicators for which data does exist, we can identify priorities for the development of new 
ones. The headline result is that per capita GDP accounts for only about half of the SDG scores of 
nations, meaning (i) about half of SDG performance is uncorrelated with per capita GDP and (ii) if we 
accepted the SDGs as the measure of progress, then development strategies based on a narrow 
pursuit of GDP growth would only get us about half way there. 
The next section provides an overview of the SDGs and their measurement. Sections 3 and 4 describe 
the method and data. Section 5 describes results and is followed by a discussion of lessons learned 
and policy implications. A brief final section concludes. 
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4.2. Context 
 
This research is concerned with the distance between the ambition of the SDGs and the reality of the 
indicators. For clarity, the goals and brief descriptions are listed in Table 75. Progress towards the goals 
is defined in terms of meeting targets, which is in turn measured by individual indicators. A striking 
feature, common to all the goals is that their titles and brief descriptions are easy to grasp 
conceptually, but difficult to define concretely. It falls to countries, practitioners, and sustainability 
researchers to try to translate lofty goals into statistical measures. Data collection is a major challenge 
in implementing and monitoring SDG progress. Breuer et al (2019) note that given the complexity of 
interconnections within and between goals and the magnitude of the measurement challenge, policy 
makers may be tempted to continue with business as usual and hope that positive outcomes will 
eventually match official SDG indicators. Indeed, coordination costs may be high. Galli et al (2018) 
found that in Montenegro, 26 institutions handle data for assessing just 137 (56.8%) of the official SDG 
indicators. 
Nor are the indicators necessarily well defined. The UN Inter-Agency Expert Group on the SDGs (IAEG-
SDG) categorizes the official indicators into three tiers based on the quality of statistical methodology 
and data coverage (IAEG-SDGs 2019): 
• Tier I: Indicator is conceptually clear, has an internationally established methodology, data 
are regularly produced by countries for at least 50% of countries and of the population in 
every region where the indicator is relevant 
• Tier II: Indicator is conceptually clear, has an internationally established methodology, but 
data are not regularly produced by countries  
• Tier III: No international established methodology or standards are available yet, but they 
are being (or will be) developed or tested. 
As of the September 2019 IAEG-SDG update, there are 104 Tier I indicators, 89 Tier II Indicators, and 
33 Tier III indicators (with an additional 6 indicators that have components categorized in different 
tiers).  As official SDG data coverage becomes stronger, the relationships shown in the present analysis 
can be expected to change.  
 
5 Three reference documents are useful for following and interpreting this research. Table 7 provides a list of 
SDGs with brief descriptions. The official UN list of goals and targets is here: https://undocs.org/A/RES/71/313 . 
And the list of indicators actually included in the 2019 SDG Index is available in Appendix 4 or more completely 
as Table 7 here:  
https://s3.amazonaws.com/sustainabledevelopment.report/2019/2019_sustainable_development_report.pdf 
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Table 7 Summary of SDGs, targets, and number of indicators used in the SDG Index 
SDG TITLE DESCRIPTION TARGETS SDG-I  
1 No Poverty End poverty in all its forms everywhere 7 3 
2 Zero Hunger End hunger achieve food security and 
improved nutrition and promote sustainable 
agriculture 
8 8 
3 Good Health & wellbeing Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being 
for all at all ages 
13 17 
4 Quality Education Ensure inclusive and quality education for all 
and promote lifelong learning 
10 9 
5 Gender Equality Achieve gender equality and empower all 
women and girls 
9 6 
6 Clean Water & Sanitation Ensure access to water & sanitation for all 8 7 
7 Affordable & Clean 
Energy 
Ensure access to affordable, reliable, 
sustainable and modern energy for all 
5 4 
8 Decent Work & Economic 
Growth 
Promote inclusive and sustainable economic 
growth, employment and decent work for all 
12 7 
9 Industry, Innovation, and 
Infrastructure 
Build resilient infrastructure, promote 
sustainable industrialization and foster 
innovation 
8 10 
10 Reduced Inequalities Reduce inequality within and among 
countries 
10 3 
11 Sustainable Cities and 
Communities 
Make cities inclusive, safe, resilient and 
sustainable 
10 4 
12 Responsible 
Consumption and 
Production 
Ensure sustainable consumption and 
production patterns 
11 7 
13 Climate Action Take urgent action to combat climate change 
and its impacts 
5 5 
14 Life Below Water Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, 
seas and marine resources 
10 4 
15 Life on Land Sustainably manage forests, combat 
desertification, halt and reverse land 
degradation, halt biodiversity loss 
12 5 
16 Peace, Justice and Strong 
Institutions 
Promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies 12 10 
17 Partnerships for the 
Goals 
Revitalize the global partnership for 
sustainable development 
19 5 
 
The clear intention behind the 2030 Agenda is that sustainable development is pursued across 
multiple fronts simultaneously. An alternative strategy entails prioritizing key goals and pursuing them 
sequentially, though this is a clear violation of holistic intention behind the 2030 Agenda. The SDG 
Open Working Group was clear and deliberate in its decision not to prioritize individual goals 
(Caballero 2019). A siloed approach would undermine the Agenda and lead to policy incoherence.  
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Silo-prevention is easiest if strategic complementarities, synergies, and trade-offs within and between 
goals and indicators can be identified and exploited. Breuer et al (2019) review the literature on 
attempts to organize and classify links between SDGs. One approach entails clustering goals and 
organizing them within a conceptual framework such as planetary boundaries (Rockstrom et al. 2009; 
O’Neill et al. 2018; Breuer et al. 2019). But these approaches organize goals around their stated intent, 
using the text and policy area as guides. They do not entail empirical analysis of the indicators 
themselves. 
An alternative strategy arbitrarily places one goal at the centre of the analysis and examines its links 
to the rest of the SDGs. Singh et al (2018) develop a hierarchical structure for identifying links between 
SDG 14 (life below water) and the rest of the goals. Through a series of expert workshops, they identify 
260 positive and just 7 negative relationships between SDG 14 indicators and the rest of the goals, but 
there is no statistical analysis of primary SDG data to support the findings. Others place specific issues 
at the centre of analysis and evaluate trade-offs across the goals. Canavan et al (2016) and Kanter et 
al (2018) focus on agriculture and nutrition, noting that policies to improve these outcomes will have 
impacts and dependencies across many other goals and must be designed and implemented at 
multiple scales, bringing global goals to local decision making. 
An alternative approach entails analysing the SDGs as a suite, considering all goals simultaneously. 
Mapping connections from 107 individual targets across 16 SDGs, Le Blanc (2015) showed that SDG 
12 (sustainable consumption and production) and SDG 10 (reduced inequality) were core ‘hubs,’ 
binding the suite of SDGs in a tighter network. However, his approach defined network links in terms 
of textual overlap between the official descriptions of goals and targets. This is a low bar. Any goal or 
target that mentions the word ‘inequality’ is granted a network link in Le Blanc’s analysis. 
Furthermore, textual analysis of SDG descriptions and targets does not necessarily map on to statistics 
actually measured in specific indicators.  
Griggs et al (2014) attempt to define a set of ‘equations’ that represent links and trade-offs between 
goals, but in effect arrive at something closer to a description of relationships than meaningful 
equations. Even here, they are limited in their analysis to just 6 goals. What these approaches have in 
common is that they largely focus on the stated intentions and official text of the SDGs. Instead, the 
inductive approach taken here is purely empirical, focusing on relatively newly available data to 
determine whether core themes can be identified. Plotting Human Development Index (HDI) scores 
against Ecological Footprints, Wackernagel et al (2017) show that countries with strong performance 
in both the SDGs and the HDI also have high Ecological Footprints. The top 10 SDG performers are 
among the top 15 HDI performers and have per capita Ecological Footprints that exceed World 
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Biocapacity per capita by over 200%, suggesting that that the development side of the SDGs dominates 
the sustainability side. The present analysis adds to this discussion by deploying a different method to 
a similar question. Namely, I examine whether the broad goals and multiple indicators of the SDGs 
can be empirically described as a fundamentally new direction for development.  
 
4.3. Methods 
 
Principal components analysis (PCA) is a tool for reducing the dimensionality of data whilst retaining 
as much information as possible. Originally proposed by Pearson (1901) and developed by Hotelling 
(1933), it is used to summarize complex and nuanced multivariate data in a succinct and readily 
interpretable manner (Dunteman 1989). The objective is to replace p observed and correlated 
variables (𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑝) with a small number of newly constructed and uncorrelated variables (𝑦1, … , 𝑦𝑝) 
that convey most of the information contained in the original 𝑥’s (Bartholomew et al. 2008). The newly 
constructed 𝑦 variables are called principal components and are constructed such that 𝑦1 explains the 
greatest possible proportion of the total variance contained in the original 𝑥’s, whilst 𝑦2 explains the 
greatest possible proportion of the remaining variance and so on (Bartholomew et al. 2008). If the 
first one or two 𝑦’s explain most of the total variance of the original 𝑥’s, then the dimensionality of 
the original data can be reduced from p variables to just one or two principal components. 
PCA may only be undertaken when there is sufficient meaningful correlation among the original 
variables to warrant the principal component representation. Several widely used tests exist for 
establishing the adequacy of data for undertaking PCA: computation of Bartlett’s sphericity test 
(Bartlett 1950), scree plot analysis, and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measures of sampling adequacy 
(Dziuban and Shirkey 1974).  
Bartlett’s sphericity essentially examines whether each successive eigenvalue is significantly different 
from the remaining eigenvalues (Jackson 1993). Conceptually, it identifies the point at which 
remaining principal components describe a spherical distribution of points (i.e. they have no coherent 
interpretation). The test computes a chi-square statistic with H0 that the sample correlation matrix 
describes independent variables from a normal population. Rejecting H0 indicates the data are fit for 
PCA (Dziuban and Shirkey 1974). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy tests 
the appropriateness of each variable for inclusion and the group as a whole. It takes values between 
0 and 1, with interpretation as follows (Dziuban and Shirkey 1974): 
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Table 8 Interpretation of Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy 
Score Adequacy of Data for PCA 
0.00 – 0.49 Unacceptable 
0.50 – 0.59 Miserable 
0.60 – 0.69 Mediocre 
0.70 – 0.79 Middling 
0.80 – 0.89 Meritorious 
0.90 – 1.00 Marvellous 
  
Following Cox (2005) the theory underlying principal components analysis can be described as follows: 
Let x =  (𝑋1 , 𝑋2 , … , 𝑋𝑝)′ be the original variables (SDG scores). Let y =  (𝑌1 , 𝑌2 , … , 𝑌𝑝)′ denote the 
newly created variables. PCA transforms x to y such that: 
i. 𝑌𝑗 =  𝑎1𝑗𝑋1 + 𝑎2𝑗𝑋2 + … + 𝑎𝑝𝑗𝑋𝑝           ( 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑝)  
ii. 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑌𝑗  , 𝑌𝑘) = 0                                              (𝑗 ≠ 𝑘) 
iii. The 𝑌𝑗
′𝑠 are ordered such that 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑌1) ≥  𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑌2) ≥  …  ≥  𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑌𝑝)  
The newly created 𝑌1 is the first principal component, 𝑌2 is the second, and so on. 
Let x have a mean vector 𝝁  and a covariance matrix 𝚺 . Let 𝒂𝑗 = (𝑎1𝑗, … , 𝑎𝑝𝑗)′ . The principal 
components are 
𝑌𝑗 =  𝒂𝒋
′x 
The first principal component, 𝑌1 , is found by choosing 𝒂1 such that  𝑌1  has the largest possible 
variance, subject to the constraint that 𝒂1
′ 𝒂1 = 1. The constraint rules out the degenerate case in 
which 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑌𝑗)  →  ∞ and is similarly imposed on all components, 𝒂j
′𝒂j = 1  (𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑝). 
Now 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑌1) − 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝒂𝟏
′ 𝐱) =  𝒂1
′ 𝚺𝒂1 = 𝑉 . We maximize 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑌1) using a Lagrange multiplier, 𝜆, and 
so consider 
𝑉 =  𝒂1
′ 𝚺𝒂1 −  𝜆(𝒂1
′ 𝒂1 − 1) 
Differentiating with respect to 𝒂1, and setting equal to 0 gives 
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝒂1
= 2𝚺𝒂1 − 2𝜆𝒂1 = 𝟎 
Hence 
(𝚺 −  𝜆𝐈)𝒂1 = 𝟎      (1) 
The matrix 𝚺 −  𝜆𝐈 must be singular (i.e. its determinant is zero) in order for Eq 1 to have a solution 
other than 𝒂1 = 𝟎. Thus 𝜆 satisfies 
|𝚺 −  𝜆𝐈| =  𝟎, 
We there is a solution if and only if 𝜆 has an eigenvalue of 𝚺. 
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Now 𝚺 has 𝑝 eigenvalues 𝜆1, 𝜆2, … , 𝜆𝑝, which are all non-negative, since 𝚺 is positive semi-definite. 
Assume these are distinct, and labelled such that 𝜆1 >  𝜆2 > ⋯ >  𝜆𝑝  ≥ 0. Now 
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑌1) = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝒂𝟏
′ 𝐱) =  𝒂1
′ 𝚺𝒂1        
=  𝒂1
′ 𝛌𝐈𝒂1      (from Eq 1)    
=  𝜆𝒂1
′ 𝒂1      
=  𝜆       
Since 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑌1) is to have maximum variance, 𝜆 has to be chosen as the largest eigenvalue, 𝜆1, and 
hence 𝒂1 must be the right eigenvector of 𝚺 corresponding to 𝜆1. 
 
The second principal component, 𝑌2 , is found similarly. We have 𝑌2 =  𝒂2
′ x with the normalising 
condition  𝒂2
′ 𝒂2 = 1. We also need 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑌1, 𝑌2) = 0. Now  
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑌1, 𝑌2) = 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝒂𝟐
′ 𝐱, 𝒂𝟏
′ 𝐱) 
=  Ε[𝒂𝟐
′ (𝐱 −  𝛍) × 𝒂𝟏
′ (𝐱 −  𝛍) ]   
=  Ε[𝒂𝟐
′ (𝐱 −  𝛍)(𝐱 −  𝛍)′𝒂1]    
=  𝒂𝟐
′ Ε[(𝐱 −  𝛍)(𝐱 −  𝛍)′]𝒂1    
=  𝒂2
′ 𝚺𝒂1      
=  𝒂2
′ 𝛌𝟏𝒂1 =  𝛌𝟏𝒂2
′ 𝒂1       
=  0, if and only if,  𝒂2
′ 𝒂1 = 0       
Thus 𝒂1 and 𝒂2 must be orthogonal.  
We now maximise 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑌2) facing two constraints,  
𝑉 =  𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑌2) =  𝒂2
′ 𝚺𝒂2 −  𝜆(𝒂2
′ 𝒂2 − 1) −  𝛿(𝒂2
′ 𝒂1 − 0).  
Differentiating with respect to 𝒂2 and equating to 0, 
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝒂2
= 2(𝚺 − 𝜆𝐈)𝒂2 −  𝛿𝒂1 = 𝟎 
Premultiply by 𝒂1
′ , to give 
2𝒂1
′ (𝚺 − 𝜆𝐈)𝒂2 −  𝛿𝒂1
′ 𝒂1 = 𝟎       
i.e. 
2𝒂1
′ 𝚺𝒂2 − 2𝜆𝒂1
′ 𝒂2 −  𝛿𝒂1
′ 𝒂1 = 𝟎 
But 𝒂1
′ 𝚺𝒂2  =  𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑌1, 𝑌2)  =  0, 𝒂1
′ 𝒂2  =  0 and 𝒂1
′ 𝒂1 = 1, and thus Eq 3 reduces to  
𝛿 =  0. 
Hence, Eq 2 becomes 
(𝚺 − 𝜆𝐈)𝒂2  =  0, 
Eq 2 
Eq 3 
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and 
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑌2)  =  𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝒂2
′ 𝐱 )  =   𝒂2
′ 𝚺𝒂2  =  𝒂2
′ λ𝒂2  =  𝜆. 
This second 𝜆 also has an eigenvalue 𝚺. It cannot be chosen as the largest eigenvalue (which is taken 
by the first principal component) and is instead chosen as the second largest eigenvalue so that 𝒂2 is 
the corresponding eigenvector. The process is continued to obtain the rest of the principal 
components 𝑌1 , 𝑌2 , … , 𝑌𝑝. The 𝑗th component is given by 𝑌𝑗 =  𝒂𝒋
′x, where 𝒂j is the 𝑗th eigenvector 
of 𝚺, and 𝑣𝑎𝑟(Y𝑗)  =  𝜆𝑗, where 𝜆𝑗 is the 𝑗th eigenvalue of 𝚺. 
Organising all principal components into a single vector, y =  (𝑌1 , 𝑌2 , … , 𝑌𝑝)′ , we place the 
eigenvectors of 𝚺 into matrix 𝐀, so that 𝐀 =  [ 𝒂1 , 𝒂2 , …  , 𝒂j]. Then 
y = A’x 
with 
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝐲) =  𝚲 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝜆1, 𝜆2, … , 𝜆𝑝) 
Now 
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝐲) =  𝚲 = 𝐀′𝚺𝐀, 
and so, as 𝐀 is orthogonal with 𝐀−𝟏 = 𝐀′, 
𝚺 = 𝐀𝚲𝐀′, 
Showing that finding principal components is essentially the same as finding the spectral 
decomposition of 𝚺. 
Now 
∑ 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑌𝑗) =  ∑ 𝜆𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1
= tr(𝚲)
𝑝
𝑗=1
 
= tr(𝐀′𝚺𝐀)      
= tr(𝚺𝐀′𝐀)      
= tr(𝚺)       
Therefore 
∑ 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑌𝑗) =  ∑ 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑋𝑗)
𝑝
𝑗=1
𝑝
𝑗=1
 
 
and so the sum of the variances of the principal components is equal to the sum of the variances of 
the original variables. ∑ 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑋𝑗)
𝑝
𝑗=1  is the total variation in the data, and that the 𝑗 th principal 
component accounts for the proportion 
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𝜆𝑗
∑ 𝜆𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
 
of this. Similarly, the first 𝑚 principal components account for 
∑ 𝜆𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1
∑ 𝜆𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
 
Of the total variation. 
Principal components analysis is a powerful tool for distilling salient features from complex data. It is 
widely used through the ecology, biology, psychology, pedagogy, business management, and market 
research. However, it is rarely used in economics, despite many concepts and datasets that are strong 
candidates for this kind of analysis. Business and consumer confidence are broadly acknowledged as 
important economic indicators yet can only be understood as latent concepts. Indeed, many of the 
most interesting areas of contemporary economic research deal specifically with latent variables such 
as social capital (Scrivens and Smith 2013; Wealth Economy 2019), identity (Akerlof and Kranton 2000, 
2010), and economic narratives (Shiller 2017, 2019). It is particularly useful for analysing survey data. 
Using survey responses from 12 developed and developing countries, Bain et al (2019) use PCA to 
construct mental maps describing public perceptions of the sustainable development goals. Results 
showed that the public understanding of sustainability differs across countries and cultures, and can 
therefore be used in targeting communications about sustainable development. Bain et al (2019) use 
PCA to analyse survey responses and comment on the public understanding of sustainability. In 
contrast, I analyse data on SDG performance directly to comment on whether the SDG framework in 
practice is delivering on its objectives in principal. 
 
4.4. Data  
 
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development sets out 17 Sustainable Development Goals that 
include 169 targets measured by 232 unique indicators. The development of new official statistics and 
economic measures for setting and evaluating policy is an important element of the 2030 Agenda. 
While some of the 232 SDG indicators have close analogues in existing official statistics, many do not. 
This is by design. One objective of the SDGs is to provide a broader focus for policy and measurement, 
going beyond standard income-driven measures. A consequence, however, is that there is no 
comprehensive dataset with global coverage that includes all 232 indicators. This too, is by design. 
Whilst the broad goals and targets are set, the statistical standards are ‘living’ in that they continue to 
evolve as data becomes available and lessons are learned during implementation.  
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In the absence of an official UN dataset with comprehensive SDG coverage, data for this study come 
from the SDG Index and Dashboards 2019 (Sachs et al. 2019). Developed by Bertelsmann Stiftung and 
the Sustainable Development Solutions Network, the SDG Index measures country-level performance 
on each of the 17 SDGs. It is not an official UN Standard, but is audited by the European Commission 
Joint Research Centre (Papadimitriou et al. 2019). The 2019 Index covers 162 countries and includes 
a total 114 indicators, 85 of which have global coverage with an additional 29 for OECD countries. 
Approximately 35% of these are exact matches for the indicators approved by the Inter-Agency and 
Expert Group on SDG Indicators, 24% are closely aligned, and 40% are not available in UNSTATS. 
Criteria for inclusion in the Index include: 
1. Global relevance, applicability across countries, and international comparability 
2. Statistical adequacy 
3. Regular, timely availability of data 
4. Data quality and the legitimacy and reliability of the data source 
5. Global coverage (data must be available for at least 80% of UN Member States with 
population greater than 1 million).  
The underlying data for the 2019 Index entails a mix of official (≈ 65%) and non-official (≈ 35%) data. 
More than half of the official data comes from OECD, WHO, and UNICEF. Non-official data come from 
academic institutions, NGOs, and the published research literature. They are used where official 
measures are known to contain systematic biases and to bridge data gaps, “in particular to gauge 
environmental spill over effects embodied into trade via input-output estimations” (Lafortune et al. 
2018, p15). On average, 7 indicators per goal are included, though this varies from 3 indicators for 
SDG 1 (zero poverty) and SDG 10 (reduced inequality), to 17 indicators for SDG 3 (good health and 
wellbeing). See Sachs et al (2019) for a full mapping of 114 indicators across the 17 goals. 
Indicator data is normalized via the min-max method with a rescaling range of [0, 100]. This facilitates 
interpretation as higher scores indicate better performance (Lafortune et al. 2018; Papadimitriou et 
al. 2019). The SDG Index is constructed such that a country’s score on each goal can be interpreted as 
the percentage of achievement. For instance, the UK’s score on SDG 5 (gender equality) is 81.29 
indicating that the UK is on average 81.29% of the way to achieving this goal. As such, country scores 
for each goal can range from 0 (worst possible position) to 100 (best possible position). This requires 
a definition of the best and worst possible positions. Where possible, absolute quantitative thresholds 
are used (e.g. zero poverty, universal school completion, etc). Where no quantitative target is 
available, the upper bound is determined according to the ‘leave no one behind’ principle. In practice, 
this amounts to using universal access as the upper bound for some topics (e.g. coverage of public 
78 
 
services, access to infrastructure, wastewater treatment, etc) or ‘zero deprivation’ (e.g. for measures 
of extreme poverty such as wasting). Deadline-specific biophysical targets such as ‘zero GHG emissions 
from electricity by 2070’ are set as their own upper bounds. In some cases, several countries already 
out-perform the SDG target (e.g. child mortality rates). In such instances, the upper bound is set as 
the average of the top five performing countries. Overall, just 12% of indicator used in the Index have 
upper bounds that exactly match official SDG targets. 44% are set using the average of top performers, 
26% employ biophysical maximums, and 19% rely on the leave no one behind principle (Lafortune et 
al. 2018). 
Several caveats must be considered when using the SDG Index. Not all goals have equal country 
coverage (see Table 7), and not all countries have equal SDG coverage. It is possible that (i) an 
individual indicator has sufficient global coverage for inclusion in the Index whilst (ii) a given country 
lacks data on that specific indicator. In such cases, countries with missing data are assigned their 
regional average score for each goal. For instance, Afghanistan did not have data for SDG 1 and was 
therefore assigned the regional score for East Europe and Central Asia (Papadimitriou et al. 2019). 
Additionally, while the SDG Index assigns equal weights at the goal level, this does not mean that it 
assigns equal weights at the indicator level. For instance, each of the 17 indicators used to calculate 
the Index score for SDG 3 contribute 1/17th of the weight, whereas the 3 indicators used to calculate 
the score for SDG 1 contribute 1/3rd.  
To aggregate from individual indicators to scores for each SDG, the Index relies simply on the 
arithmetic mean. This aids interpretation, but enables perfect compensability between indicators. 
Within a given goal, high scores on some indicators can ‘compensate’ for low scores on another. This 
is an undesirable feature. One alternative is to aggregate from the indicator level to the goal level 
using the geometric mean, as this is a non-compensatory measure (meaning success in one indicator 
cannot compensate poor performance in another). Papadimitriou et al (2019) show that this has 
minimal effect on actual rankings. The European Commission’s statistical audit concludes that the 
Index results are “robust enough, allowing meaningful conclusions to be drawn from the index” 
(Papadimitriou et al. 2019, p2). 
Table 9 provides summary statistics of country-level SDG Index scores for the 2019 Index. Sample sizes 
differ slightly across goals due to data availability. For instance, SDG 14 (life below water) has no data 
for land-locked countries. Variances range an order of magnitude, from 95.75 (SDG 2 – zero hunger) 
to 991.94 (SDG 1 – no poverty). This is important in PCA because components are constructed to 
explain the greatest possible share of total variance across the original variables. Original variables 
with greater variance are therefore weighted more heavily. If the original variables are recorded in 
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different scales, this could lead to arbitrary and undue influence on the PCA. To avoid this arbitrary 
weighting, the correlation matrix is analysed rather than the covariance matrix (Bartholomew et al. 
2008; Jollife and Cadima 2016). 
The data is fully appropriate for the application of PCA methods. Bartlett’s test of sphericity returns a 
Chi-square statistic of 1605.159 with 136 degrees of freedom. The null (that the original variables are 
insufficiently correlated for PCA) is rejected with p-value 0.000. Similarly, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
measure of sampling adequacy KMO = 0.901, which is “marvellous” (Dziuban and Shirkey 1974). 
 
Table 9 Summary Statistics of SDG Index Scores 
    N  Mean  St.Dev  variance  min  max 
SDG 1 151.00 74.40 31.50 991.94 0.00 100.00 
SDG 2 162.00 53.56 9.79 95.75 19.01 77.87 
SDG 3 162.00 70.04 20.11 404.57 17.59 97.89 
SDG 4 162.00 76.90 23.37 546.05 8.42 99.92 
SDG 5 162.00 60.17 16.19 262.16 10.39 89.24 
SDG 6 162.00 67.64 16.44 270.15 27.47 96.98 
SDG 7 162.00 71.13 28.14 791.85 0.00 99.37 
SDG 8 162.00 71.63 10.43 108.72 36.48 90.61 
SDG 9 162.00 35.06 23.72 562.67 1.87 93.31 
SDG 10 148.00 59.12 24.36 593.27 0.00 100.00 
SDG 11 162.00 71.81 16.10 259.26 27.76 98.35 
SDG 12 162.00 77.43 19.00 360.92 22.17 99.29 
SDG 13 162.00 86.61 13.35 178.35 33.41 99.43 
SDG 14 126.00 50.51 15.05 226.37 8.67 81.30 
SDG 15 162.00 64.81 14.64 214.37 23.50 93.31 
SDG 16 162.00 66.01 14.05 197.52 31.07 93.05 
SDG 17 162.00 64.46 14.79 218.84 27.24 100.00 
 
 
Table 10 presents the correlation matrix across all SDG Index scores. Correlations are generally strong 
and positive, indicating a degree of overall coherence among the SDG Index scores and that the data 
are appropriate for PCA. Correlations with absolute value less than 0.2 are in grey while strong 
negative correlations are highlighted in red. Goals 1-11 and 16 deal with poverty, hunger, health, 
education, gender equality, clean water, energy, growth, innovation, inequality and communities and 
peace and justice. With some apology for generality, these are the ‘quality of life’ goals. Goals 12-15 
deal with production and consumption patterns, climate change, oceans, and terrestrial ecosystems. 
They are the ‘environmental impact’ goals. Table 10 suggests a trade-off between quality of life and 
environmental impact, similar in nature to that found by Wackernagel et al (2017).  
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Table 10 Correlation Matrix of SDG Index Scores 
 
SDG1 SDG2 SDG3 SDG4 SDG5 SDG6 SDG7 SDG8 SDG9 SDG10 SDG11 SDG12 SDG13 SDG14 SDG15 SDG16 SDG17 
SDG1 1 
                
SDG2 0.5446 1 
               
SDG3 0.8559 0.6194 1 
              
SDG4 0.7838 0.6382 0.8425 1 
             
SDG5 0.4531 0.5202 0.633 0.6078 1 
            
SDG6 0.7704 0.674 0.8644 0.7894 0.6593 1 
           
SDG7 0.8615 0.5144 0.86 0.8106 0.5617 0.7776 1 
          
SDG8 0.5322 0.6286 0.6859 0.645 0.5794 0.6619 0.5292 1 
         
SDG9 0.6819 0.6946 0.8222 0.6924 0.6684 0.7844 0.7144 0.6853 1 
        
SDG10 0.3058 0.3241 0.3385 0.1606 0.062 0.2357 0.1357 0.194 0.395 1 
       
SDG11 0.6606 0.4401 0.7772 0.7309 0.6615 0.7029 0.6641 0.5795 0.5881 0.1176 1 
      
SDG12 -0.627 -0.5623 -0.8059 -0.6468 -0.6328 -0.766 -0.6542 -0.5947 -0.8758 -0.3675 -0.5882 1 
     
SDG13 -0.3588 -0.1055 -0.4089 -0.3537 -0.3055 -0.3967 -0.2956 -0.2012 -0.4203 -0.2099 -0.3465 0.5457 1 
    
SDG14 -0.128 0.0479 -0.0895 -0.0677 0.1322 0.0153 -0.0855 0.0719 -0.0376 -0.1831 -0.0194 0.0318 0.0087 1 
   
SDG15 0.0305 0.2839 0.0962 0.0779 0.1946 0.1506 0.1058 0.1719 0.2177 0.0457 -0.0194 -0.1964 0.1261 0.2124 1 
  
SDG16 0.6654 0.5614 0.7856 0.6674 0.5102 0.6641 0.5918 0.6008 0.7678 0.4603 0.6864 -0.7228 -0.4305 -0.0776 0.1242 1 
 
SDG17 0.2205 0.0898 0.2483 0.1907 0.1613 0.2155 0.3233 -0.0609 0.1831 0.1006 0.2197 -0.1302 -0.207 -0.0784 -0.053 0.1926 1 
Table 10 presents the correlation matrix across all goals included in the PCA. Correlations with absolute magnitude < 0.2 are in grey. Strong negative correlations are 
highlighted in red. Overall SDG Index scores are strongly correlated. SDG 12 & 13 have strong negative correlations with the rest of the set. SDG 14 & 15, and to a lesser extent 
SDG 17 are poorly correlated with the rest of the set.  
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4.5. Results 
 
Table 11 shows the main results from the PCA on all 17 SDG Index scores. Columns 1-2 list the 
components and their Eigenvalues, while column 3 indicates the share of total original variance 
captured by each component. Column 4 shows the cumulative share of variance explained when all 
preceding components are combined. Results clearly indicate a dominant first component capturing 
52% of the variation across all 17 SDG Index scores. In total, four components have Eigenvalues greater 
than one and explain a cumulative 74.44 % of total variance.  
Table 11 Variance explained by each principal component 
Component 
Variance Explained 
Variance 
Eigenvalue 
% Cumulative % 
1 8.8403 0.5200 0.5200 
2 1.5560 0.0915 0.6115 
3 1.2372 0.0728 0.6843 
4 1.0213 0.0601 0.7444 
5 0.9554 0.0562 0.8006 
6 0.6651 0.0391 0.8397 
7 0.5820 0.0342 0.8740 
8 0.4653 0.0274 0.9013 
9 0.3651 0.0215 0.9228 
10 0.3201 0.0188 0.9416 
11 0.2715 0.0160 0.9576 
12 0.2054 0.0121 0.9697 
13 0.1618 0.0095 0.9792 
14 0.1334 0.0078 0.9870 
15 0.0873 0.0051 0.9922 
16 0.0767 0.0045 0.9967 
17 0.0561 0.0033 1.0000 
Table 11. Variance explained by each component. N = 110. 4 components have Eigenvalues > 1.00, ρ = 0.7444. 
Eigenvalues are the variances of each principal component. 
A promax rotation6  is applied to facilitate interpretation of components. Promax rotations allow 
correlation between components (i.e. they relax the standard orthogonality restriction). This is 
acceptable if (i) some correlation between the latent concepts that the PCA is trying to uncover is 
expected and (ii) interpretation is improved. Both requirements are met. We would expect overlap 
between components if the SDGs they are trying to describe are part of a coherent, integrated 
framework. The resulting rotated components lend themselves to an interpretation that is at least 
 
6  Component rotations are commonly used to aid model interpretation. Promax rotations permit some 
correlation between components, which is justified here because we would expect some correlation between 
SDGs (Bartholomew et al. 2008). 
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credible. However, for completeness, the full set of unrotated loadings across all 17 components is 
presented in Appendix 5.  
Table 12 reports loadings for the first four rotated components (Eigenvalues > 1). The last row 
indicates the proportion of total original variance explained by each component. These differ slightly 
from the unrotated explained variance reported in Table 11 and Appendix 5. This is a side-effect of 
promax rotation. In combination, the four components still describe 74.44% of the total original 
variation (though the sum across the final row is 75.43, this overstates the model’s explanatory power 
because some of the components are explaining some of the same original variation). Rho is still 
0.7444 after promax rotation. Loadings with absolute value less than 0.2000 are suppressed in the 
output.  
Table 12 Component loadings for the four component model 
VARIABLE COMP1 COMP2 COMP3 COMP4 UNEXPLAINED  
SDG1 0.3291 
  
-0.2334 0.2100 
SDG2 0.2347 
 
0.2691 
 
0.3045 
SDG3 0.3288 
   
0.0739 
SDG4 0.3678 
   
0.1665 
SDG5 0.2530 
  
0.3100 0.3261 
SDG6 0.3148 
   
0.1668 
SDG7 0.3672 
   
0.1818 
SDG8 0.2766 
 
0.2293 
 
0.3205 
SDG9 0.2232 0.2312 
  
0.1416 
SDG10 
 
0.8091 
 
-0.2473 0.1839 
SDG11 0.3303 -0.2142 
  
0.2695 
SDG12 
 
-0.2468 0.2085 
 
0.1846 
SDG13 
 
-0.2078 0.7213 
 
0.2441 
SDG14 
 
-0.2851 
 
0.8050 0.2645 
SDG15 
  
0.2584 0.4219 0.4501 
SDG16 0.1912 0.2886 
  
0.2455 
SDG17 
  
-0.4725 
 
0.6114 
% OF TOTAL VARIANCE 47.37 10.21 8.94 8.91  
Table 12. Promax rotation of component loadings for the first four components (Eigenvalues > 1). N = 110 and ρ 
= 0.7444. 
The loadings on the first component are generally positive and of similar magnitude7. This component 
could be interpreted as overall development. Countries with high SDG Index scores for these Goals 
will score highly on this component. The second component contrasts countries that score well on 
SDG 10 (reduced inequality) and SDG 16 (peace, justice, and strong institutions) against those that are 
performing well in reducing their environmental impacts (SDG 12 deals with material footprints, 
 
7 Loadings for SDG 10, 12, 14, and 15 are negative, but with small absolute value. 
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SDG13 with GHG emissions, SDG14 with impact on oceans). Countries with a high score on this 
component are achieving greater progress towards SDG 10 and 16, with relatively less progress 
towards reducing environmental impact and natural capital depletions.  
Table 13 Interpretation of principal components (four component model) 
Table 13. Offers interpretation of the four principal components with Eigenvalues greater than 1, with the aid of 
promax rotation. In combination, they explain 74.44% of the total original variance. All 17 SDGs are included.  
The third component appears to contrast SDG 13 against SDG 17 but should not be over interpreted. 
The unexplained variance for SDG 17 is 61% and the goal is an outlier in terms of its targets, indicators, 
and coverage in the SDG Index. To make strong claims would be imprudent and the responsible course 
of action is to avoid ‘imposing’ and interpretation on it (see chapter 4.7). The fourth component, 
accounting for 8.91% of total variation contrasts SDG 14-15 (life below water and life on land) against 
SDG 1 (zero poverty) and SDG 10 (reduced inequality). In summary, the first four components can be 
interpreted as described in Table 13. 
Figure 13 maps country scores on the first two components. Colours refer to income level. The first 
component, named ‘overall development’ generates clearly ordered groupings by income category. 
High (low) income countries have high (low) scores on this component. SDGs 10 and 16 deal with 
inequality, peace, justice and strong institutions. Combined, and with some generosity, these can be 
interpreted as reflecting some variant of social capital. SDGs 12-14, and to a lesser extent 11, can be 
said to reflect natural capital. SDG 12’s indicators include solid waste, SO2 emissions, and nitrogen 
footprints. SDG 13 includes various measures of GHG emissions. SDG 14 includes marine protected 
areas and measures of overfishing. Thus, the second principal component contrasts performance in 
social versus natural capital oriented SDGs.  
Figure 14 plots country scores on components 2 and 3, colour-coded by income category as above. 
The lack of clearly identifiable clusters of colour demonstrates that these components cannot be 
described by income level and truly capture different dimensions of sustainability.  
 
Component  Explained 
Variance 
Interpretation 
1 47.37 % Overall development 
2 10.21 %  Contrasting social capital against natural capital 
3 8.94 % Uninterpreted 
4 8.91 % Contrasting ecosystem management against poverty and inequality 
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Figure 13 Country-level scores on the first two principal components 
 
Figure 14 Country scores on components 2 and 3 
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4.6. Discussion 
 
The sustainable development goals provide the organizing framework and direction to which the 
international development community is committed. They rightly recognize that sustainable 
development is a broad concept with constituent elements that range from the clearly 
complementary to the seemingly contradictory. The breadth of scope means that measuring progress 
requires a wide range of data, some already covered in official statistics, some not. The process of 
defining and collecting progress indicators is ongoing, but adoption and (at least partial) 
implementation of the SDGs is already under way. To support coherent policy, it is helpful to identify 
potential synergies and trade-offs, and to have some method of measuring what works. At this early 
stage, and before they undergo their first major revision, it is also useful to assess whether progress 
towards the goals – as measured by SDG indicators – affirms and reinforces what we already know 
about sustainable development and delivers on the intent of the 2030 agenda. That is, does it pass 
the ‘sniff test’? Some simplification of the myriad goals and indicators is needed.  
Principal components analysis is an established methodology for reducing the dimensionality of 
complex correlated data and can provide useful insights into these issues. Preliminary analysis (KMO, 
Bartlett’s sphericity, scree plot examination) on data from the SDG Index confirms that this data is 
appropriate for PCA.  
Examination of the correlation matrix (Table 10) indicates that amidst strong overall agreement 
among goals, there is an important break. ‘Quality of life’ goals (SDGs 1-9 and 16) are strongly 
correlated with each other, and strongly negatively correlated with ‘environmental impact’ goals (SDG 
12-13, and to a lesser extent SDG 14-15). This underscores one of this paper’s main motivations: 
assessing whether measured progress in SDG performance actually delivers for people, planet, and 
prosperity or whether there are unavoidable trade-offs between environmental and economic 
outcomes.  
Table 11 shows the proportion of original variance described by each principal component, with the 
cumulative tally in the final column. Four components are needed to describe 74.44% of original 
variance. The large proportion of variance explained by the first principal component (52%) suggests 
a dominant common feature across most of the goals. The loadings of each SDG onto each component 
(shown after promax rotation in Table 11) can be interpreted as the weight given to each variable on 
each component. The first component (Table 11, column 2) has positive loadings fairly evenly 
distributed across most of the goals. Negative loadings on component 1 are found for SDG 10, 12, 14, 
and 15. Because these are all less than 0.1 in absolute value, they do not weigh heavily on the 
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component. In combination, the pattern and distribution of SDGs loading onto the first principal 
component lend a clear interpretation: this is a broad measure of overall development in the 
traditional sense.  
Figure 13 plots individual country scores on the first two principal components. The first two PCs 
account for 52% and 9.15% of total variation in the SDG Index. Thus, the two-dimensional scatter-plot 
of country scores in Figure 13 represents a moderate to good approximation to the original scatter-
plot in 17-dimensional space. It is, by definition, “the best variance-preserving two-dimensional plot 
of the data”, representing over 61% of total variation. Component 1 (overall development) is on the 
horizontal axis. Colours distinguish between low, lower middle, upper middle, and high income 
countries as classified by the United Nations. The distribution of countries from left to right by income 
status lends further support to the interpretation of component 1 as ‘overall development’. Finally, 
Table 14 reports Pearson correlation coefficients between component scores and per capita GDP. The 
very strong positive correlation between per capita GDP and PC 1 confirms statistically what Figure 13 
conveys graphically: that income remains a major determinant of SDG performance. 
Table 14 Correlation between per capita GDP and the principal components 
 
GDP  
PER CAPITA 
PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 
GDP PER CAPITA 1 
    
PC1 ‘OVERALL DEVELOPMENT’ 0.858 1 
   
PC1 ‘NATURAL VS SOCIAL CAPITAL’ 0.0574 -0.026 1 
  
PC3 UNINTERPRETED -0.2303 -0.0007 -0.0203 1 
 
PC4 ECOSYSTEMS VS POVERTY -0.1745 0.0018 0.0065 0.0045 1 
*GDP per capita in 2017 PPP. Table show Pearson’s correlation coefficients between each principal 
component and per capita GDP. 
That this component describes the majority of original variance indicates that overall development 
level is still the majority focus of the SDGs, if we use available SDG indicators as the basis for 
measurement. But it is a small majority, at just 52% of variation explained. That 48% of the variance 
is not explained by overall development is a clear signal that SDG performance cannot meaningfully 
be proxied by per capita income. Doing so would ignore 48% of the variation in SDG scores. 
PC 2 describes a different dimension of sustainable development. Capturing the maximum possible 
remaining variation that is not already described by PC1, PC2 contrasts a very strong positive loading 
from SDG 10 (reduced inequality) and moderate positive loadings from SDG 9 (industry, innovation, 
and manufacturing) and SDG 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions) against moderate negative 
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loadings from SDGs 11-14 (sustainable cities, responsible consumption and production, climate action, 
and life below water).  
Indicators for SDG 9 include internet coverage, mobile phone access, percentage of women in science 
and engineering and university performance (Sachs et al. 2019). SDG 10 indicators focus on income 
inequality – the Gini Index, Palma ratio (income share of the top 10% divided by the income share of 
the bottom 40%), and the elderly poverty rate. And SDG 16 indicators include data on crime rates, 
prison population, corruption indices, and freedom of the press. Together, these can be considered 
the ‘social capital goals’. With these groupings, PC2 can be interpreted as contrasting social capital 
performance against natural capital performance. Countries with high scores on this component are 
closer to achieving SDGs 10 and 16 than they are to achieving goals 11-14.  
Similarly, PC 3 contrasts a strong positive loading from SDG 13 (climate action) against a strong 
negative loading from SDG 17 (partnerships for the goals). For reasons outlined below (Chapter 4.7), 
this should not be over interpreted. PC 4 has very strong positive loadings for SDG 14-15 (life below 
water and life on land) and moderate negative loadings from SDG 10 (inequality) and SDG 1 (no 
poverty). This is interpreted in Table 13 as contrasting ecosystem management against poverty and 
inequality.  
Restricting the model to just four components means that some of the variation in the original 
variables (SDGs) is unexplained. The final column of Table 12 reports the variation in each SDG that 
cannot be explained by the four components8. Some SDGs are better explained by the model than 
others. For instance, the four-component model explains (1 - 0.0739) 93% of variation in SDG 3, but 
only 39% of variation in SDG 17. Because SDG 17 (i) loads heavily onto PC 3 and (ii) is so poorly 
explained by the four-component model, PC 3 may not have meaningful interpretation. 
Several ‘stopping rules’ have been proposed to identify the ‘correct’ number of components to include 
in a PCA (Jackson 1993; Peres-Neto et al. 2005). In practice, it is more an art than a science. PCA is 
technique for reducing dimensionality and making sense of large complex data. One school of thought 
is that the right number of components to include is determined by how well they distil interesting 
information from a larger dataset (Bartholomew et al. 2008). A general rule of thumb is that 
components with eigenvalues greater than one should be retained. The eigenvalue of PC 4 is 1.0213, 
explaining 6% of total variation, while the eigenvalue for PC 5 is 0.9554, explaining 5.6% of total 
variation (Table 11). It is a narrow distinction, but if the 17 original variables (SDGs) were perfectly 
 
8 Note that in the unrestricted model in Appendix 5, unexplained variation is 0 for all variables (SDGs) 
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uncorrelated, each could be expected to describe 1/17th (5.88%) of total variance. Components that 
describe less than this would carry less information than the original variables.  
4.7. Robustness 
 
SDG 17 (partnerships for the goals) is an outlier. It is weakly correlated with the rest of the goals (Table 
10), it has by far the largest number of targets (Table 7), though only 5 indicators are actually included 
in the SDG Index (Lafortune et al. 2018), and these have highly uneven coverage (Papadimitriou et al. 
2019). Two robustness tests are performed. First, a 5-component model is calculated to determine 
whether the Kaiser rule of thumb that only components with eigenvalues greater than one must be 
retained is too restrictive. The four-component model failed to describe over 60% of the variation in 
SDG 17, and the eigenvalue for the 5th component was very close to one at 0.9554. Including a 5th 
component therefore could aid interpretation of PC 3. Moreover, if the loadings on PC 1-2 in the five-
component model are consistent with those in the four-component model, this offers further 
confidence in their interpretation.   
Table 15 Component loadings for the 5-component model 
VARIABLE COMP1 COMP2 COMP3 COMP4 COMP5 UNEXPLAINED  
SDG1 0.3269 
 
-0.2089 
  
0.2073 
SDG2 0.2372 
  
0.2757 
 
0.2878 
SDG3 0.3279 
    
0.0739 
SDG4 0.3665 
    
0.1662 
SDG5 0.2524 
 
0.2713 
  
0.3243 
SDG6 0.3139 
    
0.1666 
SDG7 0.3614 
   
0.2089 0.1491 
SDG8 0.2834 
   
-0.3444 0.2600 
SDG9 0.2252 0.2179 
   
0.1416 
SDG10 
 
0.7828 -0.1686* 
  
0.1786 
SDG11 0.3287 -0.2223 
   
0.2558 
SDG12 
 
-0.2165 
 
0.2496 
 
0.1738 
SDG13 
 
-0.1482* 
 
0.7696 
 
0.1632 
SDG14 
 
-0.2877 0.7315 
  
0.2638 
SDG15 
  
0.5476 0.4021 
 
0.2429 
SDG16 
 
0.2657 
   
0.2424 
SDG17 
    
0.8968 0.0925 
% OF TOTAL VARIANCE 47.31 9.27 8.40 8.12 6.69  
Table 15. Promax rotation of component loadings for five components. N = 110 and ρ = 0.8006. Loadings with 
absolute value less than 0.2 are suppressed or (*) shown in grey for comparison with Table 12. 
 
Table 15 presents loadings for the 5-component model. PC 1 and PC 2 have similar loadings to the 4-
component model, explain about the same share of total variance, and their interpretation does not 
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change. But the third component does change. PC 3 in the five-component model (PC3_5) no longer 
contrasts SDG 13 against SDG 17 (as in the four-component model PC3_4). In the five-component 
model, PC3_5 now contrasts high positive loadings for SDG 14-15 against moderate negative loadings 
from SDG 1. This is similar in interpretation to the fourth principal component in the 4-component 
model. Results across the two models reinforce the interpretation of three principal components that 
can be considered, overall development, contrasting social versus natural capital related performance, 
and contrasting ecosystem management against poverty.  
The five component model explains 80% of total variance, while the more restricted four-component 
model described 74.44%. However, the unexplained variation in the five-component model is more 
evenly distributed across the goals. Notably, the unexplained variation in SDG 17 falls from 61% in the 
four-component model to 9.25% in the five-component model. PC4_5 has strong positive loadings 
from SDG 13 (climate action) and moderate positive loadings from SDG 15, 12, and 2. Finally, PC 5 
contrasts a very strong positive loading from SDG 17 against a moderate negative loading from SDG 
8. This could be interpreted as distinguishing progress in partnerships for the goals against progress in 
decent work and economic growth.  
Table 16 Component loadings across four components and 16 SDGs 
VARIABLE COMP1 COMP2 COMP3 COMP4 UNEXPLAINED  
SDG1 0.3392 
 
-0.2405 
 
0.2053 
SDG2 0.2219 
  
0.2942 0.2810 
SDG3 0.3332 
   
0.0740 
SDG4 0.3723 
   
0.1650 
SDG5 0.2493 
 
0.3003 
 
0.3244 
SDG6 0.3162 
   
0.1673 
SDG7 0.3809 
   
0.1856 
SDG8 0.2582 
   
0.3718 
SDG9 0.2180 0.2269 
  
0.1416 
SDG10 
 
0.7991 -0.2275 
 
0.1771 
SDG11 0.3364 -0.2254 
  
0.2593 
SDG12 
 
-0.2245 
 
0.2476 0.1745 
SDG13 
   
0.7819 0.1550 
SDG14 
 
-0.2801 0.7807 
 
0.2627 
SDG15 
  
0.4348 0.3905 0.3170 
SDG16 
 
0.2743 
  
0.2440 
% OF VARIATION 49.96 10.32 9.25 8.51  
Table 16. Promax rotation of loadings for the first four components (Eigenvalues > 1). N = 110, ρ = 0.7809. 
Loadings with absolute value less than 0.2 are suppressed. SDG 17 is omitted from the analysis. 
A second robustness check concedes that SDG 17 is an outlier and considers the principal components 
in a model with only the first 16 SDGs. Table 16 presents loadings from that model. The model 
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describes a slightly higher proportion (ρ = 0.7809) of original variance than the 17-goal version 
described in Table 12 (ρ = 0.7444). Loadings and interpretation of PC 1 and PC 2 are relatively 
unchanged. PC 3 is similar to previous models, describing 9.25% of variation and contrasting high 
positive loadings from SDG 14-15 against moderate negative loadings from goals on poverty and 
inequality. This is similarly interpreted as distinguishing between progress on ecosystem management 
versus poverty and inequality goals.  
4.8. Conclusion 
 
Sustainable development is a multifaceted process with complex complementarities and myriad 
potential trade-offs. The Sustainable Development Goals were developed by the international 
community in recognition of the fact that the old development paradigm had not adequately 
accounted for its contribution and sensitivity to mounting environmental and social pressures. The 
general intent of the SDGs was to re-orient the global political economy to deliver more inclusive 
growth, protect environmental assets, and promote human wellbeing alongside material outcomes.  
Progress towards the 17 goals is measured by a suite of indicators whose data varies from well-
established to aspirational. The process of refining, adding and replacing indicators is on-going. This 
dynamic and not always straightforward process can make it difficult to identify strategic 
complementarities and policy trade-offs. Given such complexity, tools for distilling core components 
from large data can help demonstrate the extent to which the SDGs truly represent a departure from 
and alternative to standard measures of development such as per capita GDP.  
Principal components analysis was applied to the most comprehensive global set of data on SDG 
Indicators, the SDG Index (Sachs et al. 2019). It revealed a single dominant principal component that 
explains 52% of variation across the goals and which can be interpreted as overall development level. 
Country scores on this component clearly show that per capita income remains a leading indicator of 
progress within the SDG framework. However, it also shows that 48% of variation cannot be described 
by per capita income, suggesting that nearly half of SDG progress relies on other, non-income 
components. A suite of analyses that varied the number of components and goals revealed a 
component describing about 10% of variation in SDG performance that contrasts performance on 
reducing inequality against performance on reducing environmental impacts. A third component 
describing 8.4 – 9.25 % of variation contrasts marine and terrestrial ecosystem conservation against 
poverty and inequality.  
Results suggest that the distance between what the SDGs represent in principal and what their 
indicators measure in practice is relatively small. Whilst income remains a dominant determinant of 
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SDG performance, nearly half of measured progress towards achieving the SDGs cannot be explained 
by variation in per capita income. Of the four potential outcomes described in the introduction, the 
results suggest that the SDGs and indicators included in the SDG Index are closer to ‘mission 
accomplished’ than any other outcome. This research supports the idea that the SDGs and related 
indicators are largely measuring what they intended to measure. However, about half of all indicators 
are not included in the Index and are therefore excluded from this analysis. The next round of revisions 
should focus on adding new indicators, particularly those related to social outcomes.  
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis contributes to sustainability measurement and policy. I develop new accounting 
procedures that reveal rather than conceal distinctions and connections between national and global 
sustainability. The unifying threads throughout the papers are an acknowledgement of the wealth 
theory of sustainability (Weitzman 1976; Hartwick 1977; Dasgupta and Heal 1979; Solow 1986; Arrow 
et al. 2012; Fenichel et al. 2018) and an interest in extending its measurement (Pearce and Atkinson 
1993a; World Bank 2011; Atkinson et al. 2012; UNU-IHDP and UNEP 2012, 2014; Lange et al. 2018; 
Managi and Kumar 2018). The theory provides a clear wealth management rule: endowing future 
generations with the potential to be ‘at least as well off as the present’ requires that comprehensive 
wealth is non-declining over time. Wealth accounts are tools for assessing whether the management 
rule is being observed. I investigate their suitability for a globalised world and comment on how they 
might be augmented and extended. 
The first two papers focus on the measurement of natural capital and how this relates to overall 
sustainability measurement. They are motivated by the knowledge that globalisation has opened 
markets, facilitated the spread of people, ideas, and culture, and lifted millions out of poverty. But it 
as also ushered in an era of unprecedented natural resource depletion and environmental change. 
Many of the development challenges we currently face deal with the intersection of these two trends: 
the benefits of economic activity and the costs of environmental degradation. International trade 
plays an important role in both. Responding to calls as early as James Meade (1955) and as 
contemporary as Joe Stiglitz (2009b), they explore the relationship between national and global 
sustainability.  
Two complementary natural capital accounts were developed. One from the traditional territorial or 
production-based perspective and another from the consumption-based perspective. The former 
records resource depletions that take place within a country’s borders, regardless of where those 
resources are ultimately consumed. The latter records resource depletions embodied within a 
country’s final demand, regardless of where in the world those depletions actually took place. 
International trade is the link between the two, and can drive a wedge between the wealth of 
producing versus consuming countries. The results showed that the two perspectives generate very 
different maps of global natural capital depletions, and that the production versus consumption 
accounting gap is important for countries at all stages of development. 
The second paper directly addresses carbon accounting within the wealth framework. Carbon 
emissions are depletions of atmospheric natural capital. But the question of where along a global 
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supply chain for CO2 emissions should we account for the loss of wealth remains (Davis et al. 2011). 
Following Arrow et al (2012), we develop greenhouse gas accounts that attribute emissions-related 
wealth depletions according to the location of damages (losses due to climate change). We contrast 
this account against traditional production based GHG accounts, and consumption-based accounts 
that have received attention in recent literature. Results showed that once again, the different 
accounting perspectives yield completely different maps of global emissions.  
Several lessons can be drawn from these papers. They acknowledge that nothing in either economic 
or natural science requires us to restrict our measurement of sustainability to any individual 
accounting perspective. The reality is that the great global challenges we face are complex and 
multifaceted. If one believes policies to address them should be guided by evidence, then accounts 
such as these are a necessity. The argument is not that any individual accounting perspective is ‘right’, 
but rather that each offers insight into an important dimension of sustainability. Even for carbon 
accounts, where the wealth theory does give a clear economic justification for adopting the damage 
perspective, it is still argued that production and consumption accounts offer relevant information on 
the nature of emissions in the global economy. Combined, the suite of accounts from multiple 
perspectives tells a more complete story. 
Given the large and growing role of international trade in gross world product, no measure of 
sustainability is complete without taking explicit account of trade. Better, more readily available 
evidence on global trends in resource use are relevant not just to environmental policy, but to issues 
of economic, fiscal, and resource security as well. Even if countries wish to take a closed perspective 
and only develop domestic resource strategies, they may still want accounts that illustrate global 
trends and strategies pursued by other countries. China’s Belt and Road Initiative is an important case. 
Domestic facing policy makers may still want an awareness of China’s global natural capital strategy. 
For this reason, the research adds to calls for the development of public sector balance sheets, and 
for these to include natural capital explicitly. This would help countries monitor the domestic 
resources they own and how they are managed, the global resources on which the rely and what their 
exposure is to shocks, and the likely fiscal implications of, say asset stranding (e.g. if fossil fuel reserves 
can no longer provide tax revenue). 
Finally, the international dimensions described in these papers may help with efforts to build 
partnerships in delivering sustainability and encourage countries to think beyond borders. This would 
relate to SDG 17, but also to issues of resource security, least cost abatement, and industrial strategy. 
Early studies in this area focused on carbon policies and accounts, and revealed that issues of leakage 
and ‘rich’ versus ‘developing’ country ‘responsibility’ could be major impediments to developing 
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global policy. A combination of production, consumption, and damage-based accounts would shed 
light on opportunities to for countries to work together to reduce natural capital depletions along the 
supply chain. Boulding (1966) wrote of the cowboy and spaceship economies and how each might 
approach resource scarcity. The accounting mechanisms demonstrated here put numbers to his ideas. 
Shifting focus somewhat from natural capital to sustainability measurement more broadly, the final 
paper interrogates the sustainable development goals. As the ‘North Star’ for the international 
development community (Wackernagel et al. 2017) the SDGs and related indicators effectively ‘reveal’ 
the applied definition of sustainability adopted by the UN Member States. The goals were heralded as 
a paradigm shift in development thinking, moving beyond income oriented objectives to incorporate 
environmental and social outcomes with equal weight. Empirical analysis of actual SDG data enables 
us to investigate the distance between what the SDGs aspire to measure and what they actually 
measure. Results showed that the goals largely meet their ambition. They represent an integrated, 
multifaceted suite of objectives that cannot be reduced to a single measure such as per capita GDP. 
Of course, income components still weigh heavily, and rightly so. But about half of SDG performance 
is due to non-income measures, suggesting the goals do in fact represent a more rounded view of the 
sustainability of development.  
The work is timely. 2020 is an important year for communities in economic measurement, 
international development, and the environment. The UN System of Environmental Economic 
Accounts will complete a revision of the SEEA- Experimental Ecosystem Accounts framework, which 
will go before the UN General Assembly for acceptance as a UN Statistical Standard. Natural capital 
accounts are a key element of this process, and the accounting perspectives developed here could 
help the design of the Standard and its adoption and implementation by countries. Data is a major 
challenge to conducting environmentally extended multi-regional input-output analysis. If the SEEA 
standards are adopted and the resulting accounts are adequately updated, metrics such as the ones 
presented here could be available annually within the standard suite of official economic statistics.  
Similarly, the Inter-Agency Expert Group on the Sustainable Development Goals will conduct its first 
comprehensive review of the SDG indicators. The papers could contribute to this process, particularly 
in relation to indicators for SDG 12 (sustainable consumption and production) and SDG 13 (climate 
action). Latent variable methods including principal components analysis could become a useful tool 
for informing this process and communicating it to public and policy audiences (Bain et al. 2019). 
This thesis aims to contribute to the field of sustainable development and economic measurement by 
highlighting the role of international trade in the modern economy, and what this means for 
management of natural capital and comprehensive wealth. The papers demonstrate the importance 
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of developing accounts from multiple complementary perspectives to understand contributions 
towards national and global sustainability. But several opportunities for extensions and further 
research present themselves. Improved data would facilitate the regular construction of production 
and consumption accounts so that we could examine trends over time rather than rely on ‘snapshot’ 
analyses. In particular, the development of SEEA accounts would enable natural capital and ecosystem 
service flows to be ‘built-in’ to the social accounting matrices and official input output tables. This 
would enable standard economic analysis to automatically incorporate some consideration for natural 
capital. Improved data would also expand the coverage of natural capital within the models. 
Significant omissions include air quality, water (availability and quality), and biodiversity. For policy, 
an important next step is to build natural capital accounts into the public sector balance sheets of 
nations in order to better estimate public sector net worth. 
Similarly, the principal components analysis of the SDGs raises interesting questions for further 
research. It would be interesting to investigate the trade-offs arising in the second and subsequent 
components. PC 2 highlighted a contrast natural versus social capital, after income variation is 
described by PC 1. Another component contrasted ecosystem management against inequality and 
poverty. This suggests that finding synergies here could be a priority for overall SDG progress. Future 
work could investigate the extent to which these are complementary or substitutable capitals, and 
whether the degree of substitutability and complementarity depends on income level.  
In sum, the research presented here improves our understanding of what an evidence base for 21st 
century sustainability might entail. It argues that international trade and transboundary externalities 
are important factors in sustainability measurement and concludes that any framework that fails to 
account for the international dimension of sustainability is subject to unnecessary blind spots. The 
reality is that multidimensional challenges like climate change and sustainability are underserved by 
unidimensional statistics. Natural capital accounts and SDG indicators are vital to developing the 
evidence we need to guide policy and measure progress towards sustainability. I hope the collected 
essays presented here demonstrate that 21st century progress cannot be measured with 20th century 
statistics and that when it comes to accounting, perspective matters.  
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6. APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1 MRIO Model Description 
We describe a simplified (2-region, n-sector) version of our model below, following Miller and Blair 
(2009). Industry 𝑖 (𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛) in regions 𝑟 and 𝑠, produce output, 𝑥. The resulting output vectors by 
industry represent total supply by region. Supply equals demand as outputs become intermediate 
inputs 𝑧 , or satisfy final demand 𝑦 , which includes investment, consumption, and government 
expenditure. The resulting system of linear equations is described in Eq.1: 
   
 
(1) 
 
Equation system (1) describes trade interactions 9  between regions and industries, and can be 
rewritten as Eq.2: 
 
(2) 
Technical coefficients, 𝑎𝑖𝑗  describe the ratio of intermediate input, z to output, x, and form the basis 
of input-output analysis. Domestic, 
ss
ija and 
rr
ija , and interregional technical coefficients, 
rs
ija  and 
sr
ija , are described by Eq.3 and Eq.4, respectively: 
(3)     ; 
(4)     ; 
These technical coefficients reflect the amount of industry input i required to produce one unit of 
output xj in region r (or s), taking into account the input precedence as well as the place where the 
 
9 Note that exports from r to s are conceptually equal to imports of s from r. In practice, the statistics tend to 
differ not only due to transport and taxes, but also due to innate discrepancies in trade statistics. For the present 
study we employed export data, as this generally represents quantities traded more reliably-  
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output is produced (Miller and Blair 2009). Rearranging Eq3 and Eq4, and combining with Eq2, 
provides regional output in terms of domestic and interregional technical coefficients, Eq5: 
(5) 
 
Expressing the outputs as a function of the final demands, and the regional and interregional technical 
coefficients, the solution of the system in the matrix notation is shown in Eq.6: 
(6) 
 
Rewriting (6) once again in block matrix notation and multiplying the final demands of each region by 
the well-known Leontief inverse Eq.7 is obtained:  
(7)   
where (I-A)-1 provides information about the direct and indirect output changes across regions and 
industries due to changes in the final demand in r or s. Vectors y•r and y•s represent the ‘total’ final 
demand - domestic plus imports - of region r and s respectively. Notice that 
-1 •( - ) rI A y  accounts for 
the change in production (x) in both regions due to a change in the final demand of r. The 
interpretation is similar for region s. 
The model is additionally extended to environmental impacts linked to the changes in production 
which are induced by the final demand in one specific region –‘s’ or ‘r’. We study carbon emissions 
across sectors and regions, denoted here as 'k’.  
Pre-multiplying both sides of Eq.7 by a diagonalized carbon intensity vector, 𝑓𝑘, describes the ratio of 
carbon emissions to output by sector and region. The pre-multiplication of the diagonalized intensity 
vector, 𝑓𝑘 , and the Leontief inverse, (I-A)-1, yields resource multipliers, i.e. the total, direct and 
indirect, increase in emissions among industries and regions due to a change in final demand in region 
r (or s).  The resulting formulation is shown in Eq.8: 
(8)     𝐟k∗ = ?̂?𝒌𝐱 = ?̂?𝒌 (𝐈 − 𝐀)−𝟏𝒚∙𝒓 +  ?̂?𝒌 (𝐈 − 𝐀)−𝟏𝒚∙𝒔 
where fk* is the vector of total emissions across regions due to the consumption in y•r and y•s.  
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Appendix 2 List of countries and regions in the GTAP_v9 database 
Country Name GTAP Region 
Code 
  
Albania ALB Guatemala GTM 
Argentina ARG Guinea GIN 
Armenia ARM Honduras HND 
Australia AUS Hungary HUN 
Austria AUT India IND 
Azerbaijan AZE Indonesia IDN 
Bahrain BHR Iran IRN 
Bangladesh BGD Ireland IRL 
Belarus BLR Israel ISR 
Belgium BEL Italy ITA 
Benin BEN Jamaica JAM 
Bolivia BOL Japan JPN 
Botswana BWA Jordan JOR 
Brazil BRA Kazakhstan KAZ 
Brunei Darussalam BRN Kenya KEN 
Bulgaria BGR Korea, Republic Of KOR 
Burkina Faso BFA Kuwait KWT 
Cambodia KHM Kyrgyzstan KGZ 
Cameroon CMR Lao People's Democratic Republic LAO 
Canada CAN Latvia LVA 
Caribbean XCB Lithuania LTU 
Chile CHL Luxembourg LUX 
China CHN Madagascar MDG 
China, Hong Kong SAR HKG Malawi MWI 
Colombia COL Malaysia MYS 
Costa Rica CRI Malta MLT 
Cote d'Ivoire CIV Mauritius MUS 
Croatia HRV Mexico MEX 
Cyprus CYP Mongolia MNG 
Czech Republic CZE Morocco MAR 
Denmark DNK Mozambique MOZ 
Dominican Republic DOM Namibia NAM 
Ecuador ECU Nepal NPL 
Egypt EGY Netherlands NLD 
El Salvador SLV New Zealand NZL 
Estonia EST Nicaragua NIC 
Ethiopia ETH Nigeria NGA 
Finland FIN Norway NOR 
France FRA Oman OMN 
Georgia GEO Pakistan PAK 
Germany DEU Panama PAN 
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Paraguay PRY Rest of South Asia XSA 
Peru PER Rest of Southeast Asia XSE 
Philippines PHL Rest of Western Africa XWF 
Poland POL Rest of Western Asia XWS 
Portugal PRT Rest of the World XTW 
Puerto Rico PRI Romania ROU 
Qatar QAT Russian Federation RUS 
Rest of Central Africa XCF Rwanda RWA 
Rest of Central America XCA Saudi Arabia SAU 
Rest of EFTA XEF Senegal SEN 
Rest of East Asia XEA Singapore SGP 
Rest of Eastern Africa XEC Slovakia SVK 
Rest of Eastern Europe XEE Slovenia SVN 
Rest of Europe XER South Africa ZAF 
Rest of Former Soviet Union XSU South Central Africa XAC 
Rest of North Africa XNF Spain ESP 
Rest of North America XNA Sri Lanka LKA 
Rest of Oceana XOC Sweden SWE 
Rest of South Africa Customs Union XSC Switzerland CHE 
Rest of South America XSM Taiwan TWN 
Rest of South Asia XSA Tanzania TZA 
Rest of Southeast Asia XSE Thailand THA 
Rest of Western Africa XWF Togo TGO 
Rest of Western Asia XWS Trinidad and Tobago TTO 
Paraguay PRY Tunisia TUN 
Peru PER Turkey TUR 
Philippines PHL Uganda UGA 
Poland POL Ukraine UKR 
Portugal PRT United Arab Emirates ARE 
Puerto Rico PRI United Kingdom GBR 
Qatar QAT United States USA 
Rest of Central Africa XCF Uruguay URY 
Rest of Central America XCA Venezuela VEN 
Rest of EFTA XEF Viet Nam VNM 
Rest of East Asia XEA Zambia ZMB 
Rest of Eastern Africa XEC Zimbabwe ZWE 
Rest of Eastern Europe XEE   
Rest of Europe XER 
 
Rest of Former Soviet Union XSU 
  
Rest of North Africa XNF 
  
Rest of North America XNA 
  
Rest of Oceana XOC 
  
Rest of South Africa Customs Union XSC 
  
Rest of South America XSM   
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Appendix 3 Production and Consumption Resource Depletions, full results. 
NATURAL RESOURCE DEPLETIONS (PRODUCTION & CONSUMPTION)   
Resource Depletions (millions of USD) Per capita depletions & comparison 
to global average (GA)   
Production  Consumption Ratio  Production Consumption  
GDP Value % 
GDP 
Value % 
GDP 
PBP/CBP Per capita P/GA Per capita C/GA 
ALBANIA 12,891 197 1.53 253 1.97 0.78 67.90 0.47 87.19 0.60 
ARGENTINA 530,163 4,831 0.91 5,226 0.99 0.92 115.96 0.80 125.46 0.87 
ARMENIA 10,142 52 0.51 246 2.42 0.21 18.07 0.13 85.42 0.59 
AUSTRALIA 1,390,557 27,292 1.96 15,088 1.09 1.81 1,221.69 8.47 675.39 4.68 
AUSTRIA 431,120 534 0.12 3,773 0.88 0.14 63.65 0.44 449.56 3.12 
AZERBAIJAN 65,952 8,724 13.23 784 1.19 11.13 951.07 6.59 85.42 0.59 
BAHRAIN 28,777 2,297 7.98 917 3.19 2.50 1,796.86 12.46 717.70 4.98 
BANGLADESH 128,638 2,164 1.68 3,419 2.66 0.63 14.06 0.10 22.21 0.15 
BELARUS 61,758 522 0.85 1,739 2.82 0.30 55.12 0.38 183.57 1.27 
BELGIUM 527,008 988 0.19 7,017 1.33 0.14 89.41 0.62 635.15 4.40 
BENIN 7,814 33 0.42 327 4.18 0.10 3.45 0.02 34.55 0.24 
BOLIVIA 23,963 763 3.18 512 2.14 1.49 75.67 0.52 50.82 0.35 
BOTSWANA 15,683 314 2.00 169 1.08 1.86 153.18 1.06 82.36 0.57 
BRAZIL 2,616,202 19,250 0.74 21,847 0.84 0.88 96.89 0.67 109.96 0.76 
BRUNEI DARUSSALAM 18,525 2,523 13.62 346 1.87 7.29 6,404.59 44.41 878.18 6.09 
BULGARIA 57,418 400 0.70 1,095 1.91 0.37 54.43 0.38 149.03 1.03 
BURKINA FASO 10,724 373 3.47 126 1.18 2.95 23.17 0.16 7.85 0.05 
CAMBODIA 12,830 364 2.84 615 4.80 0.59 25.02 0.17 42.33 0.29 
CAMEROON 29,337 708 2.41 486 1.66 1.46 34.50 0.24 23.70 0.16 
CANADA 1,788,648 32,228 1.80 18,706 1.05 1.72 938.42 6.51 544.69 3.78 
CARIBBEAN 101,170 907 0.90 2,301 2.27 0.39 39.26 0.27 99.56 0.69 
CHILE 252,252 3,033 1.20 4,309 1.71 0.70 176.79 1.23 251.21 1.74 
CHINA 7,572,554 112,456 1.49 159,277 2.10 0.71 83.66 0.58 118.50 0.82 
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CHINA, HONG KONG SAR 248,514 1,675 0.67 4,474 1.80 0.37 236.92 1.64 632.72 4.39 
COLOMBIA 335,415 10,095 3.01 3,518 1.05 2.87 217.54 1.51 75.80 0.53 
COSTA RICA 42,263 75 0.18 547 1.29 0.14 16.34 0.11 118.92 0.82 
COTE D'IVOIRE 25,382 328 1.29 409 1.61 0.80 15.72 0.11 19.55 0.14 
CROATIA 62,237 209 0.34 872 1.40 0.24 48.80 0.34 203.73 1.41 
CYPRUS 27,427 31 0.11 511 1.86 0.06 27.94 0.19 453.93 3.15 
CZECH REPUBLIC 227,948 998 0.44 2,501 1.10 0.40 95.10 0.66 238.32 1.65 
DENMARK 344,003 2,991 0.87 2,604 0.76 1.15 536.90 3.72 467.43 3.24 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 57,747 276 0.48 1,085 1.88 0.25 27.48 0.19 108.18 0.75 
ECUADOR 79,277 4,411 5.56 2,293 2.89 1.92 290.64 2.02 151.06 1.05 
EGYPT 236,002 9,650 4.09 7,702 3.26 1.25 112.34 0.78 89.67 0.62 
EL SALVADOR 23,139 51 0.22 441 1.91 0.12 8.29 0.06 71.28 0.49 
ESTONIA 23,170 608 2.62 654 2.82 0.93 457.73 3.17 492.36 3.41 
ETHIOPIA 31,953 293 0.92 752 2.35 0.39 3.26 0.02 8.35 0.06 
FINLAND 273,674 618 0.23 3,115 1.14 0.20 114.68 0.80 578.10 4.01 
FRANCE 2,862,680 2,846 0.10 25,446 0.89 0.11 43.55 0.30 389.42 2.70 
GEORGIA 14,435 58 0.40 409 2.84 0.14 14.84 0.10 105.67 0.73 
GERMANY 3,757,698 6,656 0.18 35,908 0.96 0.19 82.92 0.57 447.31 3.10 
GHANA 39,566 300 0.76 806 2.04 0.37 11.94 0.08 32.08 0.22 
GREECE 287,798 786 0.27 7,191 2.50 0.11 70.75 0.49 647.57 4.49 
GUATEMALA 47,655 211 0.44 719 1.51 0.29 14.11 0.10 48.12 0.33 
GUINEA 6,785 96 1.42 140 2.06 0.69 8.73 0.06 12.67 0.09 
HONDURAS 17,710 69 0.39 401 2.26 0.17 8.31 0.06 47.98 0.33 
HUNGARY 140,782 210 0.15 1,529 1.09 0.14 21.07 0.15 153.34 1.06 
INDIA 1,823,050 16,742 0.92 50,037 2.74 0.33 13.42 0.09 40.12 0.28 
INDONESIA 892,969 29,584 3.31 21,790 2.44 1.36 120.40 0.83 88.68 0.61 
IRAN 583,500 45,689 7.83 14,017 2.40 3.26 605.22 4.20 185.67 1.29 
IRELAND 239,019 401 0.17 1,840 0.77 0.22 87.51 0.61 401.92 2.79 
ISRAEL 261,629 342 0.13 2,828 1.08 0.12 44.07 0.31 364.15 2.53 
ITALY 2,276,292 2,899 0.13 22,368 0.98 0.13 48.83 0.34 376.69 2.61 
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JAMAICA 14,440 22 0.15 339 2.35 0.06 7.78 0.05 119.73 0.83 
JAPAN 6,157,460 5,091 0.08 61,921 1.01 0.08 39.83 0.28 484.39 3.36 
JORDAN 28,840 134 0.46 1,434 4.97 0.09 17.65 0.12 189.29 1.31 
KAZAKHSTAN 192,627 16,160 8.39 3,272 1.70 4.94 976.03 6.77 197.61 1.37 
KENYA 41,953 182 0.43 941 2.24 0.19 4.29 0.03 22.16 0.15 
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF 1,202,464 1,662 0.14 22,171 1.84 0.07 33.29 0.23 443.99 3.08 
KUWAIT 154,028 27,686 17.97 2,836 1.84 9.76 8,676.07 60.16 888.68 6.16 
KYRGYZSTAN 6,198 23 0.38 322 5.19 0.07 4.23 0.03 58.38 0.40 
LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 8,749 248 2.84 307 3.51 0.81 39.20 0.27 48.46 0.34 
LATVIA 28,224 121 0.43 503 1.78 0.24 58.97 0.41 244.31 1.69 
LITHUANIA 43,477 56 0.13 741 1.71 0.08 18.65 0.13 244.85 1.70 
LUXEMBOURG 60,005 18 0.03 616 1.03 0.03 35.59 0.25 1,187.57 8.23 
MADAGASCAR 9,893 461 4.66 318 3.21 1.45 21.18 0.15 14.60 0.10 
MALAWI 8,003 157 1.96 106 1.32 1.48 10.02 0.07 6.76 0.05 
MALAYSIA 297,952 9,713 3.26 6,866 2.30 1.41 339.20 2.35 239.78 1.66 
MALTA 9,505 2 0.02 236 2.48 0.01 5.37 0.04 566.60 3.93 
MAURITIUS 11,518 42 0.36 257 2.23 0.16 33.47 0.23 205.11 1.42 
MEXICO 1,171,188 8,441 0.72 12,707 1.08 0.66 70.88 0.49 106.70 0.74 
MONGOLIA 10,410 849 8.16 324 3.12 2.62 307.48 2.13 117.45 0.81 
MOROCCO 101,370 574 0.57 2,871 2.83 0.20 17.48 0.12 87.37 0.61 
MOZAMBIQUE 13,131 352 2.68 314 2.39 1.12 14.10 0.10 12.60 0.09 
NAMIBIA 12,410 326 2.63 278 2.24 1.17 147.10 1.02 125.62 0.87 
NEPAL 18,914 49 0.26 326 1.72 0.15 1.81 0.01 11.92 0.08 
NETHERLANDS 893,757 3,991 0.45 6,234 0.70 0.64 239.07 1.66 373.44 2.59 
NEW ZEALAND 168,462 1,054 0.63 1,828 1.09 0.58 240.42 1.67 417.08 2.89 
NICARAGUA 9,774 80 0.81 261 2.67 0.30 13.72 0.10 45.00 0.31 
NIGERIA 411,744 29,163 7.08 5,176 1.26 5.63 179.05 1.24 31.78 0.22 
NORWAY 498,832 29,053 5.82 4,055 0.81 7.17 5,865.70 40.67 818.64 5.68 
OMAN 67,937 12,194 17.95 1,963 2.89 6.21 3,766.83 26.12 606.47 4.21 
PAKISTAN 213,587 1,339 0.63 4,958 2.32 0.27 7.68 0.05 28.46 0.20 
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PANAMA 34,374 140 0.41 950 2.76 0.15 37.66 0.26 256.14 1.78 
PARAGUAY 25,100 43 0.17 367 1.46 0.12 6.77 0.05 58.32 0.40 
PERU 171,762 3,455 2.01 3,137 1.83 1.10 116.10 0.81 105.42 0.73 
PHILIPPINES 224,143 2,593 1.16 5,643 2.52 0.46 27.22 0.19 59.23 0.41 
POLAND 528,725 2,700 0.51 7,335 1.39 0.37 70.93 0.49 192.71 1.34 
PORTUGAL 244,895 582 0.24 3,153 1.29 0.18 55.17 0.38 298.61 2.07 
PUERTO RICO 100,352 100 0.10 793 0.79 0.13 27.16 0.19 215.65 1.50 
QATAR 167,775 18,318 10.92 1,039 0.62 17.62 9,383.78 65.07 532.49 3.69 
REST OF CENTRAL AFRICA 68,544 6,258 9.13 833 1.21 7.52 259.15 1.80 34.48 0.24 
REST OF CENTRAL AMERICA 1,487 13 0.87 20 1.32 0.66 39.29 0.27 59.43 0.41 
REST OF EAST ASIA 36,710 764 0.54 776 1.54 0.98 30.22 0.21 30.70 0.21 
REST OF EASTERN AFRICA 75,182 3,641 2.08 1,238 2.11 2.94 58.03 0.40 19.73 0.14 
REST OF EASTERN EUROPE 7,015 10 4.84 217 1.65 0.05 2.74 0.02 60.86 0.42 
REST OF EFTA 20,415 110 0.14 314 3.09 0.35 310.15 2.15 884.76 6.14 
REST OF EUROPE 100,327 1,144 1.14 2,247 2.24 0.51 82.14 0.57 161.28 1.12 
REST OF FORMER SOVIET UNION 81,671 5,717 7.00 2,963 3.63 1.93 135.07 0.94 70.01 0.49 
REST OF NORTH AFRICA 234,718 22,729 9.68 5,713 2.43 3.98 528.41 3.66 132.82 0.92 
REST OF NORTH AMERICA 8,066 46 0.57 130 1.61 0.35 375.88 2.61 1,067.59 7.40 
REST OF OCEANA 31,809 584 1.83 806 2.53 0.72 56.63 0.39 78.20 0.54 
REST OF SOUTH AFRICA CUSTOMS 
UNION 
7,609 271 3.56 123 1.62 2.20 82.33 0.57 37.48 0.26 
REST OF SOUTH AMERICA 6,998 45 0.64 139 1.98 0.33 35.24 0.24 108.21 0.75 
REST OF SOUTH ASIA 22,525 204 0.91 441 1.96 0.46 6.63 0.05 14.30 0.10 
REST OF SOUTHEAST ASIA 61,031 1,791 2.93 1,702 2.79 1.05 34.66 0.24 32.94 0.23 
REST OF THE WORLD 0 3 3.51 3 2.86 1.12 
    
REST OF WESTERN AFRICA 26,508 932 13.39 759 4.38 1.23 18.32 0.13 14.92 0.10 
REST OF WESTERN ASIA 269,017 36,013 
 
11,796 
 
3.05 421.90 2.93 138.19 0.96 
ROMANIA 185,363 1,098 0.59 2,365 1.28 0.46 54.48 0.38 117.38 0.81 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 2,051,662 101,086 4.93 39,746 1.94 2.54 707.09 4.90 278.02 1.93 
RWANDA 6,492 167 2.58 86 1.32 1.95 15.90 0.11 8.17 0.06 
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SAUDI ARABIA 671,239 101,097 15.06 16,139 2.40 6.26 3,580.16 24.83 571.55 3.96 
SENEGAL 14,391 116 0.81 414 2.88 0.28 8.75 0.06 31.15 0.22 
SINGAPORE 275,599 47 0.02 3,009 1.09 0.02 8.99 0.06 580.46 4.02 
SLOVAKIA 98,181 160 0.16 1,316 1.34 0.12 29.71 0.21 243.85 1.69 
SLOVENIA 51,291 110 0.21 675 1.32 0.16 53.57 0.37 328.89 2.28 
SOUTH AFRICA 416,878 4,334 1.04 6,439 1.54 0.67 83.77 0.58 124.48 0.86 
SOUTH CENTRAL AFRICA 127,965 15,135 11.83 2,143 1.67 7.06 166.45 1.15 23.56 0.16 
SPAIN 1,488,067 2,002 0.13 16,702 1.12 0.12 42.83 0.30 357.33 2.48 
SRI LANKA 65,293 542 0.83 1,770 2.71 0.31 26.72 0.19 87.30 0.61 
SWEDEN 563,110 1,051 0.19 4,356 0.77 0.24 111.24 0.77 461.00 3.20 
SWITZERLAND 699,580 330 0.05 4,128 0.59 0.08 41.69 0.29 521.72 3.62 
TAIWAN 
 
886 
 
8,350 
 
0.11 
    
TANZANIA 33,879 120 0.35 451 1.33 0.27 2.52 0.02 9.49 0.07 
THAILAND 370,819 4,515 1.22 9,149 2.47 0.49 66.86 0.46 135.48 0.94 
TOGO 3,756 34 0.89 161 4.27 0.21 5.02 0.03 24.03 0.17 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 25,433 1,983 7.80 318 1.25 6.24 1,485.86 10.30 238.30 1.65 
TUNISIA 45,811 971 2.12 977 2.13 0.99 90.21 0.63 90.79 0.63 
TURKEY 832,546 2,525 0.30 13,084 1.57 0.19 34.40 0.24 178.23 1.24 
UGANDA 20,177 496 2.46 280 1.39 1.77 14.13 0.10 7.97 0.06 
UKRAINE 163,160 2,843 1.74 4,359 2.67 0.65 62.21 0.43 95.36 0.66 
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 350,908 26,149 7.45 6,716 1.91 3.89 3,015.18 20.91 774.39 5.37 
UNITED KINGDOM 2,619,700 13,364 0.51 26,279 1.00 0.51 211.26 1.46 415.42 2.88 
UNITED STATES 15,517,926 80,863 0.52 163,430 1.05 0.49 259.46 1.80 524.38 3.64 
URUGUAY 47,962 59 0.12 501 1.05 0.12 17.30 0.12 148.10 1.03 
VENEZUELA 316,482 21,126 6.68 4,139 1.31 5.10 717.02 4.97 140.47 0.97 
VIET NAM 135,539 5,094 3.76 5,597 4.13 0.91 57.97 0.40 63.71 0.44 
ZAMBIA 23,460 199 0.85 304 1.30 0.65 13.95 0.10 21.30 0.15 
ZIMBABWE 12,098 90 0.74 206 1.71 0.44 6.26 0.04 14.34 0.10 
WORLD 73,270,714 1,006,192 1.37 1,006,192 1.37 1.00 144.67 1.00 144.67 1.00 
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Appendix 4 Production and consumption greenhouse gas accounts 
 
PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 
  
GHG emissions (millions of 2011 USD) GHGs per capita & comparison to global average 
  
Production Consumption Ratio  Production Consumption 
NAME GDP Value % GDP Value % GDP PBP/CBP Per Capita P/GA Per Capita C/GA 
ALBANIA 12,891 669 5.19 928 7.20 0.72 230.27 0.37 319.36 0.52 
ARGENTINA 530,163 26,861 5.07 26,879 5.07 1.00 644.81 1.04 645.25 1.04 
ARMENIA 10,142 694 6.84 829 8.18 0.84 241.22 0.39 288.45 0.47 
AUSTRALIA 1,390,557 56,951 4.10 59,534 4.28 0.96 2,549.28 4.11 2,664.90 4.30 
AUSTRIA 431,120 9,177 2.13 12,882 2.99 0.71 1,093.58 1.77 1,535.10 2.48 
AZERBAIJAN 65,952 4,226 6.41 4,699 7.12 0.90 460.75 0.74 512.24 0.83 
BAHRAIN 28,777 3,830 13.31 2,749 9.55 1.39 2,996.63 4.84 2,150.68 3.47 
BANGLADESH 128,638 7,809 6.07 10,178 7.91 0.77 50.74 0.08 66.13 0.11 
BELARUS 61,758 8,261 13.38 7,739 12.53 1.07 872.06 1.41 816.89 1.32 
BELGIUM 527,008 15,488 2.94 20,168 3.83 0.77 1,401.95 2.26 1,825.51 2.95 
BENIN 7,814 696 8.90 1,455 18.62 0.48 73.52 0.12 153.75 0.25 
BOLIVIA 23,963 2,257 9.42 2,326 9.71 0.97 223.90 0.36 230.83 0.37 
BOTSWANA 15,683 669 4.27 893 5.69 0.75 326.13 0.53 435.26 0.70 
BRAZIL 2,616,202 55,799 2.13 68,656 2.62 0.81 280.84 0.45 345.55 0.56 
BRUNEI DARUSSALAM 18,525 1,267 6.84 1,255 6.77 1.01 3,216.89 5.19 3,184.31 5.14 
BULGARIA 57,418 7,158 12.47 5,513 9.60 1.30 974.13 1.57 750.18 1.21 
BURKINA FASO 10,724 284 2.65 365 3.40 0.78 17.66 0.03 22.70 0.04 
CAMBODIA 12,830 715 5.57 1,273 9.92 0.56 49.16 0.08 87.54 0.14 
CAMEROON 29,337 862 2.94 1,116 3.81 0.77 42.03 0.07 54.40 0.09 
CANADA 1,788,648 78,467 4.39 76,750 4.29 1.02 2,284.81 3.69 2,234.83 3.61 
CARIBBEAN 101,170 6,151 6.08 7,300 7.22 0.84 266.15 0.43 315.84 0.51 
CHILE 252,252 11,962 4.74 13,413 5.32 0.89 697.38 1.13 781.94 1.26 
CHINA 7,572,554 1,086,166 14.34 899,264 11.88 1.21 808.08 1.30 669.03 1.08 
CHINA, HONG KONG SAR 248,514 12,542 5.05 15,142 6.09 0.83 1,773.64 2.86 2,141.27 3.46 
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COLOMBIA 335,415 10,225 3.05 12,561 3.74 0.81 220.35 0.36 270.67 0.44 
COSTA RICA 42,263 1,064 2.52 1,669 3.95 0.64 231.23 0.37 362.68 0.59 
COTE D'IVOIRE 25,382 947 3.73 1,183 4.66 0.80 45.34 0.07 56.64 0.09 
CROATIA 62,237 2,906 4.67 3,521 5.66 0.83 678.92 1.10 822.47 1.33 
CYPRUS 27,427 2,005 7.31 1,744 6.36 1.15 1,782.77 2.88 1,550.17 2.50 
CZECH REPUBLIC 227,948 15,069 6.61 13,130 5.76 1.15 1,435.69 2.32 1,250.98 2.02 
DENMARK 344,003 9,566 2.78 9,346 2.72 1.02 1,717.26 2.77 1,677.83 2.71 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 57,747 2,920 5.06 3,319 5.75 0.88 291.21 0.47 331.04 0.53 
ECUADOR 79,277 4,610 5.82 5,942 7.50 0.78 303.74 0.49 391.50 0.63 
EGYPT 236,002 26,839 11.37 26,262 11.13 1.02 312.45 0.50 305.74 0.49 
EL SALVADOR 23,139 983 4.25 1,374 5.94 0.72 158.68 0.26 221.82 0.36 
ESTONIA 23,170 2,484 10.72 2,080 8.98 1.19 1,870.98 3.02 1,567.01 2.53 
ETHIOPIA 31,953 1,131 3.54 1,804 5.64 0.63 12.56 0.02 20.03 0.03 
FINLAND 273,674 8,308 3.04 9,936 3.63 0.84 1,541.93 2.49 1,843.94 2.98 
FRANCE 2,862,680 53,681 1.88 73,923 2.58 0.73 821.54 1.33 1,131.31 1.83 
GEORGIA 14,435 994 6.88 1,334 9.24 0.74 256.43 0.41 344.36 0.56 
GERMANY 3,757,698 104,199 2.77 126,065 3.35 0.83 1,298.02 2.10 1,570.41 2.53 
GHANA 39,566 1,744 4.41 2,738 6.92 0.64 69.41 0.11 109.01 0.18 
GREECE 287,798 30,440 10.58 24,461 8.50 1.24 2,741.17 4.42 2,202.76 3.56 
GUATEMALA 47,655 1,580 3.32 2,357 4.95 0.67 105.70 0.17 157.64 0.25 
GUINEA 6,785 139 2.05 401 5.91 0.35 12.60 0.02 36.33 0.06 
HONDURAS 17,710 1,120 6.32 1,333 7.53 0.84 134.08 0.22 159.66 0.26 
HUNGARY 140,782 6,614 4.70 7,500 5.33 0.88 663.26 1.07 752.13 1.21 
INDIA 1,823,050 265,697 14.57 251,665 13.80 1.06 213.03 0.34 201.78 0.33 
INDONESIA 892,969 58,064 6.50 63,876 7.15 0.91 236.31 0.38 259.97 0.42 
IRAN 583,500 72,619 12.45 70,745 12.12 1.03 961.95 1.55 937.13 1.51 
IRELAND 239,019 6,618 2.77 6,094 2.55 1.09 1,445.99 2.33 1,331.55 2.15 
ISRAEL 261,629 10,404 3.98 12,098 4.62 0.86 1,339.70 2.16 1,557.85 2.51 
ITALY 2,276,292 58,432 2.57 75,145 3.30 0.78 984.05 1.59 1,265.51 2.04 
JAMAICA 14,440 1,210 8.38 1,262 8.74 0.96 427.48 0.69 445.99 0.72 
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JAPAN 6,157,460 154,512 2.51 183,623 2.98 0.84 1,208.70 1.95 1,436.43 2.32 
JORDAN 28,840 3,171 11.00 4,220 14.63 0.75 418.68 0.68 557.09 0.90 
KAZAKHSTAN 192,627 37,437 19.44 24,556 12.75 1.52 2,261.16 3.65 1,483.15 2.39 
KENYA 41,953 1,937 4.62 2,713 6.47 0.71 45.58 0.07 63.85 0.10 
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF 1,202,464 75,285 6.26 69,827 5.81 1.08 1,507.60 2.43 1,398.32 2.26 
KUWAIT 154,028 12,557 8.15 10,440 6.78 1.20 3,935.15 6.35 3,271.54 5.28 
KYRGYZSTAN 6,198 1,078 17.39 1,780 28.73 0.61 195.49 0.32 322.86 0.52 
LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 8,749 285 3.25 621 7.10 0.46 44.93 0.07 98.05 0.16 
LATVIA 28,224 1,457 5.16 1,881 6.66 0.77 707.50 1.14 913.11 1.47 
LITHUANIA 43,477 1,691 3.89 2,583 5.94 0.65 558.36 0.90 852.88 1.38 
LUXEMBOURG 60,005 2,358 3.93 2,176 3.63 1.08 4,549.58 7.34 4,198.28 6.78 
MADAGASCAR 9,893 316 3.19 487 4.92 0.65 14.52 0.02 22.38 0.04 
MALAWI 8,003 160 2.00 338 4.22 0.47 10.23 0.02 21.61 0.03 
MALAYSIA 297,952 30,409 10.21 25,204 8.46 1.21 1,061.95 1.71 880.19 1.42 
MALTA 9,505 583 6.14 897 9.44 0.65 1,401.44 2.26 2,155.60 3.48 
MAURITIUS 11,518 780 6.77 953 8.28 0.82 622.55 1.00 761.34 1.23 
MEXICO 1,171,188 63,615 5.43 66,656 5.69 0.95 534.17 0.86 559.71 0.90 
MONGOLIA 10,410 1,901 18.26 2,225 21.37 0.85 688.24 1.11 805.56 1.30 
MOROCCO 101,370 7,545 7.44 8,585 8.47 0.88 229.61 0.37 261.26 0.42 
MOZAMBIQUE 13,131 459 3.50 1,034 7.87 0.44 18.42 0.03 41.46 0.07 
NAMIBIA 12,410 455 3.67 571 4.60 0.80 205.54 0.33 257.61 0.42 
NEPAL 18,914 649 3.43 1,448 7.65 0.45 23.76 0.04 52.97 0.09 
NETHERLANDS 893,757 25,539 2.86 24,935 2.79 1.02 1,529.89 2.47 1,493.71 2.41 
NEW ZEALAND 168,462 4,846 2.88 5,575 3.31 0.87 1,105.48 1.78 1,271.60 2.05 
NICARAGUA 9,774 645 6.60 814 8.33 0.79 111.09 0.18 140.16 0.23 
NIGERIA 411,744 9,666 2.35 14,335 3.48 0.67 59.34 0.10 88.01 0.14 
NORWAY 498,832 9,893 1.98 9,374 1.88 1.06 1,997.25 3.22 1,892.55 3.05 
OMAN 67,937 9,055 13.33 7,267 10.70 1.25 2,797.04 4.51 2,244.77 3.62 
PAKISTAN 213,587 19,551 9.15 21,566 10.10 0.91 112.24 0.18 123.81 0.20 
PANAMA 34,374 3,258 9.48 3,515 10.23 0.93 878.71 1.42 948.01 1.53 
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PARAGUAY 25,100 705 2.81 1,292 5.15 0.55 112.06 0.18 205.26 0.33 
PERU 171,762 6,611 3.85 9,085 5.29 0.73 222.13 0.36 305.28 0.49 
PHILIPPINES 224,143 11,783 5.26 14,715 6.56 0.80 123.67 0.20 154.44 0.25 
POLAND 528,725 43,516 8.23 41,482 7.85 1.05 1,143.25 1.85 1,089.81 1.76 
PORTUGAL 244,895 8,011 3.27 8,673 3.54 0.92 758.79 1.22 821.48 1.33 
PUERTO RICO 100,352 1,662 1.66 2,514 2.50 0.66 451.92 0.73 683.31 1.10 
QATAR 167,775 9,680 5.77 5,746 3.42 1.68 4,959.11 8.00 2,943.47 4.75 
REST OF CENTRAL AFRICA 68,544 1,569 2.29 2,427 3.54 0.65 64.96 0.10 100.52 0.16 
REST OF CENTRAL AMERICA 1,487 39 2.61 66 4.44 0.59 117.78 0.19 200.54 0.32 
REST OF EAST ASIA 36,710 8,685 23.66 6,846 18.65 1.27 343.68 0.55 270.89 0.44 
REST OF EASTERN AFRICA 75,182 2,439 3.24 3,932 5.23 0.62 38.87 0.06 62.66 0.10 
REST OF EASTERN EUROPE 7,015 1,171 16.70 1,515 21.60 0.77 329.06 0.53 425.61 0.69 
REST OF EFTA 20,415 911 4.46 919 4.50 0.99 2,563.46 4.14 2,587.74 4.18 
REST OF EUROPE 100,327 14,128 14.08 12,643 12.60 1.12 1,014.14 1.64 907.57 1.46 
REST OF FORMER SOVIET UNION 81,671 25,206 30.86 22,898 28.04 1.10 595.47 0.96 540.95 0.87 
REST OF NORTH AFRICA 234,718 19,951 8.50 21,760 9.27 0.92 463.83 0.75 505.89 0.82 
REST OF NORTH AMERICA 8,066 281 3.48 545 6.76 0.52 2,313.91 3.73 4,487.86 7.24 
REST OF OCEANA 31,809 1,886 5.93 3,179 9.99 0.59 182.98 0.30 308.45 0.50 
REST OF SOUTH AFRICA CUSTOMS UNION 7,609 178 2.34 302 3.98 0.59 54.10 0.09 91.96 0.15 
REST OF SOUTH AMERICA 6,998 218 3.11 437 6.25 0.50 169.87 0.27 341.33 0.55 
REST OF SOUTH ASIA 22,525 815 3.62 2,177 9.66 0.37 26.45 0.04 70.61 0.11 
REST OF SOUTHEAST ASIA 61,031 1,238 2.03 2,277 3.73 0.54 23.95 0.04 44.06 0.07 
REST OF THE WORLD 0 11 
 
11 
 
1.04 
    
REST OF WESTERN AFRICA 26,508 888 3.35 3,005 11.33 0.30 17.46 0.03 59.08 0.10 
REST OF WESTERN ASIA 269,017 29,674 11.03 35,661 13.26 0.83 347.64 0.56 417.77 0.67 
ROMANIA 185,363 11,728 6.33 12,136 6.55 0.97 582.11 0.94 602.33 0.97 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 2,051,662 225,524 10.99 200,729 9.78 1.12 1,577.53 2.55 1,404.08 2.27 
RWANDA 6,492 173 2.67 257 3.95 0.67 16.46 0.03 24.40 0.04 
SAUDI ARABIA 671,239 54,766 8.16 57,669 8.59 0.95 1,939.44 3.13 2,042.26 3.30 
SENEGAL 14,391 865 6.01 1,099 7.63 0.79 65.05 0.10 82.60 0.13 
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SINGAPORE 275,599 9,904 3.59 10,096 3.66 0.98 1,910.61 3.08 1,947.57 3.14 
SLOVAKIA 98,181 4,114 4.19 5,350 5.45 0.77 762.14 1.23 991.08 1.60 
SLOVENIA 51,291 2,370 4.62 2,689 5.24 0.88 1,154.35 1.86 1,309.66 2.11 
SOUTH AFRICA 416,878 52,695 12.64 38,838 9.32 1.36 1,018.66 1.64 750.79 1.21 
SOUTH CENTRAL AFRICA 127,965 2,584 2.02 4,158 3.25 0.62 28.42 0.05 45.73 0.07 
SPAIN 1,488,067 42,201 2.84 47,658 3.20 0.89 902.84 1.46 1,019.58 1.65 
SRI LANKA 65,293 2,711 4.15 4,246 6.50 0.64 133.74 0.22 209.48 0.34 
SWEDEN 563,110 7,053 1.25 11,454 2.03 0.62 746.41 1.20 1,212.11 1.96 
SWITZERLAND 699,580 6,227 0.89 14,023 2.00 0.44 787.02 1.27 1,772.26 2.86 
TAIWAN 
 
36,649 
 
26,825 
 
1.37 
    
TANZANIA 33,879 1,053 3.11 1,803 5.32 0.58 22.13 0.04 37.91 0.06 
THAILAND 370,819 36,329 9.80 32,449 8.75 1.12 537.97 0.87 480.50 0.78 
TOGO 3,756 321 8.55 626 16.68 0.51 48.09 0.08 93.78 0.15 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 25,433 3,364 13.23 1,619 6.37 2.08 2,520.60 4.07 1,212.81 1.96 
TUNISIA 45,811 3,386 7.39 3,431 7.49 0.99 314.64 0.51 318.80 0.51 
TURKEY 832,546 42,853 5.15 50,192 6.03 0.85 583.75 0.94 683.72 1.10 
UGANDA 20,177 459 2.28 796 3.94 0.58 13.09 0.02 22.67 0.04 
UKRAINE 163,160 37,309 22.87 28,677 17.58 1.30 816.28 1.32 627.41 1.01 
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 350,908 22,681 6.46 32,401 9.23 0.70 2,615.29 4.22 3,736.08 6.03 
UNITED KINGDOM 2,619,700 70,612 2.70 93,869 3.58 0.75 1,116.24 1.80 1,483.89 2.40 
UNITED STATES 15,517,926 766,199 4.94 832,509 5.36 0.92 2,458.42 3.97 2,671.18 4.31 
URUGUAY 47,962 1,050 2.19 1,650 3.44 0.64 310.28 0.50 487.43 0.79 
VENEZUELA 316,482 22,829 7.21 22,803 7.21 1.00 774.82 1.25 773.94 1.25 
VIET NAM 135,539 19,088 14.08 20,015 14.77 0.95 217.25 0.35 227.80 0.37 
ZAMBIA 23,460 288 1.23 615 2.62 0.47 20.22 0.03 43.10 0.07 
ZIMBABWE 12,098 1,430 11.82 1,587 13.12 0.90 99.41 0.16 110.31 0.18 
WORLD 72,642,218 4,322,741 5.95 4,322,741 5.95 1.00 619.56 1.00 619.56 1.00 
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Appendix 5 List of Indicators included in SDG Index (2019) 
Goal Description Data 
SDG 1 No Poverty Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90/day (% population) 
SDG 1 
 
Poverty headcount ratio at $3.20/day (% population) 
SDG 1 
 
Poverty rate after taxes and transfers, Poverty line 50% (% 
population) 
SDG 2 Zero Hunger Prevalence of undernourishment (% population) 
SDG 2 
 
Prevalence of stunting (low height-for-age) in children under 5 
years of age (%) 
SDG 2 
 
Prevalence of wasting in children under 5 years of age (%) 
SDG 2 
 
Prevalence of obesity, BMI ≥ 30 (% adult population) 
SDG 2 
 
Cereal yield (t/ha) 
SDG 2 
 
Sustainable Nitrogen Management Index 
SDG 2 
 
Yield gap closure (%) 
SDG 2 
 
Human Trophic Level (best 2 - 3 worst) 
SDG 3 Good Health & Wellbeing Maternal mortality rate (per 100,000 live births)  
SDG 3 
 
Neonatal mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 
SDG 3 
 
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000 live births) 
SDG 3 
 
Incidence of tuberculosis (per 100,000 population) 
SDG 3 
 
New HIV infections (per 1,000) 
SDG 3 
 
Age-standardised death rate due to cardiovascular disease, 
cancer, diabetes, and chronic respiratory disease in 
populations age 30–70 years (per 100,000 population) 
SDG 3 
 
Age-standardised death rate attributable to household air 
pollution and ambient air pollution (per 100,000 population) 
SDG 3 
 
Traffic deaths rate (per 100,000 population) 
SDG 3 
 
Life Expectancy at birth (years) 
SDG 3 
 
Adolescent fertility rate (births per 1,000 women ages 15-19) 
SDG 3 
 
Births attended by skilled health personnel (%) 
SDG 3 
 
Percentage of surviving infants who received 2 WHO-
recommended vaccines (%) 
SDG 3 
 
Universal Health Coverage Tracer Index (0-100) 
SDG 3 
 
Subjective Wellbeing (average ladder score, 0-10) 
SDG 3 
 
Gap in life expectancy at birth among regions (years) 
SDG 3 
 
Gap in self-reported health by income (0-100) 
SDG 3 
 
Daily smokers (% population age 15+) 
SDG 4 Quality Education Net primary enrolment rate (%) 
SDG 4 
 
Lower secondary completion rate (%) 
SDG 4 
 
Literacy rate of 15-24 year olds, both sexes (%) 
SDG 4 
 
Enrollment in early childhood learning program (% ages 4-6) 
SDG 4 
 
Population age 25-34 with tertiary education (%) 
SDG 4 
 
PISA score (0-600) 
SDG 4 
 
Percentage of variation in science performance explained by 
students' socio-economic status 
SDG 4 
 
Students performing below level 2 in science (%) 
SDG 4 
 
Resilient students (%) 
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SDG 5  Gender Equality Demand for family planning satisfied by modern methods (% 
women married or in unions, ages 15-49) 
SDG 5  
 
Ratio of female to male mean years of schooling of population 
age 25 and above  
SDG 5  
 
Ratio of female to male labour force participation rate 
SDG 5  
 
Seats held by women in national parliaments (%) 
SDG 5  
 
Gender wage gap (Total, % male median wage) 
SDG 5  
 
Gender gap in minutes spent per day doing unpaid work 
(minutes) 
SDG 6 Clean Water Population using at least basic drinking water services (%) 
SDG 6 
 
Population using at least basic sanitation services (%) 
SDG 6 
 
Freshwater withdrawal as % total renewable water resources 
SDG 6 
 
Imported groundwater depletion (m3/year/capita) 
SDG 6 
 
Anthropogenic wastewater that receives treatment (%) 
SDG 6 
 
Population using safely managed water services (%) 
SDG 6 
 
Population using safely managed sanitation services (%) 
SDG 7 Affordable & Clean Energy Access to electricity (% population) 
SDG 7 
 
Access to clean fuels & technology for cooking (% population) 
SDG 7 
 
CO2 emissions from fuel combustion / electricity output 
(MtCO2/TWh) 
SDG 7 
 
Share of renewable energy in total final energy consumption 
(%) 
SDG 8 Decent Work & Economic Growth Adjusted Growth (%) 
SDG 8 
 
Prevalence of Modern Slavery (victims per 1,000 population) 
SDG 8 
 
Adults (15 years and older) with an account at a bank or other 
financial institution or with a mobile-money-service provider 
(%) 
SDG 8 
 
Unemployment rate (% total labor force) 
SDG 8 
 
Fatal work-related accidents embodied in imports (deaths per 
100,000) 
SDG 8 
 
Employment-to-Population ratio (%) 
SDG 8 
 
Youth not in employment, education or training (NEET) (%) 
SDG 9 Industry, Innovation & Manufacturing Population using the internet (%) 
SDG 9 
 
Mobile broadband subscriptions (per 100 inhabitants) 
SDG 9 
 
Logistics performance index: Quality of trade and transport-
related infrastructure (1=low to 5=high) 
SDG 9 
 
The Times Higher Education Universities Ranking : Average 
score of top 3 universities (0-100) 
SDG 9 
 
Number of scientific and technical journal articles (per 1,000 
population) 
SDG 9 
 
Research and development expenditure (% GDP) 
SDG 9 
 
Research and development researchers (per 1,000 employed) 
SDG 9 
 
Triadic Patent Families filed (per million population) 
SDG 9 
 
Gap in internet access by income (%) 
SDG 9 
 
Women in science and engineering (%) 
SDG 10 Reduced Inequality Gini Coefficient adjusted for top income (1-100) 
SDG 10 
 
Palma ratio 
SDG 10 
 
Elderly Poverty Rate (%) 
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SDG 11 Sustainable Cities & Communities Annual mean concentration of particulate matter of less than 
2.5 microns of diameter (PM2.5) (μg/m3) 
SDG 11 
 
Improved water source, piped (% urban population with 
access) 
SDG 11 
 
Satisfaction with public transport (%) 
SDG 11 
 
Rent overburden rate (%) 
SDG 12 Sustaonable Consumption & Production Municipal Solid Waste (kg/day/capita) 
SDG 12 
 
E-waste generated (kg/capita) 
SDG 12 
 
Production-based SO2 emissions (kg/capita) 
SDG 12 
 
Imported SO2 emissions (kg/capita)  
SDG 12 
 
Nitrogen production footprint (kg/capita) 
SDG 12 
 
Net imported emissions of reactive nitrogen (kg/capita) 
SDG 12 
 
Non-Recycled Municipal Solid Waste (kg/day/capita) 
SDG 13 Climate Action Energy-related CO2 emissions per capita (tCO2/capita) 
SDG 13 
 
Imported CO2 emissions, technology-adjusted (tCO2/capita) 
SDG 13 
 
People affected by climate-related disasters (per 100,000 
population) 
SDG 13 
 
CO2 emissions embodied in fossil fuel exports (kg/capita) 
SDG 13 
 
Effective Carbon Rate from all non-road energy, excluding 
emissions from biomass (€/tCO2) 
SDG 14 Life Below Water Mean area that is protected in marine sites important to 
biodiversity (%)  
SDG 14 
 
Ocean Health Index Goal - Clean Waters (0-100) 
SDG 14 
 
Percentage of Fish Stocks overexploited or collapsed by EEZ 
(%) 
SDG 14 
 
Fish caught by trawling (%) 
SDG 15 Life on Land Mean area that is protected in terrestrial sites important to 
biodiversity (%) 
SDG 15 
 
Mean area that is protected in freshwater sites important to 
biodiversity (%) 
SDG 15 
 
Red List Index of species survival (0-1) 
SDG 15 
 
Permanent Deforestation (5 year average annual %) 
SDG 15 
 
Imported biodiversity threats (threats per million population) 
SDG 16 Peace, Justics & Strong Institutions Homicides (per 100,000 population) 
SDG 16 
 
Unsentenced detainees (%) 
SDG 16 
 
Proportion of the population who feel safe walking alone at 
night in the city or area where they live (%) 
SDG 16 
 
Property Rights (1-7) 
SDG 16 
 
Birth registrations with civil authority, children under 5 years 
of age (%) 
SDG 16 
 
Corruption Perception Index (0-100) 
SDG 16 
 
Children 5–14 years old involved in child labour (%) 
SDG 16 
 
Transfers of major conventional weapons (exports) (constant 
1990 US$ million per 100,000 population) 
SDG 16 
 
Freedom of Press Index (best 0 - 100 worst) 
SDG 16 
 
Prison Population (per 100,000 people) 
SDG 17 Partnerships for the Goals Government Health and Education spending (% GDP) 
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SDG 17 
 
For high-income and all OECD DAC countries: International 
concessional public finance, including official development 
assistance (% GNI) 
SDG 17 
 
Other countries : Government Revenue excluding Grants (% 
GDP) 
SDG 17 
 
Tax Haven Score (best 0-5 worst) 
SDG 17 
 
Financial Secrecy Score (best 0-100 worst) 
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Appendix 6 Component loadings for all 17 Principal Components (Eigenvalues) 
SDG PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 PC8 PC9 PC10 PC11 PC12 PC13 PC14 PC15 PC16 PC17 UNEXPLAINED  
SDG1 0.28 -0.15 0.05 0.19 0.05 0.07 -0.46 0.03 -0.09 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.52 -0.04 -0.34 0.47 -0.04 0 
SDG2 0.24 0.25 -0.20 0.16 0.13 0.25 0.15 -0.50 0.25 0.44 -0.25 -0.03 0.17 -0.27 -0.08 -0.20 -0.02 0 
SDG3 0.32 -0.07 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.02 -0.12 0.10 -0.07 -0.12 0.02 -0.10 -0.11 -0.02 -0.26 -0.36 0.79 0 
SDG4 0.29 -0.02 0.16 0.19 -0.02 0.02 -0.13 -0.05 0.20 0.30 0.10 0.34 -0.69 0.15 0.02 0.29 -0.01 0 
SDG5 0.25 0.20 0.22 -0.14 -0.04 -0.13 0.54 0.03 -0.46 0.24 0.21 0.32 0.19 0.21 -0.16 -0.03 0.00 0 
SDG6 0.30 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.08 -0.19 -0.08 0.07 0.07 -0.66 0.02 0.59 0.21 0.01 -0.11 0 
SDG7 0.29 -0.08 0.21 0.18 0.19 -0.07 -0.32 -0.05 -0.24 -0.16 0.06 0.24 0.02 -0.16 0.31 -0.55 -0.35 0 
SDG8 0.25 0.25 -0.04 0.15 -0.25 0.14 0.22 -0.05 0.41 -0.52 0.50 0.02 0.07 -0.05 -0.07 -0.01 -0.13 0 
SDG9 0.30 0.06 -0.17 -0.09 0.00 -0.09 0.10 -0.20 -0.15 -0.30 -0.26 0.16 0.08 -0.13 0.58 0.41 0.29 0 
SDG10 0.12 -0.20 -0.70 -0.13 0.07 0.37 -0.01 0.17 -0.28 0.14 0.36 0.01 -0.13 -0.03 0.09 -0.03 -0.08 0 
SDG11 0.27 -0.06 0.27 0.05 -0.12 0.09 0.20 0.56 0.06 0.24 -0.04 -0.36 0.01 -0.47 0.21 0.10 -0.07 0 
SDG12 -0.29 -0.01 0.15 0.23 0.11 0.25 -0.02 0.13 0.24 0.25 0.28 0.22 0.33 0.25 0.48 -0.07 0.32 0 
SDG13 -0.16 0.30 -0.02 0.63 0.29 0.29 0.16 0.18 -0.32 -0.24 -0.22 -0.06 -0.14 0.08 -0.10 0.12 -0.04 0 
SDG14 -0.01 0.50 0.26 -0.51 -0.03 0.55 -0.32 0.05 -0.09 -0.06 -0.06 0.04 -0.06 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0 
SDG15 0.05 0.54 -0.23 -0.09 0.47 -0.50 -0.17 0.28 0.17 0.10 0.16 -0.04 0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0 
SDG16 0.28 -0.07 -0.20 -0.09 -0.06 0.09 0.07 0.42 0.31 -0.08 -0.51 0.25 0.14 0.42 -0.05 -0.16 -0.15 0 
SDG17 0.08 -0.35 0.23 -0.27 0.74 0.18 0.27 -0.08 0.19 -0.18 0.07 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.10 0.09 -0.02 0 
% OF TOTAL VARIANCE 52.00 9.15 7.28 6.01 5.62 3.91 3.42 2.74 2.15 1.88 1.60 1.21 0.95 0.78 0.51 0.45 0.33 100% 
 
Appendix 5 Component loadings describe the weight of each variable on each principal component. The last row indicates the share of original total variance described by 
each component. 
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Appendix 7 Scree plot of PCA on 17 SDG Index Scores 
 
Appendix 6 shows a scree plot of Eigenvalues against the number of principal components. Eigenvalues greater than 
1 (above the red line) describe 74.44% of original variance. The figure shows that between 1 and 4 components are 
sufficient. 
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